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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis identifies that there has been a change within inter-Arab relations since 
the Kuwait Crisis in 1990-91. It asserts that the ensuing crisis unravelled the Arab 
system and brought about an end to the discourse of pan-Arab nationalism. 
Moreover, this crisis served to bring out the real discourse within inter-Arab 
relations: only the state's self-interest determines the foreign policy of Arab states, 
not their belonging to Arab institutions or an Arab nation. 
However, as I shall argue, despite the continuous presence of the Arab League, the 
Arab system was diminished by the KC. In this context, two parallel issues 
demonstrate the diminishing of the system: one is the marginalisation of Iraq, and the 
other is the peace process between the Arab states and Israel. In both cases, the 
United States has acted as the 'powerful regulator' which has determined the Stand 
der Dinge (order of things) of the region. 
This thesis will also argue that Arab states in both cases had no choice but to 
conform to regional mechanisms determining the dynamics of the two 
aforementioned developments. The presence of the United States in the region was 
demonstrated by the ousting of Iraq from Kuwait, since which time the United States 
has become the main actor and a regional unit in the emerging system. However, for 
the US to remain so and to keep its interest in the region safe, it has had to rely solely 
on force. 
This thesis, therefore, will illustrate the nature of the new Middle East regional 
system, showing that the structure of the emerging Middle East system since 1990 
has been dominated by the use of force. Iraq invaded Kuwait by force, it was ousted 
from there by force; the sanctions on Iraq were kept in place by force, and the Israeli 
occupation of Arab lands remains by force. Finally, the system was brought into full 
consolidation by force demonstrated by the Operation Iraqi Freedom in March-April 
2003. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Introduction 
The first issue the student encounters while conducting research on the Middle East is 
the voluminous works on the region. The problem then is where to start, to determine 
what is relevant and what is not. Once it has been decided what is relevant to the 
subject, the student remains hostage to any abrupt changes in the region which could 
affect the steering of the research. 
The issues examined in this study are directed at filling a gap in the knowledge within 
the academic discipline which focuses on the Middle East. However, this study does not 
offer a 'where we are now' perspective on the ME, nor does it offer one of 'where we 
are going'; instead, it offers a critique constituted in the form a question - that is, 
whether there is an Arab system that governs inter-Arab relations since the Kuwait 
Crisis. The answer offered to this question will be a resounding 'no' and, although the 
primary discussion focuses on the 'system', the concept of 'order' is also frequently 
underlined because, as I will argue, a system can be said to be in ful l formation only 
when an order has been formed. 
However, the subject I have chosen to write on is primarily dependent on the entire 
regional order. This means that unforeseen events such as the death, or illness, or 
assassination of a leader would not have an effect on the conduct of my study. The war 
on Iraq, which occurred whilst I was conducting the last weeks of my research, was 
fully anticipated in my study, however. Even at the very onset of the research, the basic 
premise of my argument was that conflict and the use of force are the main mechanisms 
for viewing Middle East politics. The war on Iraq therefore slipped easily into this 
paradigm. 
The contribution of this thesis is, therefore, its attempt to offer a better understanding of 
how the Arab states in the ME have been fitting into a wider Middle East system whilst 
their 'Arab' system was diminishing. 
Hypothesis 
The central hypothesis of this research is that the Arab system began to diminish after 
the KC. Inter-Arab relations were affected by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as Arab 
states were divided into two camps - those for and those against the invasion. This rift 
continued throughout the 1990s. I argue that after the Second Gulf War, however, the 
ME became galvanised by the United States' powerful presence in the region. Within 
this galvanisation, a wider ME system was in the process of consolidation. It was fully 
consolidated by the war on Iraq, which has demonstrated the American strong hand in 
this region. Nevertheless, since the onset of the crisis, Realpolitik directed Arab states' 
foreign policies, which helped their integration in the wider ME system. 
Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis has been organised into five chapters, the first four chapters of which build 
the ground for the fif th and last chapter of the thesis. 
Chapter one unveils the tools of analysis upon which the entire study is built in order to 
define its terms. Theories of international relations are offered in order to define the 
variety of approaches to the study of the international system. Specifically, however, 
Pluralism, Globalism, Realism and Neo-Realism are the theories taken into 
consideration here, since each of these theories has a vision of the International System. 
Following this, the concept of power is defined, since this concept constitutes the comer 
stone of the entire study. 
Another concept defined in this chapter is that of 'region'. The ME is not taken merely 
to be an abstract concept. Rather, it is considered in terms of a specific political 
framework and interactions across the units in the region branch from this framework. 
The concept of Foreign Policy is therefore also defined in order to reach an 
understanding of the environment within which foreign policy is conducted. 
Finally, the chapter defines basic concepts that are used repeatedly throughout this 
study, such as that of the state, the Arab state, nationalism and the leader of the state. 
In the final section of the chapter, there is provided a broad theoretical background to 
the driving force behind Arab states' interactions. The framework for analysis offered in 
this chapter is therefore one which promotes Neo-Realism as the theory which provides 
the founding stone of this research. 
Chapter two supports this theoretical framework by providing a literature survey and 
forming a background to facilitate an understanding of inter-Arab relations. To this end, 
it takes the concept system as a measuring stick, examining literature produced in the 
context of the period before the Kuwait Crisis. It was deemed appropriate to look at the 
period from the end of the Second Ward War to the Kuwait Crisis. 
The Impact of the Kuwait Crisis on the Arab Region Order 
My research has suggested that the crisis left an impact on the regional order in the ME 
in which it shaped the whole period of the 1990s and beyond. Chapter Three, therefore, 
is designed to identify the full impact of the crisis on this regional order. However, as 
this study is based on theoretical premises, it is also appropriate to question the impact 
of this crisis on the international order. A section of this chapter is therefore set out for 
this specific purpose, added to by another in which I discuss the United States' role and 
profit from the crisis. 
The first question posed in this chapter is whether there has been a change in the Arab 
order or not. It asks whether the crisis constituted a cut-off point in inter-Arab relations 
or whether it was merely a part of a continuing pattern of Arab behaviour? In this 
context, the concept of order is taken into consideration when questioning the causes 
and circumstances that could trigger change in an existing order. 
However, the ultimate issue of concern in this chapter is whether the crisis created a 
new Arab regional order or helped to prolong an existing order. The chapter deals with 
pan-Arabism and Arab security in order to answer the question. The hypothesis of this 
research proffers that the crisis further prolonged an existing order because it further 
fragmented the Arabs. What happened on security matters is that it took Arab security 
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out of their own hands and placed it into the hands of the United States. It is therefore 
argued that galvanisation guarantees security - in specific terms, the American presence 
in the region hindered further attacks of an Arab state against another. Furthermore, it 
helped to stop the Arab Muzayadah (outbidding), by putting the ultimate decision on 
regional matters firmly into the hands of the United States. 
The Nature of Inter-Arab Politics since 1990 
Three issues are discussed in further detail in this chapter: first, the marginalisation of 
Iraq throughout the 1990s and how Arab states dealt with it; secondly, the peace process 
and finally, the al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Following Iraq's ousting from Kuwait, its future fell into the hands of the United States. 
The sanctions imposed upon Iraq were both economic and political. Their political 
significance lies in the demonstration of how the United States continues to increase its 
grip on the region. It is true that just as economic sanctions have had a hugely negative 
impact on the Iraqi people and on the Iraqi regime, so too political sanctions have had 
an effect upon the entire Arab states in the region. The hypothesis of this thesis is that 
while marginalising Iraq, the United States' foreign policy orientation in the region took 
a firm track. This chapter demonstrates that the fact that other Arab states obeyed the 
will of the United States not to approach Iraq at any cost, gave the United States' role a 
discursive meaning. 
Furthermore, parallel to the marginalisation of Iraq, the peace process was initiated. 
Arab states now had no choice but to scramble to make peace deals with Israel since 
within peace with Israel, Arab states found political refuge. Israel is a strong regional 
power; the United States is the faithful ally of Israel, and the main profit from 
peacemaking is that those regimes that make peace with Israel are likely to be 
considered as moderate and non-reactionary. Arab states, therefore, were getting weaker 
and weaker everyday. Within the emerging system they were put on the periphery of 
that system, based on their regional political performance. Arab states no longer 
demonstrated any power; therefore, their regional role was marginal. 
As I argue in this chapter, the increasingly marginal role of the Arab states was cleariy 
demonstrated when the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out. The imbalance of power in the 
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region led to the failure of the peace process. The al-Aqsa Intifada was a symptom of 
the failure of the peace process, which in turn was the outcome of the imbalance of 
power. Arab states were helpless in the face of Israeli force and the re-invasion of 
Palestinian lands. Trying to rescue what remained from their static status, Arab states 
gathered in a summit in Beirut to denounce the Israeli action against the Palestinians. 
This however was marked by a new peace initiative which was presented by the Saudi 
Crown Prince offering Israel full normalisation of relations with Israel when Israel 
withdraws from Arab lands. However, as this chapter also maintains, the normal 
relation between Israel and Arab states is conflictual; therefore, it is not normal to have 
peace based on the terms of the regional order which is governed by the certain balance 
of power. 
The New Middle East System 
Chapter Five discusses the absence of an Arab system which could govern inter-Arab 
relations. It also examines the newly emerged wider Middle East system within which 
Arab states have become integrated. 
The absence of an Arab political weight in the region has left Arab states marginalised 
and helpless in the face of the regional challenges. Arab states can no longer act a as 
body politique: the Arab League is weak. The peace process has failed to bring any 
peaceful changes to the participating parties, and the al-Aqsa Intifada has been reduced 
to scattered actions. Israeli forces have re-occupied the Palestinian land, marginalised 
the Palestinian leader and carried on with the building of settlements. Finally, the war 
on Iraq took place and brought to a conclusion the KC. 
In this chapter, however, I will assert that the actual conclusion of the KC is the 
emerged Middle East system which was initiated at the onset of the crisis within a 
process of consolidation. The political developments which were discussed in the first 
section of the thesis therefore serve to demonstrate this process. 
The most salient features of the new emerging system are, however, in the form of the 
security dilemma that has come to be the feature of the system; inter-Arab states' rivalry 
for regional hegemony has been reduced. The galvanisation of the region has levelled 
Egypt with Kuwait and Jordan with Syria. The power of an Arab state is irrelevant in 
the face of the American powerful presence in the region. I argue, therefore, that the 
security dilemma for Arab states, although within galvanisation, is that they feel 
protected. However, as the system is based on self-help mechanisms, Arab states 
become concerned about how to cope with the overall power of the United States and 
Israel. 
The chapter then proceeds to demonstrate how this concern has dominated Arab states' 
foreign policy since 1990. Therefore, while Arab states were automatically 
amalgamating within the new emerging wider Middle East system, they kept part of 
their pre-Kuwait Crisis heritage, which is their Arabism - more precisely, the fact of 
their being Arab states. With the remaining Palestinian problem unsolved, and the 
breakout of al-Aqsa Intifada, the failure of the peace process was confirmed. As a result, 
the Arab states kept holding Arab League conferences to condemn Israel for its 
continuous occupation of Arab land and to push for inter-Arab cooperation. 
The events of 9/11 served to reinforce the American grip on the region. The United 
States declared its war on terrorism and George W Bush declared that those who are not 
with the United States are against it. Arab states, however, were already with the United 
States, based on the systemic settings of the region. The United States is a regional 
player with the status of being an 'absolute' power. Therefore, the behaviour of Arab 
states was based on self-interest - mainly the survival of the regime. In this way, the 
war on Iraq confirmed to Arab states that there is no possibility of 'messing around' 
with Washington. Thus, force became the most salient feature of the structure of the 
new system. This chapter therefore culminates with demonstration of how the Middle 
East system came to the point of consolidation with the war on Iraq in March-April 
2003. 
V I 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Tools of Analysis 
Introduction 
An examination of the regional politics of the Arab states of the ME requires a 
consideration of the type and behaviour of those states and the dynamics of the system 
within which they operate. As the ME evolved, increased attention has been given to the 
regional dynamics that have shaped the behaviour of the units of that region. However, 
Arab states of the ME operate on two levels of interaction: regional and global. In order 
to identify the attributes of these interactions, it will first be necessary to clarify the 
conceptual tools which will be used throughout this study. This first chapter, therefore, 
will aim to identify and theorise the primary concepts utilised in the main body of this 
study. 
The first concept needing to be defined in order to build up a definite theoretical and 
conceptual framework is that of 'system'. This will entail an analysis of the main 
schools of thought which consider or discuss the system. The primary focus, therefore, 
will be on Globalism, Pluralism, and Realism. These schools of thought have now 
received widespread acceptance within the study and teaching of international relations. 
Michael Banks (1985) claims that the study of international relations has become 
focused on three main paradigmatic approaches: Realism (and its adjunct, Neo-Realism), 
Pluralism and Structuralism (alternatively known as Globalism).' However, this will be 
followed by an examination of the neo-Realist approach to the study of the system. The 
second step will be to define the concept of 'region' and its relationship with the 
concept of'system'. 
' Cited in Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enole as promoted in "Questions about Identity in International 
Relations," in K. Booth, & S. Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge- Polity 
Press, 1997), p. 294. • y 
The concept 'order' is also considered. This study sees a difference between the concept 
system and the concept 'order'. In this chapter, I shall clarify the difference which will 
help explaining my study. 
DeHning the concept of 'galvanisation' 
'Galvanisation' is a key concept that is applied throughout this study. It is borrowed 
from physics where it means a galvanised iron or steel which has been coated with a 
layer of zinc to protect it from corrosion. Galvanising is an effective method of 
protecting steel, because even i f the surface is scratched, the zinc still protects the 
underlying metal.^ The concept of 'galvanisation', therefore, is used in this study to 
indicate how Arab states have become coated by the American presence and American 
power in the region. The thesis is to emphasise how Arab states are encapsulated by the 
influence which the United States exerts on the region. 
Defining the International System 
In international relations the 'system' refers to a set of interactions and interrelations 
across the units which make up the system. Therefore, perspectives alter according to 
views on what constitutes 'the system'. A group of states form an international system 
when the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others.^ S. 
Hoffman notes that the international system is a pattern of relations among the basic 
units of world politics.'* An international system as a whole represents the premise that 
the 'whole' comes first and then the parts. This approach, therefore, assumes that the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts, and that the behaviour and even the construction 
of the parts are shaped and moulded by structures embodied within the system itself.^ 
2 
Definition is borrowed from Dictionary of Physics, edited by Alan Isaacs, (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996)p, 160 
' Bull, H. &Watson, A., (eds.) The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), pp. 26-45. 
See Stanley Hoffmann, "International System and International Law," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney 
Verba, (eds.), The International System (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 207-
211. 
5 
Buzan, B., 'The Levels of Analysis: Problems in International Relations Reconsidered," in K. Booth & 
S. Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 200. 
For Bull, the international system is formed when two or more states have sufficient 
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause 
them to behave - at least in some measure - as parts of a whole.^ Furthermore, Raymond 
Aron defines the international system as the ensemble constituted by political units 
which maintain regular relations with each other and which are all capable of being 
implicated in a generalised war7 Thus, it is considered to be a system because it is the 
sum of these interactions which is most crucial to the concept itself. 
However, interactions among the units are also stipulative because they are international; 
states that behave contradictory to the rules of the system are therefore rejected from its 
structure.* Thus, interactions between units are not based on values founded on moral 
norms or religious faith: they are based on the structure of the system itself.^ In sum, 
Waltz defines the system as "...composed of a structure and of interacting units. The 
structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as 
a whole."'" 
Defining the concept of 'order': the 'Arab Order' 
This study defines of order as a pattern of behaviour. A study by R. D. McKinlay and 
Richard Little suggests that order is seen as a combination of what they call 'pattern' 
and 'goal satisfaction'. " I f order is a pattern then disorder is a deviation from a pattern, 
of course"." Similar to this argument is that of Bull, whose work is the most influential 
on the concept of order, he wrote: 
^ Bull, H., The Anarchic Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colombia University 
Press, 1977), pp. 9-10. 
' Aron, R., Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. R. Howard & A. Baker (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962), p. 49. 
The best example of a state whose behaviour was considered as not adhering to the rules of the 
international system was Iraq which had sanctions imposed on it in order to bring it back to what is 
called the international order. 
One might think of inter-churches' relations as religious system. The structure of these relations must 
be religious. There must be enough religious ground on which interactions take place, and the 
outcomes of these interactions must be religious. 
8 
9 
10 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, (Reading MA.: 1979), p. 79. 
Cited in Rengger, N. J., International Relations. Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond 
International Relations Theory, (London, New York: Routledge 2000), p. 18. See R. D. McKinlay & 
Richard Little, Global Problems and World Order (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). 
By world order I mean those patterns of dispositions of human 
activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life 
among mankind as a whole. International order is order among 
states: but states are simply groupings of men, and men may be 
grouped in such a way that they do not form states at all.'^ 
Remarkably, Bull separated the 'international order' from the 'world order'. The 
international order for bull is a pattern of behaviour supportive of the society of states, 
and the world order is a pattern of behaviour supportive of human social life. My study 
is concerned with the concept of the international order. The definition of concept of 
'order' is thus relevant in understanding the concept Arab order. 
However, Bull extends the discussion by maintaining that in all societies, order is a 
pattern of behaviour that sustains the elementary or primary goals of social life. Order in 
this context is maintained by a sense of common interests in those elementary or 
primary goals, rules by which prescribe the pattern of behaviour that sustains them, and 
by institutions which make these rules effective.Furthermore, the maintenance of 
order in any society presupposes that among its members, or at least among those of its 
members who are politically active, there should be a sense of common interests in the 
elementary goals of social life.''* 
In this case, the difference between the 'concept system' and that of 'order' is obvious 
in the way in which there is no common interest in the international system to be seen, 
but there is an interest. Each unit of the system seeks to secure its own interest, which in 
turn, negates the idea of a common interest. 
It must therefore be understood then that there are two views on order: firstly, that order 
refers to a relationship between states, and secondly, that order refers to a condition of 
humanity as a whole. I shall argue in my study that 'order' is a condition of the 
relationship between states when it is a pattern of behaviour which ultimately is 
governed by a common interest in a given region. Within order, there is a certain degree 
of common interest. Furthermore, as Hall and Paul put it, 'order' is a term that carries 
12 
Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics Q^ndon: Palgrave, 1977), p. 19. 
" Ibid., p. 51. 
" Ibid., p. 51 
normative and ideological connotations, as it bears particular conceptions about how 
social, political, and economic systems are and ought to be structured.'^ 
The system is therefore buttressed by anarchy, where an order is reinforced by the 
pattern of behaviour which states share. The reason Arab states make the most poignant 
example of this is: 
Since the KC, the Arab system ended, but an Arab 'order' remained as the common 
character by which to distinguish a collective Arab politics in the ME. The Arab 'order' 
means the pattern of behaviour which characterises Arab states. Arab states are 
members of the Arab league. They tend to hold the same summits, and these summits 
have almost the same framework over again. Arab states also have rivalry with an 
unchanging character of the relationship between these states. Therefore, based on what 
is discussed in this section, there is a condition in the relationship between Arab states: 
they are states with the same cultural heritage and their co-operation in the political 
sphere results in a regional Arab political order. This condition became a political 
practice over time. That is the Arab 'order'. 
Theoretical Approaches to the Study of the System in International Relations 
It is a difficult task to place the great diversity of analytical approaches within 
international politics into neat categories. Within this diversity lies what I will refer to 
as the 'critical point'- that is, what can be considered as the 'saturation' point or the 
limit to which a school of thought has been able to provide the ultimate and the best 
configuration of analyses of international politics. However, the more the study of 
international politics develops, the less likely there is to be a 'saturation' point, simply 
because theories change and develop along with international political developments 
themselves. 
Having said this, there are nevertheless some fundamental ideas within the study of 
international politics, and it remains the case that all schools of thought have had 
something to contribute to the understanding of international relations. It is therefore 
expedient at this point to define some of the basic tenets of the approaches represented 
T.V. Paul and J. Hall, "Introduction," in T.V. Paul and J. Hall, (eds.). International Order and the 
Future of World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), p. 2 
by these schools of thought and the ways in which they help to clarify a better 
understanding of the system. 
Pluralism 
Lying at the heart of the Pluralist approach to the study of international relations is the 
liberal political philosophy, which emphasises co-operation and peace rather than 
conflict. Liberalism holds that human nature is essentially good, something which helps 
to make progress possible. In Pluralism, the causes of war lie in corrupt social 
institutions and the misunderstandings among leaders. It holds that war or any other 
aggressive actions can be moderated through institutional reforms and inter-state co-
operation. 
In the case of co-operation across states, liberals are more optimistic than the Realists. 
Liberals see in the spread of democratic political systems, the expanded range of 
international economy, extensive scope of international organisations reasons for 
harmony in inter-state relations. They also render war an unacceptable form of interstate 
relations. 
In Pluralist thinking, the state-as-actor plays a minimal role. Pluralists have adopted an 
interest-group approach to decision-making that reveals the procedures by which 
foreign policy is made: decisions are the outcome of a complex inter-play between 
different agencies of government, organisations, pressure groups and sub-state actors. 
Therefore, the interactions across these units do not constitute a structure but a process. 
Nye and Keohane'^ have described the international system as an interdependent system 
in which the different actors are sensitive and vulnerable to the actions of others.'^ 
Pluralists, however, regard the system a process by which the actors learn from their 
interactions. Pluralists, therefore, conceptualise the system in three different ways. 
" Robert Keohane developed the idea of Neo-liberal institutionalism, which is a theory that shares 
concepts with liberal and neo-Realist approaches. Neo-liberal institutionalism attempts to understand 
the nature of international co-operation and stresses the importance of institutions which are 
constructed by states to facilitate mutually beneficial policy co-ordination among governments. See 
Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 
1989), p. 10. 
" Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition (Boston & 
Toronto: Little Brown, 1977), pp. 20-25. 
(i) For some of them, the International System is merely the sum of the 
foreign policies of all states — and they tend to emphasise the role of 
specific bureaucracies and pressure groups in the formulation of foreign 
policy. 
(ii) Other Pluralists view the system as the sum of foreign policies plus the 
activities of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, 
international banks, and transitional interest groups. 
(iii) Certain Pluralists include all the previously mentioned elements in their 
definition of a system but add all other types of transactions such as ideas, 
values, communications, trade patterns, and financial flows. 18 
Realists, for example, would argue that there is no complete analysis of world politics 
unless the anarchical structure of the international system is taken into account. For 
Pluralists, however, regimes, international organisations, and other organisations serve 
to alleviate the effects of anarchy. That is to say, they behave to create mutual restraint 
and to create trust amongst states. Therefore, the more these organisations are engaged, 
the more the trust will prevail amongst states and the greater the overall level of 
stability'^ will be in international relations. 
In sum, the Pluralist image of international relations is based on four main 
assumptions:^^ 
i) Non-state actors are important; 
ii) The state is not a unitary actor; 
i i i) The state is not a rational actor; 
iv) The agenda of intentional politics is extensive. 
Viotti, P. R. & M. V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism, Globalism, 2d ed. 
(Toronto and New York: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 245-246. 
" Deutsch and Signer defined 'stability' as the probability that the system retains all of its essential 
characteristics, that no single nation becomes dominant, that most of its members continue to survive, 
and that large-scale war does not occur. And from the more limited perspective of the individual 
nations, stability would refer to the probability of their continued political independence and territorial 
integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a 'war of survival'.' Karl 
Deutsch and David Singer, 'Multiple Power Systems and International Stability', World Politics 16 
(April, 1964), 390-91. 
Globalism 
The Globalist perspective of international relations is embodied in the Marxist analysis 
of world politics, which is preoccupied particularly with the analysis of the global 
political economy. For Globalists, to understand the international system is to 
understand the development of global economic, political and social processes. Viotti 
and Kauppi, for example, have identified four essential assumptions of the literature of 
Globalism.^' The first is about the understanding of the global context within which 
states and other national and international actors function. As I have pointed out, the 
behaviour of individual states can be understood only by understanding the structure of 
the international system. In this context, whereas Neo-Realists define the international 
system in terms of structure and the political power of interacting states, Globalists seek 
to explain the structure itself. They claim that the central regulating force within and 
behind the system is not anarchy but the existing capitalist world-economy. Therefore, 
the second assumption of the Globalist vision is guided by the importance of historical 
analysis: that is, of course, a focus on the rise of capitalism. 
These two assumptions are central to Wallerstein's analysis of 'world system's theory'. 
For example, for Wallerstein, 'the absence of a single political authority makes it 
impossible for anyone to legislate the general will of the world-system and hence to 
curtail the capitalist mode of production.'^^ Consequently, the central site of effect of 
the system is the structure of world economy. Wallerstein's analysis examines a three-
layered structure ~ a core, a periphery and semi-periphery^^-- in which the countries of 
the core are the dominant forces which undertake an appropriation of the surplus of the 
whole world-economy and reinforce their dominance by means of their military 
advantage within the interstate system.'^ * 
^ Quilliam, Neil, Syria and the New World Order (London, Ithaca Press, 1999), p. 10. 
Viotti & Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 1993, pp. 449-50. 
Wallerstein, I., The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 69. 
For more on the semi-periphery, see I. Wallerstein' The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 30-35; 115-116; I. Wallerstein, The Modern Capitalist World-
System, 3 vols. (New York, 1974-89). 
^ Wallerstein, I., The Capitalist World Economy, 1979, pp. 16-17. 
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The third assumption of the Globalist perspective refers to the mechanisms of 
domination which keep Third World states from developing and which contribute to the 
uneven worldwide development. The understanding of these mechanisms requires an 
examination of dependency relations between the northern industrialised states (Europe, 
Japan, and North America) and the poorer states in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, 
something that will be examined below. 
Finally, the fourth assumption concludes that Globalists consider economic factors as 
being absolutely critical in explaining the evolution and functioning of the world 
capitalist system and the relegation of Third World states to a subordinate position. 
These two latter assumptions are particularly evident in the work of Wallerstein and the 
dependency theorists.^^ The dependence of the countries of the South on the countries 
of the North, which has resulted from unequal terms of trade, and which also in turn is 
translated to action through the operation of multinational organisations, international 
banks etc. (that is to say trans-national coalitions), perpetuates the permanent 
stratification of world classes. Put simply, the alliance of the international bourgeoisie 
with the 'comprador' (or the national bourgeoisie) in the Third World is detrimental to 
the proletariat of the 'South'. 
For Globalists, therefore, this stratification is the system, which, in turn, is capitalism: 
without stratification, capitalism would not exist in the international system. Therefore, 
to quote Wallerstein, 'there are today no socialist systems in the world economy any 
more than there are feudal systems because there is only one world system. It is a 
world-economy and it is by definition capitalist in form.'^^ 
In summary, Globalists, in their analysis of international relations, adhere to four main 
assumptions: 
(i) Economic Globalism defines the international system ; 
This school of thought emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in response to what was considered as 
discredited American analyses of development. For more on this see, for example, W.W. Rostow, 
The Stage of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960). 
26 
Wallerstein, I., The Capitalist World Economy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), p 
401, and The Politics of World Economy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
" Quilliam, N., Syria and the New World Order, 1999, p. 11. 
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(ii) The international system defines the level of analysis; 
(iii) Historical analysis is relevant; 
(iv) Dependency is perpetuated by mechanisms of economic domination. 
Realism 
In the post-war period. Realism has dominated Western approaches to the study of 
international politics. 'Classical' Realism is the early version of its formulation, and 
structural or 'Neo'-Realism is the more contemporary version. 
Following World War 11, Realism emerged as a reaction to what was regarded as the 
failure of the assumptions of political 'ideaUsm'^*. The latter, with its belief that the 
human nature is good and that war is a senseless action which can be prevented by the 
utility of international law and organisations such as media, was rejected as utopian.^^ 
Realism, therefore, constituted an attack on this ideal vision of international politics, to 
the degree that Kegley and Wittkopf believe that Idealism underestimated the 'realities' 
of power politics and was thus partly responsible for the slide to war in 1939.^° In 
contrast, the Realists held that human nature is essentially bad and is motivated by the 
striving for power. This point is aptly summed up by Hans Morgenthau who 
concludes that political Anschauungen involves either the 'desire to keep power, to 
increase power, or to demonstrate power.'^^ 
Realism also views the state as the most important actor in the making of international 
politics. Unlike idealists or liberal internationalists, the Realists deem conflict to be 
^ Smith & Mollis, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 1991, pp. 45-68. 
'^ E . H. Carr (1939) called this the neglecting of the harsh realities of power politics and power logic. 
See Kegley, C. W. Jr., and E.R. Wittkopf, E.R., World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 8* ed., 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), p. 31. 
^ Kegley & Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 2001 pp. 20-22. 
E.H. Carr produced the most sustained attack on the assumptions of Idealism. He proposed an 
approach that saw international relations as they were, rather than as they might be. This approach had 
to be able to explain the way in which events since 1930 had unfolded - a matter, said Carr, of analysis 
rather than normative commitment. See Smith & HoUis, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations, pp. 20-22. 
Morgenthau, H., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3"* ed., (New York: A. 
Knopf, 1960), p. 38. 
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inevitable, considering it to be a natural state of affairs rather than a consequence that 
can be attributed to socio-political systems or historical circumstances.^^ As a result, the 
anarchical nature of international politics dictates the policymaking of the state in a 
permanently hostile environment. Security, as an end for the state, requires the 
acquisition of power. Thus, for Realists, it is the nature of anarchy and power which is 
crucial to an understanding of the international system. 
Anarchy is about the absence of an overriding authority above the state authority. Under 
the logic of anarchy, 'survival dictates that units of the system are subject to the 
pressure of competition.'^'' Therefore, with 'power as the crucial variable, the attempt to 
maximise it being what drives actions and its distribution being what determines the 
interactions of states,'anarchy causes a security dilemma from which there is no 
escape but to have a system. On the premise of this Realist vision of international 
politics, the system is the outcome of the inevitable need for a system. It is not created 
or invented, but it exists along with the interactions across its own units because 
anarchy dominates the making of international relations. 
Under the conditions of anarchy, therefore, states resort to different strategies of self-
help. The main action that states employ is the building up of their military arsenals. 
Whilst continuing to build their military power, however, they are still confronted with 
the 'security dilemma': the more a state increases its military capability, the more it 
poses a threat to other states, and within the continuation of that threat, the security 
dilemma continues to exist. Another option open to states, of course, is to ally with 
other states to face the threat of others. Pooling the capabilities of states is to balance the 
power of another state or a group of states. In other words, the two above-mentioned 
choices to which states resort are mainly for purposes of balancing power. Viotti and 
Kaupi have argued that stability and the avoidance of war result from the maintenance 
of a balance of power among states. Thus, they add, 'the need to maintain a balance of 
For a comparison of Realism and Liberalism, see Joseph Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Co-
operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', International Organisation 42 
(1988), pp. 485-507; and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "NeoRealism, and Neoliberalism", World Politics, 40 
(1988), pp. 235-51. 
Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 67. 
Viotti, & Kauppi , International Relations Theory, 1993, p. 101. 
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power to avoid the triumph of a dominant power is a Realist concern dating back to the 
works of Thucydides.'^^ 
It can be seen therefore, that the traditional paradigm in Realist theory is based upon the 
following assumptions: 
(i) That nation-states, in a 'state-centric' system, are the key actors, 
(ii) That domestic politics, can be clearly separated from foreign policy, 
(iii) That international politics is a struggle for power in an anarchic environment.^^ 
In short, the six assumptions in the Realist paradigm can be summarised as follows: 
(i) The state is the principal actor in international relations; 
(ii) The state is unitary; 
(iii) The state is a rational actor; 
(iv) The state is preoccupied with national security;^^ 
(v) Power is defined in terms of military capability; 
(vi) National security is the main concern of the state as 'high politics'.''^ 
This demonstrates that Realism promoted a static vision of the international system, 
which shapes the behaviour of the state itself as the main part of that system. 
Neo-Realism 
Neo-Realism (or structural Realism) is a variant of Realism. The development of neo-
Realist thought has been powerfully represented by Kenneth Waltz in his book Theory 
of International Politics^". The essence of neo-Realism, as Smith and Hollis argue, 'is a 
*^ Viotti & Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 1993, p. 50. On this argument, see also M. Wight, 
Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1979). 
Dougherty, J. E . , & R.L. Pflatzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, 3"^ ed., (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1990), p. 81. 
Quilliam, N., Syria and the New World Order, 1999, p. 8. 
'^ Viotti & Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 1993, p. 36. 
See Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, 1979. 
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more theoretically refined systemic or structural account of international relations','*' 
that is, the emphasis on the 'structure' of the international system as a determinant in 
the behaviour of the state. Whereas for Realists, the state is a unitary rational actor, 
Neo-Realists emphasise the structure of the international system over the state. Realists 
often focus on national foreign policies in the belief that they hold the key to the 
dominant forces in world politics. In this context, the Realist Raymond Aron maintains 
that the realm of international politics is impossible to theorise because it is shaped by 
diverse economic, political and ideological forces.'*^ The Realist error, however, was to 
suppose that no clear distinction between the system of states and the nature of the 
sovereign units could be drawn. 
However, Waltz acknowledges that economics, politics and culture are intertwined, but 
adds that a theory of international relations can be developed by abstracting the 
international system from other domains. Neo-Realism, therefore, begins with the 
premise that a theory of international relations and a theory of foreign policy are not the 
same. 
In spite of this stance, the main 'neo' argument of the Neo-Realists is about the 
structure of the international system. Waltz has laid down a three-tier definition of the 
structure of the international system, distinguishing it from the structure of domestic 
political system. These are firstly, the organising principle of the international system, 
secondly, the functional differentiation of units, and finally, the distribution of 
capabilities across units. In domestic political systems, the ordering principle is 
hierarchy, and in the international system the ordering principle is anarchy. ^ 
Consequently, he defines the system as: 
.. .a set of interacting units having behavioural regularities and identity 
over time. Its structure defines the ordering of its parts. Structure 
involves an ordering principle, specification of the function of 
different parts, and the distribution of capabilities. In international 
*^  Smith & Hollis, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 1993, p. 36. 
•"^  Aron, R., Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, 1962, pp. 44-60. 
Linklater, A., "Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice," in Booth & Smith, International Relations 
Theory Today, p. 143 For more on Waltz's argument see Waltz, K., "Realist Thought and Neo-Realist 
Theory", Journal of International Affairs 44 (1990), 21-37. 
Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, 1979, pp. 100-104. 
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politics, the ordering principle is anarchy, interpreted as the absence of 
a higher government above state. 45 
From this, it can be seen that under the conditions of anarchy, the struggle for power is 
inherent within the backbone of the system. Thus, the nature of the system in which all 
the states exist is, as mentioned above, a determining factor in their behaviour, forcing 
these states to focus on the balance of power if they are to survive. Moreover, 'for a 
balance of power to come into being there must exist an international system; that is, a 
community of states in regular contact with each other.' However, before the 
discussion about the balance of power proceeds, it is first necessary to define power. 
Defining Power 
Power is considered to be the main dynamic within any analysis of the interactions and 
interrelations among states in the international system. Thus, all definitions of power 
focus on influence and competition within certain interactions across actors. For Robert 
Dahl, for example, power amounts to the control of behaviour: 'A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."*^ Therefore, 
within the course of influence lies the capacity of A over B. What links them both 
together is not their independent entities, but rather that power-influence within which 
'respond' takes place. M . Weber insists that: 
Power is the probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in 
a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of 
the basis on which this probability rests.'*^ 
However, when A and B are engaged in a power struggle, resistance is the key word to 
understand the capacity of B i f B is influenced by A. This means that alliances or 
bandwagoning indicate the probability of B, for example, trying to maximise power in 
the face of A's capacity. For this reason, power is the springboard for the understanding 
of states' interrelations. 
*^  In Nye, J. S. Jr., ''NeoRealism and NeoliberalisnC World Politics, 40 (1988), pp. 241, 235-251. 
Sheehan, Michael, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London & New York: Routledge, 
1996), p. 11. 
Lukes, S., Power (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p 1. 
Lukes, S., Power, 1987, p. 2. 
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To pursue this further, there is therefore a balance of power which is associated with the 
intention of each unit of the system to pursue power for the sake of security. 
Morgenthau concludes that the balance of power refers to an actual state of affairs in 
which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.'*' To 
achieve the maximum from this equilibrium, the task of state leaders is to equalise the 
national interest of their states and the nature of any change that could occur on the 
international level. Waltz, too, has asserted that the balance of power may be defined 
quite simply as the distribution of power in the international political system.^" The 
concept 'balance of power' is therefore important to the degree that it interprets all 
kinds of states' interaction on the international level. It is the Neo-Realists, therefore, 
who are the most emphatic about the balance of power as being central to an 
understanding of international relations. 
Alliances are also important for an understanding of states' behaviour within the 
enterprise of seeking power. ^' States try to pool their capabilities together to form a 
greater weight of power. That action referred to as 'alliance' is in most, i f not in all, 
cases of international relations, the backbone of the process of maintaining the balance 
of power. J. Goldstein, for example, has argued, 'Alliance is as original an event in 
politics as is conflict. It associates like-minded actors in the hope of overcoming their 
rivals.'^^ Threat, therefore, is also a vital 'concept' for the understanding of alliances. 
Stephen Walt poses the question; 'Do states seek allies in order to balance a threatening 
power, or are they more likely to bandwagon with the most threatening state?'^ ^ Further, 
he suggests, states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. 
49 Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, p. 3. 
^ Waltz, K., "Anarchic Order and Balance of Power," in Keohane, R. (ed.), Neo-Realism and its Critics, 
1986, p. 117. 
I adapt the definition of alliance by S. Walt 'Alliance is a formal or informal relationship of security 
co-operation between two or more sovereign states. This definition assumes some level of 
commitment and an exchange of benefits for both parties; severing the relationship or failing to 
honour the agreement would presumably cost something, even if it were compensated in other ways'. 
In Stephen Wah, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 1, See also H. 
Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Arnold Wolfers, (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold 
War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959). 
" Goldstein, J. , Dynamics of Middle East Conflict and US Influence 1979-1997, 
www.american.edu/me.papr.htm. 
Walt, S., The Origins of Alliances, (New York: Cornell University Press 1987), p. 3. 
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Although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, nevertheless Walt 
proposes that the balance of threat theory is a better alternative to the balance of power 
theory.^ "* That, however, is another argument in the context of the study of power in the 
ME, but I would assert that threat could not exist without a powerful capacity for the 
threat to be considered a threat. States ally or bandwagon to face a threat that is 
generated by the possession of power.^ ^ Consequently, alliance and bandwagoning are 
seeds that grow in the field of the imbalance of power. To sum up this definition, it is 
correct to say that 'it follows that the real issue of international politics can be 
understood in terms of the rational analysis of competing interests defined as power.'^^ 
The distribution of power illustrates how capable various actors are. However, there is a 
difference in opinion amongst students of international relations about which 
capabilities are important. Some scholars emphasise military, or economic, or 
ideological, while some focus on population. For the purpose of this study, military and 
political capabilities are the standard reference of the states' power. 
Region and Regionalism 
The concepts of region and regional order also provide a central analytical and 
conceptual framework within this study, and in order to utilise them effectively, it will 
be necessary at this point to define my use of them precisely. Defining regionalism, I 
draw upon the useful distinction provided by Hurrell. As co-editor with L. Fawcett of 
58 
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order , 
^ Ibid., p. 5. 
Walt maintained that 'power and threat overlap, but are not identical.' There is a philosophical sense 
in this sentence. Behind each threat there is a certain power, whether military, economic, or any other 
source of powerful capability that causes the threat. But to take a threat as an abstract matter does not 
fit in international relations theory. However, Christopher Layne disagrees with Walt by asserting that 
"in unipolar systems there is no clear-cut distinction between balance of threat and balance of 
power...in a unipolar world, others must worry about the hegemon's capabilities, not its intentions. 
For more on the overlapping of threat and power see Walt, Origins of Alliances, 1987, p. 21. For more 
on Laynes argument see C. Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," 
International Security Vol. 17, no. 4, (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51. 
Rengger, N. J. , International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond 
International Relations Theory, (London, New York: Routledge 2000), p. 41. 
56 
" Taber, C. S., "Power Capabilities Indexes in the Third World," in R. Stoll & M. Ward (eds.) Power in 
World Politics, (Boulder, Col. Lynne Rienner 1989), p. 32. 
L. Fawcett, & A. Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and 
International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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Hurrell concludes that both regionalism and region are ambiguous terms.^ ^ He holds 
that regionalism was (in the late 1960s and 1970s) often analysed in terms of the degree 
of social cohesiveness (ethnicity, race, language religion, culture, history, of a common 
heritage); economic cohesiveness (trade patterns, economic complementarity), political 
cohesiveness (regime type, ideology), and organisational cohesiveness (existence of 
formal regional institutions).Recent debates, however, suggest that the broad term 
regionalism has been used to cover a variety of distinct phenomena. Thus, Hurrell 
breaks up the notion of regionalism into five different categories. Although worthy of 
mention here, it will not be necessary for me to detail them further since my study is 
more concerned with the term region than the concept of regionalism.^' 
(i) Regionalisation 
(ii) Regional awareness and identity 
(iii) Regional interstate co-operation 
(iv) State-promoted regional integration^^ 
(v) Regional cohesion.*^^  
Similarly, Michael Smith has concluded that regionalism is often linked very strongly 
with regional organisation and institutions. He examines why these institutions arise, 
how they have developed, and how they relate to other, more global institutions. More 
importantly, he questions how they relate to the nation-state. '^* 
59 
60 
61 
A recent study by Albert Fishlow and Stephan Haggard, distinguish between regionalisation, which 
refers to the regional concenU-ation of economic flows, and regionalism, which they define as a 
political process characterised by economic policy co-operation and co-ordination among countries. 
Cited in Edward Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, 'The New Wave of Regionalism," /n/erna/i'ona/ 
Organisation 53, 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 589-627 p. (591). 
See, for example, Bruce Russett, 'International Regimes and the Study of Regions', International 
Studies Quarterly 13/4 (Dec. 1969). Cited in Hurrell, A., "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in 
L . Fawcett, & A. Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics, 1995, p. 38. 
I refer to the whole paragraph due to its importance - as written by Hurrell, Regionalism in World 
Politics, 1995, p. 38. 
On regional integration see Leon N. Lindberg & Stuart A. Sheingold, (eds.). Regional Integration; 
Theory and Research (Cambridge, MA, 1971). Ernest Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional 
Integration Theory (Berkeley, 1975). 
63 Hurrell &Fawcett (eds.). Regionalism in World Politics, 1995, pp. 39-45. 
" Michael Smith, "Regions and Regionalism," in Brian, W., R. Little, & M. Smith (eds.). Issues in 
World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 69-70. Notably, Smith adds that perhaps the most 
salient form of regionalism in the contemporary world arena is that of regional integration 
predominantly based on the intensification and organisation of economic interdependence. This form 
of regionalism becomes part of the economic orthodoxy of the 1990s (p. 74). 
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For Hurrell, in most cases, geographic proximity characterises the primary definition of 
region: without some geographical limits, the term 'regionalism' becomes diffuse and 
unmanageable.^^ Furthermore, in the modem world, there can be no wholly self-
contained regions immune from outside pressures.^ ^ This points towards difficulties in 
defining the term 'region'. Therefore, my concern here is to define what a region 
constitutes within the international order. 
In his study. International Regions and the International System: a Study in Political 
Ecology,^^ Russet has shown that definitions of region vary depending on the methods 
and aims employed by regionalists. He identifies five criteria for delineating regions:^* 
(i) Regions of social and cultural homogeneity, that is, regions composed of states 
which are similar with respect to several kinds of internal attributes. 
(ii) Regions of states which share similar political attitudes or external behaviour, 
as identified by the voting positions of national governments in the United 
Nations 
(iii) Regions of poUtical independence; where the countries are joined together by a 
network of supranational or intergovernmental political institutions. 
(iv) Regions of economic interdependence, as identified by intra-regional trade as a 
proportion of the nations' national income 
(v) Regions of geographical proximity. 
Another definition of region can be added here, which is a region with shared 'political 
destiny'. The outcome of the political life of the region is recurrent to the degree that it 
becomes its historical mould. The Arab-Israeli conflict shaped almost the entire 
thinking about the ME. Apart from oil and Petro-Sheikhs in the region, one would think 
^ As cited in Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in L . Fawcett, & A. Hurrell (eds.), 
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order 1995, p 38. 
** Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective", in L . Fawcett, & A. Hurrell (eds.). Regionalism in 
World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order 1995 p. 46. 
*^  Russet, B., International Regions and the International System: A study in Political Ecology (Chicago: 
Rand McNally, 1967). 
Russet, B., International Regions and the International System, p. 11. 
*' Original Italics. 
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of the ME as a conflict between the Arabs and Israel. Therefore, the definition of the 
region is tied to the fact that there is a conflict that governs the entire political mood in 
that region. 
Equally useful as an attempt to define 'region' is Riemer's assumption that the 'criteria 
must not be chosen by chance, but in close relation to the definition of the region as a 
functional uni t ' .Thus , we must return to the idea of 'function' before taking size into 
consideration. In my study, I shall therefore be concerned with the political function of 
the Middle East as a region, although as Russett has concluded, there is a 'sticky' 
problem in attempting to identify the boundaries of various regions. If , however, one 
uses separateness or isolation as a major element in the definition of a region, this 
problem may not be difficult to overcome.^' That means that the ME region is defined 
by the dynamics of its own creation as a region. The borders of the region are often 
known by the political life the region has witnessed since the end of the Second World 
War. 
This, perhaps, is self-evident. Politically speaking, the boundaries of a region are its 
political function - that is to say, its relations to the international arena are channelled 
through its political performance. The position that regions hold in international policy-
making depends on the influence they have on the making of these policies. On the 
other hand, the 'great powers who dominate the international order try to sustain order 
by policing the relations between states of their particular sphere or region.'^ Put simply, 
then. Finch correctly argues that 'the characteristics of a region should be most 
pronounced in its interior - regions end in transition, seldom in definite boundaries. The 
aerial complex is substantial; it is only its boundary that is inclined to be capricious'. 
™ Svend, Riemer, 'Theoretical Aspects of Regionalism," Social Forces 21, 3 (1943), 279, Cited in 
Russett, International Regions and the International System, 1967, p.6. 
Russett, International Regions and the International System, 1967, p.6. 
''^  See Fawcett, & Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics, 1995, p 318. Here, Fawcett and Hurrel give an 
example of Churchill's advocacy of regionalism and the role of spheres of influence in Kissinger's 
thinking of detente. 
Finch, V. C , "Geographical Science and Social Philosophy," Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 29, 1 (1939), cited in Russet, International Regions and the International System, p. 7. 
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The Middle East as a Political Region 
The Middle East regional system is taken in this study to be comprised of Iraq, Egypt, 
Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians, '^^  Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the 
United States of America. The degree of interactions across these units of the system 
determines the political outcomes in the region. 
As it will be explained later, the United States is taken to be a member of the system 
because of the impact it has on the making of regional politics. This impact, however, is 
not only by means of its financial support to regional states like those of Israel, Egypt, 
or Jordan, but is represented by the amount of power the United States wields in the 
region. 
Therefore, as a primary conceptual tool for this study, I will consider the ME region as a 
political entity. This stance is based on the fact that the term ME was an invention 
arising from a political need for international forces to be present in that region. When 
colonialism ended, there was no simultaneous termination of the foreign presence there. 
On the contrary, the United States and the Soviet Union replaced Britain and France as 
the dominant powers in the region, which resulted in the transformation of power 
relations between new outside powers and regional ones. Thus, the region remained at 
the periphery: in effect, it became the theatre where power relations and power 
distribution reflected the change of power relations at the centre. 
However, the permanent existence of external powers dominating the region caused 
lack of cohesion and integration amongst its members. According to Hurrell, cohesion 
can be understood in two senses: 
(i) When the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states (and other 
major actors) of that region and the rest of the world. 
74 The Palestinian people are taken into this study only because of the impact they have on the 
interactions between other states in the region. The Palestinian Authority is considered here to be 
largely irrelevant: the authority has no impact on the making or unmaking of the regional system. 
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(ii) When the region forms the organising basis for policy within the region across a 
range of issues/^ 
Cohesion is absent in the ME because there is a huge degree of hegemony represented 
by a form of "galvanisation".^^ The Middle East has become paradigmatic of the type 
of interactions and the 'togetherness' predominant in it. Hurrell offers examples of this 
in his discussion of hegemony. He argues that "the existence of a powerful hegemon 
within a region may undermine efforts to construct inclusive regional arrangements 
involving all or most of the states within a region".'^ Indeed, what inclines Arab states 
in the ME to conduct foreign policy is the degree of the foreign "forces" which are 
present in the region. There are no 'pure' Arab politics for example which is mainly 
conducted as Arab in both forms: output and input, i f the input of Arab politics were 
Arab, the output of that politics would not necessarily be so. 
The Relationship between Regional Order and the International One 78 
The end of the Cold War represented a definite return to regionalism.^^ This was 
accompanied by what Barry Buzan has referred to as the removal of the old 
'superpower overlay' which encouraged multi-polarity and contributed to an 
Hurrell, A., "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in L. Fawcett, & A. Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism 
in World Politics, 1995, p. 44. 
*^ One might ask the question: if there were no hegemony in the ME, would it be possible that cohesion 
could predominate? The answer to this question will be included in my thesis, from chapter 4 
onwards. 
Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in Fawcett, & Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World 
Politics, p. 50. 
I adapt the definition of 'order' by Hedley Bull: 'a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or 
primary goals of the society of states, or international society'. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 
1977, p. 8. I also use the definition by Young: 'A broad framework of arrangements governing the 
activities of all, or almost all, the members of international society over a wide range of specific 
issues. We speak of an international political order, for example, as a system of territorially based and 
sovereign states that interact with one another in the absence of any central government.' Young, 
Oran, International Co-operation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 13. Also, for more on 
this, see Young, Oran, 'System and Society in World Affairs: Implications for International 
Organisations', International Social Science Journal 144 (June), pp. 197-212. For more definitions of 
the concept order, see S. Smith, "Is the Truth out there? Eight questions about international order," in 
T.V. Paul and J. Hall (eds.), International Order and the Future of World Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1999) pp.99-121. 
Fawcett, L . , "Regionalism in Historical Perspective," in Fawcett, & Hurrell (eds.). Regionalism in 
World Politics. 1995, p. 17. 
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international system in which regional arrangements could be expected to assume 
80 
greater importance. 
On the one hand, however, the mediator between regional and global orders is primarily 
the state. On the other hand, the relationship between the two orders dictates, to some 
extent, the behaviour of the states in regions. Yet what comes first? The international 
order or the regional order? Within this question lies a definitional dilemma; as Smith 
has identified: 'both are inseparable; by dealing with them separately, one becomes 
more aware of the linkages and tensions between them'. The defining structural factor 
within the relationship between the two orders is, however, embedded in the degree of 
subordination of the regional subsystem to the international one.^ ^ Intra-states relations 
are not separate from their subordination to the wider system; as Tibi has asserted, 'AH 
regional subsystems are at the same time integrated both into the global system (the 
83 
international system) and subordinate to dominant world order;' 
During the Cold War, bipolarity dominated the degree of subordination of subsystems 
to each pole of the dominating superpowers in the international order. However, after 
the Cold War ended, the shape of this domination changed, based on the change in 
power distribution. This points towards the fact that the centre of power changed from 
resting in the hands of two superpowers to being the preserve of only one of them -
something which had a severe impact on the making of the New World Order itself. 
This means - and this is crucial to the theorising of the ME regional order in the coming 
pages - that the degree of subordination of certain regions did not change. In 
consequence, for these regions the relationship between the international order and the 
regional one also remained the same. 
Buzan, B., People, State and Fear (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 208. 
" Smith, M., "Regions and Regionalism", In W. Brian, R. Little, & M. Smith (eds.), Issues in World 
Politics 1997, p. 79. 
Robert Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair argue that international relations imply the Westphalian state 
system as its basic framework, and this may no longer be an entirely adequate basis since there are 
forms of power other than state power that enter into global relations. 'World Order' is neutral as 
regards the nature of the entities that constitute power; it designates an historically specific 
configuration of power of whatever kind. Cox, R., & Sinclair, T., Approaches to World Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 494. 
Tibi, B., Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security, 2"'' ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1998), p. 37. 
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To broaden the argument it is necessary here to offer an examination of the term 'New 
World Order'. Chubin, for example, asked, 'What is the new order?' suggesting: 'From 
the South, it looks like a new form of Western dominance, only more explicit and 
interventionist than in the past ' .This perspective, which takes the whole of the south 
as an issue, is mainly about power as being a tool of domination. In this context, S. 
Hoffman argues that a New World Order occurs when there is a fundamental 
redistribution of power in the international system, illustrating that in order to 
understand the relations between the regional and international orders, we must simply 
look at the structure which governs these relations. Consequently, the structure of the 
international system can be seen as the ' l id ' , which when removed unveils the degree of 
harmony or tensions between the two orders.^ ^ 
Considering the 'structure', either in its narrowly neo-Realist version, or in its wider but 
still substantially Realist form, the relationship between these two orders is based on the 
distribution of power within a frame called the international system. Simply, the 
superpower rivalry was in itself a power existing within regional orders. Thus, it was 
the regulator, which guaranteed the stable nature of the international system. After the 
Cold War ended, the international system became governed by a single power: 
subsystems had either to continue their subordination to this superpower or other 
subsystems had to adapt new policies to enter the new order. To illustrate this point, the 
end of the Cold War liberated regional actors from superpower constraints, which led to 
what Snow has called the 'second tier regional countries', mainly those who aspired to 
87 
f i l l the power vacuum left behind. 
" Chubin, S., 'The South and the New World Order", in B. Roberts, Order and Disorder after the Cold 
War: A Washington Quarterly Reader (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), p. 435. 
*^  Hoffman, S., "A New World and its Troubles", Foreign Affairs 69,4 (1990) pp. 115-122. 
*' For more on the controversies on the discussion of the concepts order and system see H. Bull, The 
Anarchical Society; A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Macmillan, 1977); S. Hoffmann, 
World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (Lanham, MD. 1998); S. Smith, "Is there 
Truth out There? Eight Questions about International Order", in T. V., Paul and J. A., Hall, (eds.), 
International Order and the Future of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
Snow, D. M., Distant Thunder: Partners of Conflict in the Developing World, 2"'' ed. (New York: 
Armonk Press, 1997), pp. 19-23. 
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The State and Arab Nationalism 
Pan-Arabism (the term is used interchangeably here with Arabism and Arab nationalism 
to describe {al-qawmiya al-Arabiyyd), is based on the concept of the Arab nation {al-
Umma al-Arabiyya), which first appeared late in the nineteenth century.^^ The Arab 
nation is defined as the people of one language and one culture, i.e. the Arab people 
who inhabit the so-called Arab World. Yet, this single Umma has no one State that 
could be called the Arab nation-state. Nevertheless, Arab nationahsm assumes 
uniqueness to the collectivity of Arab states and a trans-state identity within the Arab 
World.^^ 
There is, however, a reverse side to the impact of Arab nationalism on the Arab states: 
the requirement that [Arab] regimes should represent a corporate national identity that 
expresses the relationship between population and territory.Furthermore, as lUia 
Harik asserts, Arab Nationalism as an ideology, even more so than Islam, denies 
legitimacy to the [political] state system. According to Harik too, the true and natural 
state is considered to be the national state whose authority is coterminous with the 
nation, the nation being defined as the people of one language and culture i . e. the Arab 
people.^' Now, as a conceptual tool, the relationship between the Arab state and Arab 
nationalism is problematic simply because Arab nationalism affects the sovereignty of 
the state and does not necessarily integrate the territory and the people. How this 
impacts upon the unmaking of the Arab system will be dealt with at a later stage in this 
study. 
Fauour M., The Arab World After the Desert Storm, (Washington D.C.: The United States Institute of 
Peace Press 1993), p 56. 
Murphy, E . C , 'Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World', The Journal of North African 
Studies3, 3 (Autumn 1998) 71-92, (74). On the impact of Islam on the Arab State System, see for 
example, Nazih, Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1991); Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State, (London, New York: 
Routledge 1989). 
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Murphy, E . , 'Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World', p. 74. 
Harik, 'The Origins of the Arab State, 16-20. 
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The State and Islam 
The basic association between the state and religion, i f religion is involved in the 
constitution of the state, is authority. The traditional view of sovereignty in the Islamic 
world is that it is unitary and divine in nature.^ ^ It is primarily concerned with power 
and authority over the community and not over territory as such. Sovereignty within the 
ME is therefore completely unlike the European concept of territorial sovereignty,^^ 
something which contradicts the idea of the sovereign state which is politically 
recognisable by its territorial borders. 
Islam, therefore, plays a vital role in reducing and hindering the authority and 
sovereignty of the state. In his full-length study of the relationship between Islam and 
the state, P. J. Vatikiotis argues that Islam rejects the idea of the nation-state and its 
secular conceptions of nationalism. He concludes that 
Islam and nationalism are mutually exclusive terms. As a constructive 
loyalty to a territorially defined national group, nationalism has been 
incompatible with Islam in which the state is not ethnically or 
territorially defined, but is itself ideological and religious... the 
loyalties of the masses, as we can witness today from Iran to North 
Africa and from Central Asia to the Sudan, remain religious and 
local."' 
However, my study is not interested in the relationship between the state and religion. 
This study treats the state, when Arab states are involved, as a political entity, which 
means that the state exists when it does not believe in moral or ethical rules. This 
however, prolongs the life of the state which in turn legitimises the existence of the state 
to become the authoritative decision-making institution with legitimate sovereignty. 
Kurdi, A. A., The Islamic State: a Study Based on the Islamic Holy Constitution (London: Mansell, 
1984) as cited in, Joffe, G. H., "Disputes Over State Boundaries in the Middle East and North 
Africa," in, Guazzone, L . , (ed.). The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of 
interdependence versus Fragmentation (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 60. 
93 
94 
Joff6, 'Disputes Over State Boundaries in the Middle East and North Africa' p.60. 
Vatikiotis, P. J., Islam and the State, (London: Routledge, 1987), pp. 42-44. 
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The Leader of the State 
I have focused initially on the concept of the state because this study is fundamentally 
concerned with the state's performance within a system. However, the nature of that 
system is dependent to a huge degree on personal politics: in the history of the Arab 
state, the leader is the main and primary actor in the making of political order and the 
International relations of the state. In this study, I shall argue that the leader of the state 
is the individual who not only makes the politics, but is also the centre of policymaking. 
The speech is mainly about leaders such as Hussein, Assad, Saddam, Mubarak, etc., 
leaders who have shaped the making of politics in the region - something which 
justifies my focus on individuals within this study. 
The Driving Forces Behind Arab States Interactions 
Focusing on the argument of penetration and the invention of the ME, Roger Owen 
observes: 
As far as the Middle East was concerned, it was generally the 
dominant colonial power that first created the essential features of a 
state, by giving it a capital, a legal system, a flag and internationally 
recognised boundaries. ...This gave many of the new states a 
somewhat artificial appearance.'^  
Apparent in Owen's argument is the idea of creation. Similarly, according to Bil l and 
Springborg, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire opened the door for a 'replacement' 
under French or British control. For them, 'the more artificial the country, the more 
difficult are the challenges of nation-and state-building.'^^ Therefore, along with the 
creation of Israel in the region, Arab states existed during the whole post-colonial 
period in terms of two opposite concepts: 'penetration' and 'pan-Arabism'. These, 
therefore, made up the structure or the 'ordering principles' on which the units 
interacted. 
" Owen, R., State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 13. 
'* Bill, J. & Springborg, R., Politics in the Middle East, 4"' ed., (New York: Harper Collins College 
Publishers, 1994), p. 39. 
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Up until the KC, two major issues influenced inter-Arab relations—Arabism and 
bipolarity. Arabism formed the basis on which Arab states interacted. Arabism, 
however, generated imbalance and conflict between Arab states. Viotti and Kauppi 
argue: 'there is hierarchy of power in international politics, but there is not a hierarchy 
of authority'.^' In the ME, there was a struggle for a hierarchy of authority until the 
early 1990s, which illustrates the absence of anarchy in the ME.^^ 
Thus, there was a crucial and superior 'above-state' authority. The 'problematique' of 
the Arab state is the state itself as it seeks survival. Unstable and apprehensive relations 
between Arab states have dictated the scene since 1945. The more 'Arab' a leader was, 
the closer to the prophet he was considered to be.^ ^ On the other hand, when Arab states 
selectively came closer to each other, this had the effect of triggering more backing of 
Israel by the superpower(s) that were originally part of the policymaking in the region. 
By the same token, 'when one Arab state's power, vis-a-vis other Arab states, was 
'relatively' on the rise, the shape of alliances changed in the region'."^ 
To pursue this further, the belief that Arab states in the ME derived their authority and 
legitimacy from the Arab nation is not fully justified.''*' There is no place to define the 
nation here, but most notably Odum and Moore have argued that 'regionalism provides 
an economy for the decentralisation of political p o w e r ' . Y e t , i f Arab states had 
derived their power from Arabism, Arabism would simply have been a driving force 
towards unity, and the ME would not have been 'politically' invented. I suggest here 
that Arabism preceded insecurity in the region; according to Hudson, an 'integrated 
^ Viotti & Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 1993, p. 48. 
Giving an example of this argument, R. Hinnebusch argues that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait 
was part of a bid to organise a new Iraq-led system based on a revival of pan-Arab nationalism, in 
Hinnebusch, Raymond, 'Egypt, Syria and the Arab State System in the New World Order', in H. A-
Jawad. The Middle East in the New World Order, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 165. 
" Or he considered himself to be so. 
Walt, The Origin of Alliances, 1987, p. 87. In this context, Walt gave an example of the unity talks 
of the mid-1960s between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and how these talks resulted in a new pattern of 
inter-Arab alignments. 
See Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Role, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab State System", 
International Studies Quarterly 37 (September 1993), 271-96. 
'"^  Quoted in Russet B., International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political 
Ecology (Chicago: Rand and McNally & Company, second printing, 1969), p. 5. 
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group of people within a given territory were said to form a 'security-community'."^^ 
Arabism as an ideology failed to create the 'Arab security community' and failed to 
form an independent political system. However, Arabism had created a regional order of 
conflict within which the dominant type of interactions was a system. This system was 
in itself the ordering principle of the Arab regional order. In this context, Gregory Gause 
in argues: 
It is a challenge to the very organising principle of the system- the 
sovereign state system bequeathed by European colonialism is at the 
heart of the instability and fractiousness that has characterised the 
interstate politics of the region since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
Most of the conflicts in the region-Arab-Israeli, inter-Arab, Arab-
Iranian- can be understood only in the context of the incentives of 
powerful local leaders who have to appeal to such transitional 
platforms to advance their interests. 
In the same context, Ehteshami and Hinnebusch conclude that: 
Global penetration and local subordination constitute a long-term 
cause of regional instability because they tend to de-legitimise local 
states and the regional state system generally. Popular resistance 
movements against foreign intervendon have generated periodic 
waves of instability and given rise to revisionist states, which have 
threatened to upset the power balance."" 
Both global penetration and local subordination in the ME were entirely formed and 
shaped within what Buzan has called 'regional security dynamics' during the era of the 
Cold War."^^ On the international level, however, bipolarity was considered a source of 
stability. Waltz emphasised that 'the bipolar structure of the international system was 
the reason for the absence of great power conflict since 1945.''°^ In the ME, bipolarity 
Hudson, M., (ed.). Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (London 
& New York: I. B. Taurus &Co. Ltd., 1999), p. 5. In the 1950s, Carl Deutsch underlined the 
importance of a core state in the development of what he termed "security community". 
'"^  Gause, G. I l l , Systemic Approach to Middle East International Relations, p. 27. For more on this see 
Bahgat Korany, 'The Arab World and the New Balance of Power in the New Middle East', in 
Hudson Michael, Middle East Dilemma: the Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New 
York: I B Taurus, 1999). 
Ehteshami, A. & Hinnebusch, R., Syria and Iran; Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 10. 
'** Buzan, B., People, States & Fear, 1991, p. 204. 
Waltz, K., The Stability of Bipolar World', Daedalus 93 (1964) 881-909. 
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had a specific impact on the international politics of the ME. Two exegeses demonstrate 
that impact: 
(i) Bipolarity has hindered the establishment of a full integrated ME independent 
system within which interactions and relations of its units can be analysed as 'the' 
units of a system. The states in the ME from 1945, although participating in the non-
alignment movement, tended to veer towards one of the superpowers. This had 
divided the ideologies and the alliances of these states, preventing them from having 
an independent attitude towards their own collective issues. From 1945-1991, 
however, the ME witnessed several wars. That is because it had no system of its 
own that could enforce constraint upon the states' behaviour in that region. 
Therefore, the end of the Cold war along with the KC brought change to the region 
by triggering the incentives for a Middle East System to generate. 
(ii) Bipolarity helped to uphold Israel in terms of alliances. Alliances in bipolarity 'seem 
to be held together by ideological glue, and are hierarchical, with each dominated by 
one superpower'.'"^ As a result, some of the Middle Eastern states found in the 
ideologies of either superpower a driving force towards hegemonic orientation in the 
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region. 
What one can conclude from this illustration is that no matter what the situation dictated, 
the final shape of interactions across Arab states had to emerge from one of the 
dimensions of regional order, which is characterised by the global penetration. 
That being said, an analysis of the type of system existing in the ME necessitates a 
focus on issues of security, as this is the most notable feature of those interactions 
within the system. One of the main security dilemmas in the ME is at the state level. Put 
simply, the ME is a region whose states in the 1990s comprised different ideologies and 
different attitudes towards the West, specifically the USA, mostly having one religious 
and national background, which consideration has made the states themselves the 
Smith & Hollis, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 103. 
On the impact of bipolarity on the Middle East see Taylor, Alan, R., The Superpowers and the 
Middle East (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991); Garthoff, Raymond L . , Detente and 
Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Regan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1985). 
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source of their own insecurity. This means that some definitions of security"° overlook 
the evidence suggesting that in some cases, national security is enforced first when 
security is a fundamental subject of the regime itself. The primary objective of regimes 
within Arab states is simply their own survival and continuity. Therefore, the Arab 
regimes typically associate themselves with the United States in order to ensure their 
own survival, on account of the political, military and economic backing which 
Washington provides. Thus, it is only appropriate to equate these regimes' primary 
national strategic objective as being pro-American, and subsequently, their co-operation 
and commitment to a common Arab cause is relegated to a secondary concern. 
Consequently, interactions among states in the ME depend upon who first invented 
whom. That necessarily leads to a consideration of who allies with whom. Security in 
the region, therefore, does not depend upon the balance of power of the ME in the first 
stage, but on the external powers which helped to invent these states in the first place. 
Thus, 'much in the ME depends on the role of those outside powers.'"' Similarly, the 
most sophisticated issue in the context of power distribution in the ME is not the 
question of who is the most powerful, but alternatively, who makes whom powerful? 
Here we are reminded of Britain at the onset of its colonisation enterprise. When the 
British found no Emirs or Shaikhs who could ally with them, they invented them. 
Framework of Analysis 
During the course of this study I will be adopting a Neo-Realist approach to my study. 
There is a strong theoretical element within Neo-Realism, which is particularly 
pertinent to the study of Arab ME states, namely: 
i . Neo-Realism suggests that in order to understand the behaviour of the units, it is 
necessary to identify what units comprise the system, and to indicate the 
Wheeler and Booth defined security dilemma as: ' A security dilemma exists when the military 
preparations of one state create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether 
those preparations are for 'defensive' purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) 
or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage). Nicholas J. 
W., & K. Booth, 'The Security Dilemma," in J. Baylis & N. J. Rengger (eds.) Dilemmas of World 
Politics; International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p 29-
32. 
I l l Ehteshami, A., 'Security Structure in the Middle East: An Overview', in H. Jawad, The Middle East 
in the New World Order, 2"'' ed. (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 98. 
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comparative weight of systemic and sub-systemic causes. This enables 
progression beyond a description of the system in order to investigate the 
relationship between the system as a whole and the units that make it up. 
Regarding the Arab ME states, this kind of analysis will enable this study to 
construct a coherent understanding of the relationship between the collective 
behaviour of the states and the system within which they exist. In this sense, 
Neo-Realism concludes that all units of the system function alike. This means 
that we do not have to study the behaviour of each unit to understand the system, 
but the so-called 'comparative weight of systemic and sub-systemic causes' helps 
us to understand the mechanisms of the relationship between the units themselves. 
i i . Neo-Realism considers the state as the principal actor in the system. It is true to 
say that the Arab state in the ME is the principal actor in shaping both the 
policies of the region and of the international relations of the region. 
i i i . Neo-Realism contends that the behaviour of the state is determined by the 
structure of the system. The structure is the regional order itself in which Arab 
states operate and behave. Therefore, it will be clear, from Chapter Three 
onwards that an understanding of the behaviour of one or all of the actors 
collectively in the region is bound up with the understanding the structure itself. 
Neo-Realism contends that we are concerned not with the function of the units 
themselves because they all function the same, but that we are concerned with the 
distribution of the capabilities of these units. Therefore, any change in the 
relationship between one Arab Middle Eastern state with the outside world 
inherently affects the behaviour of other Arab states in the region. 
iv. Neo-Realism accepts all assumptions made by the Realists. One of these is that 
power is defined in terms of military capability only. And the ME is the highest 
or the most armed region in the world. 
I shall not consider the other schools of thought in this study as a framework for 
analysis because of the evidential relevance of Neo-Reahsm to the analysis. It is only 
power that determines outcomes. The war on Iraq and the pressure on Syria and Iran in 
See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 40-41. 
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the aftermath of the war demonstrate this. Pluralism is not relevant to my study because 
non-states actors in the ME play marginal roles where the state is the primary actor in 
policy-making. Therefore, from the beginning, Pluralist thinking does not serve the 
analysis of this study because it mainly focuses on the state as a unitary and primary 
actor in the international relations of the ME. 
Globalism also does not serve my analysis. It is not economy that defines the relations 
between Arab states and the United States. It is also not economical factors on which 
inter-Arab relations are based. Regime survival is a critical issue in Arab politics and 
these regimes are Realists in a way in which they ally and/or bandwagon with the 
United States to survive. Therefore, historical analysis, as Globalists assume, is 
irrelevant to thinking of these states. 
Summary 
An examination of the system of the Arab states of the ME in the period post-Kuwait 
Crisis cannot be undertaken using an historical lens, because events are still unfolding. 
This chapter, therefore, has been designed primarily to provide the appropriate tools of 
analysis, which will be used throughout this investigation. In it, I have aimed to provide 
a sound theoretical framework, which will prove invaluable as a means of constructing 
my argument in the coming chapters of the study. Explaining, for example, what 
constitutes the international system will shed light, as a theoretical foundation, on the 
discussion of the making or unmaking of the Arab system after the Kuwait Crisis. In 
this context, the Arab regional order in the post Kuwait Crisis was marked by major 
events like the peace process in the ME and the exclusion of Iraq from collective Arab 
policymaking. These major issues, however, are not ones I have chosen to theorise here, 
but will be amongst those which I will take into consideration in Chapter Three, using 
the theoretical concepts I have discussed above to shed light on the outcomes of the 
Kuwait Crisis. 
Similarly, in my discussion of the constitution of the state and the form of interactions 
across Arab states in the ME, I have not attempted to theorise the issue of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Again, this is something that will be examined later in the study of the 
context of the dynamics of the peace process in the ME. 
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Finally, this chapter has been designed in order to provide all the building blocks upon 
which the entire thesis will rest. Its aim has been to provide a firm structure which will 
facilitate an analysis of all of the major issues pertaining to the period from the post-
Kuwait Crisis, and will therefore serve to underpin the entire study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Was There an Arab Regional System 1945-1990? 
Literature Survey 
Introduction 
The formation of Arab regional politics in the ME since the end of Second World War 
plays an important role within the understanding of the regional politics of the 1990s. In 
view of this and as my thesis is mainly concerned with the Arab regional system after 
the KC, this chapter will provide a literature review of the period between 1945 and 
1990. Although some of this literature offers an explicit discussion of the concept of 
'system' and some does not, I will nevertheless consider it in the context of system 
analysis within this period. I will first offer an overview of the most pertinent literature, 
following which I will provide a hypothesis, which will facilitate access to the third 
chapter of this study. 
In the context of the ME regional system, there are various works which have proved 
useful for an understanding of the concept, and I will outline their importance to my 
own thesis in greater detail below. Primarily, these are: 
Leonard Binder (1958), "The Middle East as a Subordinate Intentional System"^ 
Bruce Maddy-Weitzmann (1993), The "Crystallisation of the Arab State System 1945-
1954"^ 
' Binder, L . , 'The Middle East as a Subordinate International System", World Politics 10, 3, (April, 
1958), 408-29. 
^ Maddy-Weitzmann, B., The Crystallisation of the Arab State System 1945-1954, (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1993). 
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Malcolm Kerr's (1971), The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasser and his Rivals 
1958-197& 
Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.) (1984), The Foreign Policy of Arab 
States: the Challenge of Change.'^ Particularly vital to my study is Chapter Two, The 
Global System and Arab Foreign Policies: the Primacy of Constraints', by Bahgat 
Korany and Al i E. Hillal Dessouki [et al]; and Chapter Three, 'The Arab State System: 
Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities', by Paul Noble. 
Fawaz Gerges (1994), The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and 
International Politics 1955-1967.^ 
Alan R. Taylor (1982), The Arab Balance ofPower.^ 
P.J. Vatikiotis (1984), Arab Regional Politics in the Middle East. ' 
Carl L. Brown, (1984), 'International Politics of the Middle East^ 
Stephen Walt (1987), The Origins of Alliances!^ 
Bassam Tibi (1987), 'Regional Subsystems and World Order: The case of Inter-Arab 
State Relations 1967-1982'}^ 
Michael Bamett (1998), Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order 
Leonard Binder (1958), The Middle East as a Subordinate International System, 
published in the World Politics series. 12 
^ Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War: Gamal AbdAl-Nassir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3"* ed., (New York 
& Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
'* Korany, B., & A. E.Dessouki, The Foreign Policy of Arab States: the Challenge of Change (Colorado 
& Oxford: Westview Press, 1991). 
^ Gerges, F. , The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics 1955-1967, 
(Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). 
' Taylor, R. A., 772^  Arab Balance of Power (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982). 
^ Vatikiotis, P.J., Arab Regional Politics in the Middle East (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984). 
* Brown, L . C , International Politics of the Middle East, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 
1984). 
' Walt, S., The Origin of Alliances (London & Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
'* Tibi, B., Regional Subsystems and World Order: The case of Inter-Arab State Relations 1967-1982, 
British Society of Middle East Studies (BRISMES), Annual Meeting (Exeter, July, 1987). 
" Barnett, M, N. Dialogue in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998). 
Binder, L . , The Middle East as a Subordinate International System, World Politics 10, 3 (April, 1958), 
408-429. 
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Was There an Arab Regional System 1945-90? 
Binder defines the ME as the area from Libya to Iran, fringed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and the Maghreb. For Binder, the 'ingredients' of the system are the common 
membership of Arab states and Turkey in the Ottoman Empire, which had left these 
states with similar institutions. 
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (1993), The Crystallisation of the Arab State System 1945-
1954 covers the period of 1945-54. This book is vital to my study inasmuch as it 
discusses the concept 'system' in a specific period. However, this also constitutes its 
downside, as the period it chooses to cover (1945-54) is relatively limited. Although the 
title of the book alludes to the 'crystallisation' of a system, Maddy-Weitzman does not 
offer a theoretical framework within his book to show the dynamic-theoretical process 
of system formation. Rather, he is very attentive to questions of historical specificity. 
Only at the end of the book, namely in the conclusion, does he mention that the Arab 
state system consisted of five central 'players' in the inter-Arab game during the first 
decade of the Arab League's existence.''* For Maddy-Weitzman, the emergence of the 
Arab League in 1945 represents a watershed in the history of the ME. Concurrently, 
taking two points in one, he considers Arab nationalism as a factor that delegitimised 
the newly established Arab states of the League.'^ 
For Maddy-Weitzman, the formative years of the Arab system are represented by the 
Arab League that came to be made up of sovereign independent states.'^  But, the crux 
of his argument lies at the heart of a dispute within the League'^ during the formative 
" Maddy-Weitzmann, The CrystaUisation of the Arab State System 1945-1954 (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1993). 
" Ibid.,p, 180. 
Ibid., p. 1. 
Ibid., p. 26. 
" On political alliances and blocs formations within the Arab League, see Robert MacDonald, The 
League of the Arab States: A Study of the Dynamics of Regional Organisation (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1965). 
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years -- the rivalry between Iraq and Egyp t .Tak ing the balance of power as a norm to 
illustrate his argument, Maddy-Weitzman suggests that inter-Arab rivalry was first 
tested by the establishment of the state of Israel, a new state which emerged within the 
regional body and with which Arab states had to deal. This meant that there appeared a 
different dimension within conflictual relations. 
The main 'test', as he calls it, to the conflictual nature of the Arab ME was represented 
by the Arab-Israeli conflict; as the author asserts, 'the struggle for Palestine thus served 
as a mobilising factor in inter-Arab politics.' Therefore, it is essential to consider the 
role of Israel, 'whose presence is necessary to a comprehension of the politics of the 
region in general'. In this sense, it is worth mentioning at this point the argument of 
Malcolm Kerr, whose book, the Arab Cold War, will be discussed below. Ken-
maintains that Arab rulers used the Arab-Israeli conflict as a stick with which to beat 
one another.^ ^ Hence it would be misleading to argue that the Palestine cause united the 
Arab states when they were divided on all else. As Kerr puts it: 
It would be more accurate to say that when the Arabs are in a mood to 
co-operate, this tends to find expression in an agreement to avoid 
action on Palestine, but that when they choose to quarrel, Palestine 
policy really becomes a subject of dispute.^ ' 
However, for Maddy-Weitzman, within this conflictual environment, balance of power 
is similar to that of balance of interest in making the Arab system. But Maddy-
Weitzman does not bring up the term 'interest' in a frame which could be directly 
understood as the interest of the state; instead, he brings it up by referring to a raison 
d'individual, which ultimately leads to the interest of the state. 
Maddy-Weitzman offers a historical elaboration of the events in this period. He examines the 
relationship between Iraq and Transjordan on one hand and that between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Syria on the other. See Chapter Two, pp 25-55. 
" Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p 11, 175-205. see also F. Gerges, "The Study of 
Middle East International Relations: A Critique", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, 
2 (1992), pp. 208-220. In this context, Gerges is citing William Zartman, 'The Composition of 
Subordinate Systems', a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, 1974. 
^ Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War, 1971, p 61. Cited in Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p 
11. 
Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 114, as cited in Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p 11. 
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From this point, he proceeds to argue that although the Arab League promoted Arab 
solidarity, it institutionalised Arab divisions,^^ using as an example of the formative 
years of rivalry between Iraq and Egypt. He points out how Nuri al-Saed of Iraq in early 
December of 1945 threatened to withdraw, pulling with him the Hashemite Transjordan, 
from the Arab League due to the monopolisation of the League by Azzam and by 
Egypt.^^ This rivalry within the Arab regional order and within the Arab League was a 
character of the crystallising Arab system. 
Maddy-Weitzman makes clear, however, that it was the absence of a central regional 
Arab power in the region, which led to the fluctuation of coalitions. What had 
crystallised in this period was a system that was state-centric. However, he does observe 
that the ideology of Arabism was the background to which all states subscribed. This, 
for example, had caused Jordan not to make a separate peace with Israel, had caused 
Iraq not to forge a collective security system with the Western powers, and had led to 
the formation of a grand coalition against Israel in 1948.'^ '* 
Malcolm Kerr's (1971), The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasser and his Rivals 
1958-1970^^ constitutes one of the most important references for an understanding Arab 
politics. Here, Kerr admits that he does not expect there will be ever a 4* edition of his 
book since Nasser's disappearance removes the main character from a story which [he] 
relates in terms of personalities.^^ 
As the title of this book suggests, it deals with the nature of the inter-Arab relations in 
the aforementioned period and shows the interplay of ideology and politics in Arab 
political affairs. Kerr announces in the preface of the book that his work has been 
undertaken to dispel two notions: the first is to refute the suggestion that Arab politics is 
a projection of decisions made in Washington, London, Moscow and Jerusalem. This is 
due, in Kerr's view, to the fact that the Arab State's political life has its own vitality. He 
" Maddy-Weitzmann, The Crystallisation of the Arab System, pp. 55-90, 175-181. 
Ibid., p 28. 
^ Ibid., pp. 175-181. ' 
^ Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War. The first edition of this book was entitled The Arab Cold War 1958-
1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics. 
" Ibid., p. V. 
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also seeks to dispel another notion based on the conceptions of 'revolutionary' and 
'conservative' ideologies, which account for inter-Arab politics. These concepts, for 
Kerr are mixed with personal ambitions, tactical convenience, and a capacity for 
worldly realism which the Arabs have often preferred to obscure behind their outward 
words and actions.^' 
However, the main issue within Kerr's agenda is his conclusion that since the end of the 
Second World War, there was an Arab popular political sentiment which was dominated 
by urgent appeals for Arab unity. He describes the rivalry between governments and 
parties as a political reality.^^ However, in the aforementioned period of study, he refers 
to Nasser as a pan-Arab leader whose leadership shaped the making of Arab politics in 
this period. 
Kerr does not offer an analysis of the concept of system. The Arab Cold War for him 
explicitly represents what can be termed as an Arab system. Yet, Kerr's discussion is 
that the simple definition of an Arab Cold War is Arab rivalry in the Arab League ~ the 
symbol of the system ~ which was also the forum in which inter-Arab battles of that 
Arab Cold War were fought. 
In sum, Kerr's argument focuses on the polarisation between conservative states (like 
Saudi Arabia, Libya until 1969, and Jordan) and reforming or radical states (like Egypt 
and Syria). There were no structural similarities between these states either, because the 
influence they left on the making of Arab politics was different. In other words, the 
Arab balance of power tends to follow ideological lines, which affected the making of 
the system itself. 
The subsequent period is studied by Fawaz Gerges (1994), The Superpowers and the 
Middle East: Regional and International Politics 1955-1967 and covers, in his view, 
a period of conflict. This work focuses on relations between the superpowers and the 
Middle East from 1955 through 1967. To illuminate the nature of that relationship, 
Gerges analyses the major influential events of this period such as the Baghdad pact, the 
Ibid., pp. 1-23 
Ibid., p. 41, 68-73. 
'^ Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, 1994. 
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Suez crisis, and the U.S. intervention in Lebanon ending with the Arab-Israeli war of 
June 1967. Gerges's main focus is the Cold War and its impact on Arab politics. 
Gerges begins by discussing the international relations of the eastern Arab states with 
the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that the ME, as all other regions of the 
world, was unable to escape the power struggle between these two superpowers. 
As far as the Arab states in the ME are concerned, Gerges considers the existing of a 
strong pattern of linkages and interactions between Arab states in the period between 
1950 and 1960. He considers these to form a core in the Arab Mashriq - Egypt, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian people.^'' 
In the first chapter of his book, Gerges considers the Arab world as a regional 
'subsystem'; in other words, he does not refer to inter-Arab interactions as an 
independent 'Arab system'. By restricting his study to the ME, he considers two criteria 
which contribute to an understanding of the making of the Arab ME subsystem: first the 
term 'communality' as a means of examining the ME as an entity. For Gerges, 
Mauritania, for example, has not much in common with Lebanon or with Jordan; 
similarly he questions what kinds of relationships exist between North Africa and the 
Arab east. Tenuous ones at best, he suggests. Thus, the key to the delineation of a 
Middle Eastern or an Arab subsystem is the pattern of close linkages and interactions 
among members.^' 
The second criterion Gerges follows to delineate the Arab subsystem is to consider 
regional subsystem definitions. Drawing from several analysts, he argues that the 
requirements of 'necessary and sufficient conditions' to the existence of subsystem 
include four common elements or criteria:^^ 
(i) There are at least two and probably more actors. 
(ii) These units share common attributes and properties, and they interact regularly 
and intensively, thus establishing a pattern of relationships and linkages among 
^ Ibid., 1994, p 8. 
" Ibid., 1994, p 7-8. 
Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p 6. See Chapter One, p 18, n. 19. 
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themsel ves. As a result, changes in some parts of the subsystem produce changes 
in other parts. 
(iii) The subsystem is recognised by internal and external players as a distinctive 
theatre of operation. 
(iv) The actors are generally proximate. 
Gerges considers the first and the second criteria as having been fulfilled as far as the 
making of an Arab regional subsystem is concerned. Yet, in the context of the latter two 
elements, he draws upon the argument of Paul Noble to support his view. Noble noted 
that a sense of community encouraged the growth not only of translational social groups 
and cross-frontier political alliances, but also of translational political associations, such 
as the Ba'ath party and the Moslem brotherhood. Because of these links, Noble adds, 
the political system of Arab states has been closely interconnected and permeable. 
Moreover, in the context of proximity, Gerges considers the level of interactions among 
the Arab members of the core as very high. Notably, this interaction was not exclusively 
positive and co-operative: on the contrary, it was often negative and conflictual.^'* In 
addition to this, like Maddy-Weitzman and Korany and Dessouki, Gerges also considers 
the Arab-Israeli conflict as being a standard norm within an understanding of inter-Arab 
politics and thus, to coin Gerges's argument, the form of their 'sub'-system. 
For Gerges, the Baghdad pact is a test of the relationship between Arab members of the 
core. His assumption in this regard is that the creation of a regional power in the region 
in this period was a 'mark' of the system. For example, Iraq, as an Arab country, signed 
a treaty with Turkey, which was seen by Cairo and Saudi Arabia as a challenge to their 
security. Gerges identifies this as a political and ideological 'showdown' in the Arab 
subsystem. Subsequently, Gerges points out that by signing the pact, Nuri of Iraq hoped 
not only to cement his traditional alignment with the British but also to establish a 
productive relationship with the United States, the new superpower of the Western 
worid. He also planned to obtain Western aid and use the new partnership with Turkey, 
" Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p 8. See also Paul Noble, Regional Arrangements and 
the Management of Conflict under the United Nations: the Case of the Arab System, PhD thesis, 
McGill University, 1972. In my thesis, discussed below, I will also refer to Paul Noble, 'The Arab 
State System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities', in Korany, B., & Dessouki, A. E . , The 
Foreign Policy of Arab States: the Challenge of Change (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1991). 
^ Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 30. 
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Britain, and the United States to create a new regional order in which Iraq would play 
the key role. The absence of Egypt from this proposed order would have enabled Nuri to 
assume a leadership position.^' Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry over the pact should be seen as a 
struggle for the soul of the Arab world, because the relationship of Arab states with the 
outside world was determined, to a large extent, by their positions within the regional 
subsystem and by the necessities of local alliances.^^ This for Gerges illustrates the form 
of the Arab regional subsystem during that period during which time Nasser was the 
centre of gravity in the making of the regional order. 
Alan R. Taylor's The Arab Balance of Power (1982) presents an account of the Arab 
system and the course of inter-Arab politics from the foundation of the Arab League in 
1945 to 1982, the year of publishing the book. Here Taylor defines the 'balance of 
power' as referring to the patterns of equilibrium, dislocation, and readjustment which 
unfolded in the context of interdependence among the Arab states following the 
foundation of the Arab League. The term 'Arab system' is to be understood as an 
interactive relationship in which the component countries became intensely involved 
with each other in terms of alignment, rivalry, or the perception of common goals. 
Because the system was highly diversified, the evolution of inter-Arab politics was 
inevitably accompanied by a preoccupation with the balance of respective interests.^^ 
Taylor, however, does concede that there is an autonomous Arab system. Similar to 
Maddy-Weitzman's approach, Taylor considers the historical events which shaped the 
making of an Arab system. However, Taylor does not directly conclude that it is the 
'countries' that make up the system, but the 'regions'- the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Nile Valley, and the Maghreb. Consequently, he argues that 
'regionalism...had been the basic orientation of Arab politics for the past sixty years. 
In his book, which consists of eight chapters and twenty-one appendices, his study of 
Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
^ Ibid., p. 30, pp. 101-135. 
Ibid., pp. 101-112. 
Taylor, R. A., The Arab Balance of Power, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982). 
»^ Ibid., pp. XI-XII. 
Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, p 109. 
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the system is based on the notion - although he does not make use of the term 'notion' -
- of regional order. 
Taylor divides the origins of the Arab system based on regions into two — namely, 
Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. When considering Egypt, he goes back to the doctrine of 
Islamic reform, based on the idea of using the first Muslim generation or the Salafiyya'" 
movement.'*^ Concurrently, he considers the emergence of Egyptian nationalism on the 
eve of the British occupation in 1882. This movement, argues Taylor, was another pillar 
of the formation of the Arab system. However, what was distinctive about it was its 
focus on a 'mystical attachment' to the land of Egypt, and Islam was subordinated to the 
status of a facet of national culture.*^ In the Fertile Crescent, the rise of Syrian 
nationalism as a reaction to the Young Turks and to the 'Ottomanisation' of regional 
politics in the Fertile Crescent is the other part of the emerging Arab system.'*^ 
For Taylor, the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 also represented the victory of 
regionalism over universalism in the dynamics of inter-Arab politics. Although the 
League was intended to provide the institutional basis of a comprehensive system of 
inter-Arab co-operation, it actually became a vehicle through which latent rivalries were 
brought to the surface.'*^ On the other hand, it was viewed as a means of achieving 
mutually beneficial modes of co-operation, whilst at the same time maintaining the 
stability of the established political structure and creating the facade of a movement 
toward unity.'*^ 
Considering the system as comprised of rival tensions, specifically between the Fertile 
Crescent and Egypt, the regional structure of the Arab world lay at the root of the 
Salafiyya refers to the al-Salaf al-Salih (the venerable ancestors). Fundamental to this thought was a 
belief that modem Islam was capable of reconstructing the solidarity that characterised the age of the 
5a//. In this respect, the movement was pan-Islamist. 
*^  Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, p. 7. 
*^  The leading figures of this movement were for example, Ahmad Urabi Pasha, Mustafa Kamil, who 
who believed that Egyptian nationality predated Islam and that there was a bond of peoplehood 
between the Muslims and the Coptic Christians. On this see Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, pp. 
8-9. 
Ibid., pp. 10-13. 
Ibid., p. 24. This argument is similar to that of Malcolm Kerr. See Kerr's argument offered above. 
"* Ibid., p. 21-23 
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emerging struggle for power.'*' This had a major impact on the formation of the Arab 
League, specifically on the founding countries of the League, and thus on the formation 
of the system. Another factor which contributes to the making of the system, in Taylor's 
view, is the rise of the Saudi factor in Arab politics. These factors, along with their 
rivalry with the Hashemites in Transjordan and Iraq, affected the early formation of the 
Arab regional system. Consequently, 'soon after the formation of the league, two 
competitive blocs were established within the Arab system'.'*^ Further, Taylor argues 
that the emergence of Abd al-Nassir as a charismatic leader after he moved from the 
arms deal with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in 1955 to the Suez crisis in 1956, 
and, of major concern, the Arab policies he adopted, ultimately transformed the 
structure of the Arab system. 
However, the rivalry between the Fertile Crescent and the Nile Valley surfaced when 
the Baghdad pact was in the process of formation. The rally for Syria as the key to the 
Arab balance of power in that period, led to a new balance of power in the region, 
symbolised by the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) 1958-1961.^ 50 
The watershed in the Arab system, however, was the 1967 war because it enlarged the 
scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict.^' Drawing on Kerr here, Taylor argues that the war 
raised the question of whether a military solution to the problem of Israel was still valid. 
Both Abd al-Nassir and King Hussein in particular began to think in terms of political 
settlement with Israel.^^ Thus, the war altered the structure and character of the Arab 
system, which had been in the process of disintegration since the beginning of the 
decade. In this context, he concludes that the June 1967 war changed the shape of Arab 
politics: 
Ibid., p. 24. 
"** Ibid., p. 25. Taylor further argument is that the other establishing countries of the Arab League -
Lebanon and Yemen - did not play significant role in inter-Arab relations at this stage. See pp. 25-26. 
" Ibid., p. 30. 
^ Taylor, on the argument about the establishment of the United Arab Republic draws from Kerr's The 
Arab Cold War, 1971. 
Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, p 43. 
" Ibid., p.43, Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 129-155. 
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By 1970 Egypt had abandoned revolutionism in favour of a working 
relationship with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Syria under al-Asad was 
moving toward a rapprochement with Cairo, as was Qadhafi's Libya. 
Iraq retained a revolutionary orientation but was still isolated from the 
main currents of inter-Arab politics. South Yemen was even more 
radical; North Yemen was drawing closer to Saudi Arabia. Of the 
other states that had joined the system, Morocco and the Gulf 
sheikhdoms were conservative, Tunisia and Mauritania moderate, and 
the Sudan and Algeria to the left. Finally, the FLO had become an 
entity in its own right and posed a challenge to virtually all Arab 
regimes in its basic rejection of the status quo.^ ^ 
At this point, it is useful to introduce the argument of Raymond Hinnebusch, who 
considers that the Arab system first emerged as an autonomous entity in the 1950s under 
Egyptian leadership. Hinnebusch argues that the 1967 war destroyed the Egypt-centred 
Arab system, but that in the early 1970s, a new system, which Ajami called the 'Arab 
triangle', emerged from the crucible of the 1973 war. '^^  This system, however, 
Hinnebusch maintains, collapsed when Sadat broke Arab lines in pursuit of peace with 
Israel, setting Egypt and Syria at odds. Similarly, using the term 'new pragmatism', 
Taylor focuses on this 'trilateral alliance' as the product of a pragmatic trend in Arab 
politics which comprises the key grouping within the Arab system. The states of this 
alliance remained the dominant force in the system from 1971 until al-Sadat concluded 
the interim Sinai agreement with Israel in September 1975.^ ^ 
At this point the Arab system entered a new phase; in the view of Taylor, the Egyptian 
unilateral peace agreement with Israel instituted the 'polarisation' of Arab politics. The 
Arab system was split into several blocs with differing positions on the new thrust of 
53 Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, p. 47. 
The Arab triangle for Ajami is Egypt and Syria plus Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Syria, had a common 
need to capture their tenitories from Israel, launched the war of 1973 backed up by Saudi Arabia 
orchestrating the oil weapon. On this see F. Ajami, "Stress in the Arab Triangle", Foreign Policy 
(winter, 1977-78); For an analysis of the evolution of the Middle East Regional System see Raymond 
Hinnebusch, "The Middle East Regional System," in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (eds.) The Foreign 
Policies of the Middle Eastern States, (London, New York: Lynne Rienner 2002). 
Hinnebusch, R., "Egypt, Syria and the Arab State System in the New World Order," in H. Jawad, The 
Middle East in the New World Order, 2d ed. (London: McMillan Press, 1997), pp. 162-81. B. Tibi, 
"Structural and Ideological Change in the Arab subsystem Since the Six Day War," in L . Yehuda & 
A. M. Battah, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1998), pp. 147-63. 
56 Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, pp. 67-74. 
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Egyptian policy." Most pointedly, at this stage Taylor considers Egypt as being out of 
the system - something which disrupts the whole understanding of the system: 
The idea of Iraqi-Syrian unity^^ is logical in terms of geographic and 
economic affinities, but it had always been opposed by Egypt because 
such a state would have rivalled Egypt for hegemony in the Arab 
world. Once al-Sadat has withdrawn his country from the Arab system, 
however, it was natural that Iraq and Syria gravitated toward each 
other.^ ' 
Here, Taylor refutes the concept of the hostility and rivalry in Arab politics as forming a 
system. In turn, this explodes the whole idea of a system as he includes the Maghreb 
within the system without explaining the impact of that region upon the making of the 
system itself. Yet, a consideration of Egypt's peace with Israel as a withdrawal from the 
Arab system poses the idea that the Arab system for Taylor merely means Arab co-
operation. The truth is, however, that although Egypt signed that peace deal with Israel, 
it nevertheless remained central to the making of Arab politics because there was an 
anti-Egyptian bloc formed with Syria playing a leading role. This serves to exhibit the 
major impact of Egypt's role in the making or unmaking of the system. 
Meanwhile, for Taylor, the outcome and the major shape of Arab politics was 
polarisation, as suggested above. There was an Iraq-Saudi-Jordanian axis, Syrian-
Libyan Counter-axis, which was followed by the Iraq-Iran war. This, in turn, 
exacerbated the polarisation of the Arab system, which had commenced with al-Sadat's 
visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.^° 
The seventh chapter of Taylor's book briefly discusses the regional disputes considering 
the Western Sahara dispute, the North and South Yemen dispute, and The Red Sea and 
the Horn of Africa. Taylor's justification for considering the latter (the Red Sea and the 
Horn of Africa) and Somalia which was admitted to membership in 1974, is mainly 
Ibid., pp. 73-76. 
This refers to the Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement in the aftermath of al-Sadat's peace deal with Israel. 
'^ Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, p 78. 
*" Ibid., pp. 73-96. 
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because they are predominantly Arab, except for Ethiopia. Consequently, Taylor argues, 
international developments in the region affected the Arab balance of power.**' 
Thus, for Taylor, regionalism is the source of Arab disunity.^^ The Arab system became 
operative in 1945, since when the member states have been involved in a series of 
rivalries over the question of leadership. The most prominent of these was the struggle 
for hegemony between Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. In the 1970s, a variety of trans-
regional alignments emerged because of the diffusion of assets and influence. However, 
the competitive nature of inter-Arab politics remained unchanged.^ ^ 
Finally, in the last chapter of the book entitled The Arab Dilemma, Taylor considers the 
Iranian revolution as having had a destabilising effect on the Arab system. For Taylor, 
this constitutes a domestic pressure represented by fundamental Islam, writing as he was 
in 1982 at the height of the impact of the revolution. 
Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hilal Dessouki et al. (1984) The Foreign Policy of Arab 
States: the Challenge of Change. This study also provides a useful insight into Arab 
politics during this period. Of particular help is Chapter Two, 'The Global System and 
Arab Foreign Policies: the Primacy of Constraints', written by Bahgat Korany and Ali E. 
Hilal Dessouki. 
The emphasis of Korany and Dessouki in studying the Arab system is on the dialectics 
between the global system on the one hand and the Arab regional system on the other. 
At the onset of Chapter Two, 'The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies: the 
Primacy of Constraints', they argue that the Arab system is subordinated to the global 
one. This subordination has increased remarkably because the Arab system is 
fragmented and less effective at the international level.Before proceeding further with 
Taylor considers the primary destabilising factors during the 1960s and 1970s had been the conflict 
between Ethiopia and Somalia and the involvement of the Soviet Union in the affairs of these two 
countries. The Arab Balance of Power, p 105. 
" Ibid., p. 113, 
" Ibid., pp. 113-115. 
" Korany, B., & , A. E . Dessouki, "The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies: the Primacy of 
Constraints," in Korany and Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policy of Arab States: the Challenge of 
Change (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991). 
*^  Ibid., p. 25. 
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their discussion, however, they offer a definition of the global system: 'we mean the 
pattern of interactions among international actors, which take place according to an 
identifiable set of rules.''''' However, unlike other respected scholars in this chapter, by 
international actors they mean both states and non-state actors; OPEC for example is 
considered as an actor.^' 
Korany and Dessouki consider the Arab world as part of the Third world. The Arab 
world possesses several common elements that predominate over inter-Arab variations 
and make this group distinct entity within the larger Third World. These features, they 
conclude, include an Islamic component, cultural homogeneity, concentration of 
relevant resources, and the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict.^^ 
Yet, the impact of the Islamic component on the foreign policy of the Arab states and 
thus on the making of their system is that some governments might be pushed by 
Islamic groups to adopt 'Islamic foreign policy'. It is the same with cultural 
homogeneity which is embedded in pan-Arab ideology. This ideology considers the 
division of the Arab world into separate states as an aberration resulting from 'foreign 
designs'. Therefore, they see 'enthusiasm' of Arab masses about the UAR (1958-1961) 
as the confirmation of both the intense role of the masses in the making of Arab politics 
and the degree of homogeneity in the Arab system. In this context they argue that 
'almost, inter-Arab relations are not really foreign relations but part of the extended 
family instead. Thus Arab leaders tend to talk directly to the citizens of other Arab 
states'.Moreover, 'Arab homogeneity has led to occasional confrontation with the big 
powers because the latter are concerned over the potential emergence of a unified Arab 
state that could constitute an effective barrier to their influence in the region and their 
desire to control Arab resources'.'' 
*' Ibid., p. 26. 
" Ibid., p. 27. 
Ibid., p. 32. 
*' Korany and Dessouki gives an example of the secularist Saddam Hussein's emphasis on jihad against 
the coalition forces following the invasion of Kuwait, ibid., p. 32. 
™ Ibid., pp. 30-32. 
Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
48 
For these authors, too, the Arab system is unified on the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. 'The perception of the Palestinian problem and of Western policy towards the 
Arabs is the major reason that Arab nationalists in the mid-1950s refused participation 
in Western alliances and adopted a policy of nonalignment.'''^ However, the huge 
degree of intervention by big powers affected the Arab system; to the majority of 
international actors, the global system presents an arena of both constraints and 
opportunities. In the case of the Arab countries, the constraints outnumbered the 
opportunities. Korany and Dessouki illustrate this point using the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
They argue that Arab-Israeli relations in the last thirty-five years have cost the Arab 
Middle East six wars. This led to militarised Arab-Arab relations. The issue of 
militarization of the system affected the making of alliances in the ME. For example, by 
the early 1970s, Egypt had changed its dominant international partner by establishing 
close military and economic co-operation with the Soviets. 
In sum, Korany and Dessouki's argument is based on hegemony, which is rooted in the 
system itself: "nothing other than the system counts in the making of a country's foreign 
policy." As they consider examples of the forming process of the Arab system since the 
late 1940s, they argue that interactions between national capabilities and dispositions on 
the one hand, and existing systemic structures on the other, determine a country's 
foreign policy. From this angle, the Arab system, to the date of writing their book, is a 
product of the global constraints and certain internal Arab dynamics which made that 
system.'''* 
Paul Noble, 'The Arab State System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities',''^ 
Chapter Three in Korany and Dessouki, The Foreign Policy of Arab States. Here Noble 
focuses on the Arab regional system in what he called the 'core area' or the 'eastern 
Arab world'. In a footnote, he concludes that the eastern Arab world includes Egypt, 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian community, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the 
72 Ibid., p. 36. 
" Paul Noble in the same sense, in the same book, describes this as the militarization of Arab foreign 
policy. See Noble 'The Arab system, Pressure, Constraints, and Opportunities,", in Korany B., & A. E 
Dessouki (eds.), et al. The Foreign Policy of Arab States: The Challenge of Change (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 49-102. 
74 Korany and Dessouki, The Global System, pp.30-36. 
•'^  Noble, "The Arab System", in Korany B., & A. E Dessouki (eds.), et al. The Foreign Policy of Arab 
States: The Challenge of Change, 1991, pp 49-102. 
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remaining states of the Arabian Peninsula.Notably, he divides these states to two 
flanks: the east flank, which he associates with the Arab-Iranian relations, and the west 
flank, which he associates with Arab-Israeli relations. 
The norms he sets to delineate an Arab system are twofold: there are domestic settings -
- what he calls 'unit properties' - and 'relational properties', or the degree of 
homogeneity and interconnectedness. For Noble, the unit properties are the domestic 
developments within Arab states, which are similar. These developments are first the 
increasing domestic political awareness amongst the peoples of these countries, which 
resulted in the emergence of sharp ideological cleavages during the 1950s and 1960s. 
As Noble asserts: 'These developments altered the international position and behaviour 
of members of the Arab system'.He also suggests that the impact of these issues on 
the making of the system is that they influenced the state legitimacy in the early years of 
system's formation. 
The sense of Arab identity was strong throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This was 
represented by Arab cultural homogeneity. Noble attributes this to the intensity of the 
links between system members, which helped to form the system as a 'body'; linguistic 
and cultural homogeneity contributed to the development of strong political links at 
78 
both state and societal level. 
Notably during this period, power was not diffused but concentrated. Egypt's vast 
superiority, compared with the other members of the system, represented the 
pronounced power in the regional order. Therefore, the Arab system in the 1950s and 
1960s stood between an unbalanced multipower system and a one-power system.^ ^ In 
this sense. Noble alludes to the high degree of political shape of the regional power and 
thus the regional order. For the decade prior to 1967, inter-Arab relations had been 
marked by the conflict between progressive regimes with strong anti-Western bias and 
conservative regimes with close ties to the Western powers.^ *^  Nasser's presence in the 
" Ibid., p 93, n. 3. 
" Ibid., p 50. 
Ibid., pp. 52-56, 56. 
^' Ibid., p. 63. 
Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
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political arena ensured that tlie conservative regimes did not manage to form a cohesive 
bloc. 
At the same time, however, Egypt's military and economic capabilities provided only a 
limited basis of power. Yet, in the 1970s and 1980s, important changes took place in 
both the basis and distribution of power. With regard to the basis of power, as Noble 
argues, there was an increase in the importance of economic power, provided primarily 
by means of the Arab oil. In turn, this changed the international relations of the system 
itself. This became the new capacity to exert pressure on the Western powers in support 
of Arab interest. The most striking fact provided by Noble about the system is that 
while the material capabilities were becoming more significant, political capabilities 
declined in importance.^^ 
Noble argues that what distinguishes the Arab system is the huge intensity of interaction 
among its members. During the 1950s and 1960s, 'the Arab world constituted a 
revolutionary intentional system'.*^ The leader in the system in this period ~ Egypt -
posed a threat to other members of the system, which led to a conflict of status and 
influence. Therefore, Noble argues that Egypt was by far the greatest source of 
disturbance in this sphere; from 1955 on Nasser openly sought hegemony.*"^  
The nature of conflict amongst members of the system affected their inter-relations and 
affected their relations with the outside major powers. On one hand, from the mid 1950s 
on, the differences between Arab states over their relations with the Western powers 
intensified as the Western powers sought to strengthen their presence in the face of 
growing Soviet involvement in the ME. On the other hand, the opening conflict, or the 
Cold War impact, between the superpowers towards regional conflicts (e.g. the Arab-
si Ibid., p. 65. 
Similar to this argument is that of F. Ajami, End of Arabism, pp 359-368. Also similar is that of 
Dessouki, '"New Arab Order," in Kerr, Rich and Poor Stales. Korany discusses the shift of power 
taking Saudi Arabia as a case study: Korany, Petro-puissance et system mondial. Le cas de I'Arabie 
Saoudite, Etudes Internationales 10, 4 (1979). 
Noble, Paul, The Arab System, in Korany & Dessouki, (eds.). The Arab Foreign Policy of Arab 
States, 1991, p. 73. 
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Israeli conflict and Lebanese conflict) led to the increase in polarisation between 
regional states 85 
Added to this environment is the impact of Iran on the Arab system. Noble tends to 
focus on the impact of Iran on the making of the system only after the 1979 revolution. 
This new dimension of conflict added to the pressure already imposed upon the Arab 
system by the Arab-Israeli one. In particular, Israel posed a territorial and military-
security threat and Iran constituted an ideological and internal-security threat. This type 
of threat led to the militarization of foreign policy. 
The shift from pohtical warfare to diplomacy during the 1970s was a result of the 
existing of a sole regional power in the system. Diplomacy means for Noble, in this 
context, the hardening of the Arab state. As the system became less revolutionary, rigid 
Unes of division were softened in the system. 
From the late 1970s on situations worsened. Members of the system on the western 
flank of the core area were confronted with an overtly expansionist Israel. Israeli 
policies and behaviour not only endangered the security, territorial integrity, and even 
national integrity of these states but also threatened to reduce them to a subordinate and 
dependent position. The members lying on the eastern flank faced the threat of a new 
revolutionary Iran. This tended to accentuate the fragmentation of the system which 
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persisted and became intensified. 
In sum, Noble's argument considers that the events of specific periods affected the 
making of the system itself, and that there is in existence an independent Arab system 
with specific dynamics. 
P.J. Vatikiotis's Arab Regional Politics in the Middle East (1984), is divided into 
three parts: Part Two of the book focuses on inter-Arab relations. Regional politics are 
sub-sectioned within this part. 
^ Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
Ibid., p. 82. 
'^^  Ibid., pp. 88-89 , ^ f , . -
Vatikiotis, P.J., Arab Regional Politics in the Middle East (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984). 
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Vatikiotis, along with many other scholars, emphasises the rivalry in Arab politics. He 
divides inter-Arab relations after the Second World War into four periods of study; 
1948-58; 1958-67; 1967-73; from 1973.^ ^ In studying the actors in these periods, he 
considers the Fertile Crescent, The Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, and Egypt. 
Vatikiotis argues that in the 1950s and 1960s, inter-Arab relations oscillated from 
consensus to disagreement, especially under Nasser's Pan-Arab or radical Arab 
leadership. This period was characterised by a flexible system of short-lived alliances. 
These shifts personalised foreign policies. Equally significant was the penetration of 
inter-Arab politics by external influences. 
The war of 1967 undermined Egypt's role in Arab politics. Vatikiotis argues that the 
Khartoum Arab Summit Conference of that year signalled a historic compromise 
between radicals and conservatives (Egypt and Saudi Arabia).^ *^ Similar to the argument 
of Kerr, Vatikiotis considers that the death of Nasser in 1970 left a vacuum in the 
leadership in Arab politics. 
Alongside this remarkable change in Arab politics, Vatikiotis argues that there was a 
devaluation of ideological Arabism and the promotion of state interest. There emerged 
an Arab solidarity and Arab co-operation to replace Arab unity. Therefore, this new 
situation itself explains the Arab Cold War, a new pragmatic Arabism and the de-
ideologisation of Arab relations.^' 
In addition to this, the 1973 war marked the emergence of oil-producing countries as a 
new variable in the making of Arab regional order. This made the Gulf a new centre of 
political gravity. However, most noticeably from 1973-1977, the Arab worid was under 
the umbrella of Cairo-Riyadh axis. The significance of this in making the Arab system 
an international system was the continuous role that Egypt played in governing the 
making of Arab politics. 
Ibid., p. 82. 
*" Ibid., p. 160. 
Ibid., p. 161. 
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New arrangements in the shifting of Arab alliances emerged after 1979, where there was 
a brief triangular relationship between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria. There was an 
Arab alliance between Iraq and Saudi Arabia which was occasioned by their common 
interest in the security of the Gulf and the threat from the Iranian revolution.^^ 
It can be seen, therefore, that Vatikiotis concedes the existence of an Arab system. 
However, his study follows a traditional methodological approach of offering the events 
and their causes, and fails to provide a theoretical framework to understand the 
mechanisms of the existing system. The historical listing of events gives a broad 
framework to the book. 
Carl L. Brown, (1984), 'International Politics of the Middle East,'^^ includes all the 
states whose territory was once under Ottoman control and all the great powers. 
Brown's explanation of the functions of the system is based on what he terms as an 
'Ottoman political culture' inherited by those states. Therefore, Turkey and Israel are in 
the system, but Iran and Morocco are not.^ "^  
The 'rules of the Eastern Question game' is a diplomatic issue for Brown: he notices 
that Middle East system is highly penetrated by outside great powers, that there is an 
emphasis on reactive politics, and a zero-sum mentality occupies the players' outlook. 
Brown 'diagnoses' this issue as 'homeostasis', which means the ability of any one actor 
to impose its wil l on the region.^^ This, in his view, is due to the fact that there is no 
single power to achieve hegemony in the region. However, the springboard of Brown's 
argument is that diplomatic political culture inherited from the Ottoman Empire.^^ 
Bassam Tibi (1987), 'Regional Subsystems and World Order: The case of Inter-Arab 
State Relations 1967-1982'.^^ Tibi considers the concept 'subsystem' as a viable 
Ibid., p. 163. 
Brown, L . C , International Politics of the Middle East, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 
1984). 
Ibid., pp. 7-11. 
Ibid., pp. 16-18. 
'* Ibid., pp. 11-14, 18. 
" Tibi, B., Regional Subsystems and World Order: The case of Inter-Arab State Relations ]967-]982, 
British Society of Middle East Studies (BRISMES), Annual Meeting (Exeter, July, 1987). 
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methodological option for analysing political changes in world regions. As a 
consequence, he employs this concept in the study of the historical period of the ME 
between 1967 and 1982.^ ^ Here, Tibi argues that the war of 1967 launched a new period, 
which had ended, however, by 1982, because that year "marks the end of the oil age in 
the Arab subsystem of world order."^^ 
However, Tibi concludes that the regional order in the ME cannot be understood as an 
outcome inter-state interaction within a regional subsystem. There is no such Arab 
Society, or Arab World in his view; he argues that 
It is simply wrong to talk about a single 'Arab society as many Arab 
writers do or about an Arab world of its own, as Western analysts 
mostly do. We rather talk about a system of states with a regional 
setting, a system with great exposure to those external powers seeking 
for allies or proxies for imposing and promoting their interests with 
the assistance of local actors.'"" 
The criteria he employs for defining and delimiting the ME as a regional subsystem are 
"structural interconnectedness" and the "density of interaction" (co-operation, 
integration, as well as discord). He considers the Arab states of the ME plus Iran, 
Turkey, and Israel as making up the members of the system. 
Tibi considers that the June war of 1967 led to the destruction of Egyptian military 
power and the Nasserite experiment as well. Thereafter, a new regional order emerged, 
in which the core of the Arab system shifted from the centre of the revolution to the 
centre of wealth. Saudi Arabia thus started to replace Egypt in the system of Arab inter-
state relations. 
Tibi argues that the rise of political Islam, which culminated in the Iranian revolution in 
1979, characterised the 1970s. For him, the emergence of political Islam has become a 
salient feature in the domestic policies and in the regional inter-state relations in the 
ME. 
Ibid., p. 2. 
" Ibid., p. 2. 
Ibid., p. 3. 
Tibi, Regional Subsystems and World Order, p. 6. 
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Finally, Tibi characterises the system in this period as diffuse, which in turn destabilised 
the region during the period of study. For him, it was a system without a centre. The 
'age of oil ' during the period of 1967-1982 was characterised by the lack of hope, which 
is why there was a resort to political Islam, and this has had an impact on the regional 
order as a whole. 
The first outstanding Arabic contribution on the subject was of Jamil Matar and Al i al-
Din Hilal Dessouki, al-Nizam al-iqlimi al-Arabi [The Arab Regional System]. This 
book analyses inter-Arab relations from a regional system perspective. In defining an 
Arab system, the authors base their argument on the understanding of the Arab nation. 
This leads them to reject the inclusion of Israel because of its status as a non-Arab state 
and as an enemy to the Arabs within the system. They also deny the inclusion of both 
Turkey and Iran since they are non-Arab states. 
The main argument of Matar and Dessouki is that the ME is of Eurocentric and colonial 
origin. Subsequently, their definition of the ME is based on the components of the 
ME, which are its states that comprise its system, i.e. the 'Arab' states extending from 
Mauritania to the Gulf r e g i o n . Y e t , when they speak of an Arab nation, they mainly 
speak of Arab nationalism as a structurally-binding political factor in making the 
system. Thus, they define the system as a regional order, which is Arab order, which in 
turn is the structure of the system. 
It is important at this point to return to the notion of the period of the study. The third 
edition of their book was published in 1983, which is the temporal end-point to this 
particular study - the starting point being 1945. During this period, the authors consider 
the Arab system as being nationally 'closed', which means that the states that share 
geographic proximity within the system do not share its political characteristics. From 
102 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
Matar, Jamil & Hilal, Ali al-Din, al-Nizam al-iqlimi al-Arabi Dirasat if al- Alaqat Al-Arabiah al-
Siyasiali [The Arab Regional System: A study in inter-Arab relations], 3"* ed. (Beirut: Dar al 
Mustaqbal al- Arabi, 1983). 
Matar & Dessouki, pp. 28-38. These authors offer some conclusions on page 33 about the definition 
of the ME. In their opinion, the term ME does not indicate a geographic area or complex, but it is a 
political term in its origin and usage. The second conclusion is drawn by their questioning of the 
terms 'East' and 'Middle'. The Middle of where, they ask, and east of where? The usage of these 
terms for Matar and Dessouki tends to affect the unity of the Arab nation whilst entering non-Arab 
states in its system. 
105 Ibid., p. 30, 33. 
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this point, they deny interaction as integration but apply certain criteria to the mode of 
interaction, which is Arab nationalism.'"^ Al l in all, they consider that an Arab system 
has been in existence from the time of the establishment of the Arab League. 
Itamar Rabinovich, The Politics of Fragmentation and Anticipation: Inter-Arab 
Relations in the Early 1980s (1984).'"^ Rabinovich considers the establishment of the 
Arab League in 1945 as the start of the Arab system. At the beginning of his work, he 
takes the founding states of the Arab League as members of the system. Later, he tends 
to incorporate the countries of North Africa into the system. 
However, he considers the main characteristics of the system as being the absence of 
cohesion and the presence of a conflictual relationship. The Arab League, he argues, 
represented a compromise between the quest for union and unity and its members' 
10R 
particular interests. 
Rabinovich tends to introduce to the period of the 1980s by explaining the impact of the 
emergence of Arab summit meetings of 1964 to reflect the capacity of the system, 
which he refers to as 'anticipation'. Notably, for him, the Arab summits represent the 
single important all-Arab forum.'"^ 
After 1967, the decline of Egypt's role in the Arab world, the rise of the influence of the 
conservative Arab regimes, and the emergence of new radical ones, resulted in a new 
multi-polarity of Arab regional politics."" Thus, it seemed for a while that towards the 
mid-1970s, a new period had begun in Arab regional politics. The October War, the oil 
embargo, arid the accumulation of huge oil revenues seemed to have generated a 'new 
Malar & Dessouki, [The Arab Regional System: A study in inter-Arab relations], pp. 80-82, 92, 
275-278. 
Rabinovich, I., The Politics of Fragmentation and Anticipation: Inter-Arab Relations in the Early 
1980s, (Tel Aviv, Occasional Papers, The Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies: 
The Shiloah Institute, 1984). 
Ibid., p. 2. 
"^^  Ibid., pp.2-3. 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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Arab order.'"' But, by the end of the 1970s, fragmentation had surfaced in the making 
of Arab politics and this fragmentation was marked by four elements: 
(i) Egypt's defiance of the system, referring to al-Sadat's peace with Israel. 
(ii) The political frailty of most oil producing states. Saudi Arabia is an example; it 
was unable to contend with the demands and responsibilities created by its new 
position of leadership in the Arab world. 
(iii) The Iranian revolution and the war between Iran and Iraq. The revolution 
affected the Arab regional order in which, for example, the Arab oil-producing 
states in the Gulf were largely preoccupied with the combined danger of 
subversive ideas and military invasion coming from Iran. The war between Iraq 
and Iran divided the alliances among Arab states towards Iraq. 
(iv) The impact of international alignment. This refers to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Although Islam at this stage reached a level of political force, the 
Soviet Union's aUies in the region—Syria, Libya, Algeria, and he PDRY and the 
P.L.O.—were willing to incur the opprobrium of Muslims and Arabs and 
refused to denounce the Soviet actions. 
Therefore, for Rabinovich, the Arab system of the 1980s bears the imprint of the older 
and more recent developments described above. 112 
Based on all this, Rabinovich considers the Arab system of the early 1980s as an 
unusual disorder. It became increasingly difficult to mobilise the whole system for 
positive action and thus the system became an instrument in the hands of those who 
could manipulate it for their own ends.' 
Notably, and most importantly, Rabinovich alludes to the increasing impact of non-
Arab states upon the making of Arab politics. The decline of pan-Arab nationalism 
changed the normal Arab political business, and as a result, non-Arab actors began to 
111 Ibid., p.4. There are various Arab writers who described this period as the 'new Arab regional order'; 
See S'aad Al-Din Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order, (in Arabic), Beirut, 1982); Ali E . Hillal 
Dessouki, "The New Arab Political Order: Implications for the 1980s," in M. H. Kerr & E l Sayed 
Yassin (eds.). Rich and Poor States in the Middle East (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 
pp. 319-347. 
Rabinovich, The Politics of Fragmentation and Anticipation, pp. 5-8. 
Ibid.,p.25. 
58 
play a new role. The Israeli impact on inter-Arab relations was present in Arab politics 
through conflict since the 1940s, but, in the eariy 1980s, it became present through 
political interaction with the Arab system. Israel's new relationship with Egypt and 
Lebanon afforded it a measure of subtler political influence."'* 
Iran's role too became more direct and explicit, something which has generated a heated 
ideological debate. Syria and Libya extended their support to Iran during the war 
between Iraq and Iran, even attempting to integrate Iran into a new pattern of regional 
politics."^ 
To sum up, the structure of the system for Rabinovich in the early 1980s was both 
conflictual and fragmented. However, he defines an independent system as taking into 
account all Arab states as members of that system."^ 
Stephen Walt The Origins of Alliances " ^ first published (1987). I will be using the 
latest print of 1995 in this study. Here Walt examines the theory and practice of 
alliances, taking the ME as evidence to contextualise his study. His book comprises of 
eight chapters. Notably, as many other scholars mentioned below, he focuses on the 
Baghdad pact"^ as a starting point to his book. In addition, he discusses the impact of 
period from the Six day War to the Camp David Accords. In Chapter Five, which 
comprises the crux of his book, he discusses balancing and bandwagoning, again taking 
the ME as the core case. In short, he discusses the period from 1955 to 1979 taking the 
alliances in this period as the standard measure for his study. 
Ibid, p. 9. 
Ibid., p. 10. In September 1981, Iran's foreign Minister appeared at a Benghazi meeting of the Arab 
Steadfastness Front, of which Syria and Libya were the core members. In January 1982, a tripartite 
meeting of the Syrian, Libyan and Iranian foreign ministers took place in Damascus. 
Rabinovich, The Politics of Fragmentation and Anticipation, pp. 14-30. 
See Walt, S., The Origin of Alliances, 1987). 
Walt defines alliance as 'a formal or informal relationship of security co-operation between two or 
more sovereign states. This definition assumes some level of commitment and an exchange of 
benefits for both parties; severing the relationship or failing to honour the agreement would 
presumably cost something, even if it were compensated in other ways'. Ibid, p. 1. 
The actual title of the Baghdad Pact was the Pact of Mutual Co-operation. For full text, see Jacob C. 
Hrewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1914-1956 (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1956). 
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Walt associates the formation of the system in the Arab ME with the security 
environment which dominated the region after the Second World War. He argues that 
there were four developments after the end of the war:'^" 
(i) The decline in British and French influence was accompanied by an Arab awaking 
in the region. 
(ii) The division of the Arabs, as it resulted from foreign domination. Thus a desire to 
restore the political unity of the Arab world became an influential factor in 
making Arab politics. 
(iii) The establishment of Israel created an enduring source of conflict. 
(iv) Soviet and U.S. interests in the region were growing rapidly. 
Within this environment, Walt lists the states which he considers define the Middle East 
System, incorporating Israel and extra regional great powers into the system, but 
excluding Iran, Turkey and North Africa from his calculation.'^' Walt places great 
weight on the demonstrable influence on the balance of power in the ME. The central 
issue in his book therefore is the question of whether states are more likely to balance 
against states that pose a threat, or else bandwagon with those threatening states.'^ ^ 
Walt sees both anarchy and multipolarity as the driving force behind alliances in the ME. 
As evidence he draws on the fact that each state is able to develop its form of alliance 
against existing threats to its existence. For Walt, therefore this concept-threat 
theoretically replaces that of power. Thus he views the balance of threat theory as a 
refinement of traditional balance of power theory,'^^ suggesting that Arab states in the 
ME were seeking to balance threat rather than power. Consequently, the suggested 
system for Walt is that based on the insecure environment which generated that system. 
Walt, The Origin of Alliances, .p 52. 
Ibid., pp. 53-57. 
Ibid., pp. 2-5. 
1 ^ Ibid., p. 263. 
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Michael Bamett (1998), in his book Dialogues in Arab politics, limits his 
investigation of the system only to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen. His justification for choosing these states is that they are the "original 
members of the league of Arab states, they were at the forefront of and defined the 
debate about regional order".'^^ He considers the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as 
a unit in the system based on the vital role it played in Arab politics.'^^ He argues that 
even before the creation of the PLO in 1964, various leaders from the Palestinian 
community were important to the making of Arab politics 'particularly as [they] 
pertained to the confrontation of Zionism.' '^ ^ 
Bamett's study covers the period from the end of the Second World War to 1998, the 
year in which the book was first published. The moments during this period of Arab 
politics which he recognises as constituting the system are referred to as 'dialogue'. 
Dialogue for him is represented through the Baghdad Pact of 1955, the establishment of 
the United Arab Republic in 1958, the Arab Summit meeting of 1964, the Camp David 
Accords of 1979, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
For Bamett, however, the Arab dialogue is embedded in a stmcture or what he termed 
as the 'Game': 
That the structure in which actors are embedded shapes their public 
pursuits and that actors can be expected to appropriate these norms for 
their private interests. Arabism shaped the social interests of Arab 
leaders, and Arab leaders used these norms to further their personal 
objective of regime survival.'^* 
This stmcture of the dialogue in Arab politics represents the period under study, thus 
characterising the system. Bamett's characterisation is mainly a 'normative 
fragmentation' of Arab politics. In this context, he concludes: 
a central claim of this book is that there is new environment to Arab 
politics, one largely created by and through the actions of Arab states; 
Barnett, Dialogue in Arab Politics, 1998. 
Ibid., p. 16. 
Ibid., p. 16. 
Ibid., p. 16. 
Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
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this environment can be characterised as normative fragmentation 
because Arab states are no longer as pressed toward mutual 
orientation because of the decline of underlying shared values and 
identities.'^' 
For Bamett, then, the structure of inter-Arab politics constitutes a system. The engine of 
that system is first, state sovereignty; second, the capacity of Arab leaders and their 
desire to remain in power; third, Arabism which is that normative fragmentation. 
These three variables organise the system. In Bamett's view, this is the game and thus 
the dialogue of Arab politics. 
Although the view of the system differs from one scholar to another, the notable 
consensus of the respective readings documented above is that there has been a system 
in existence since the inception of the Arab League in 1945. This assumption is based 
on two factors: first, the evidence provided within the above works, and second, the 
definition of the concept 'system'. As asserted in Chapter One of this study, the system 
is the sum of interactions across the units. Therefore, it cannot be argued that a system 
existed from, for example 1945 to 1967 or between 1958 and 1967 because interactions, 
or more precisely, Arab interactions, did not cease to exist in the intervening periods. 
Even as al-Sadat made his peace with Israel, there remained a degree of interaction 
between Egypt and other Arab states. Accordingly, the readings above acknowledge 
that there was a system during this entire period. 
In the discussion of the type of system, and the moulding of the theories of international 
relations with those pertaining to the system, it is Walt who most directly applies a Neo-
Realist approach to the study of the system. In other words, Walt takes the balance of 
threat theory as the mechanism by which to examine whether states are to balance 
against other states that pose a threat, or else to bandwagon with those threatening 
states.'^' 
129 Ibid., p. 50. 
Bamett brings up the concept 'game' of Arab politics in many occasions in the book. He concludes 
that there is a constructivist approaches to the game of Arab politics, which means the social and 
strategic interactions within Arab politics. See Ibid., pp., 6-8,26-29. 
Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp.3-4. 
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Kerr and Gerges, at least, define the period of their study, and as a result their 
examination of the existence of a system lies within specific parameters. This gives their 
definition more solidity. On the other hand, the literature provided by Matar and Hilal 
leads to no specific definition of what the system is. This results in a tendency for them 
to loose their 'grip' when discussing the transformation of the system. In his evaluation 
of Matar and Hilal's work, Gregory Cause i n expresses it thus: 'Matar and Hilal 
provide no guidance for identifying just what kind of changes in the distribution of 
regional power are "fundamental" when alliance changes become the "formation of new 
axes on ideological or economic bases," or when ideology becomes a "major 
doctrine"'.'^^ In this respect, Matar and Hilal cannot be included within the paradigm of 
systemic analysis. 
In his writing, as we have seen, Bamett explains what he regards as the 'normative 
fragmentation' of Arab politics. The wide guideline in his work is his understanding of 
Arabism and its impact on alliance formation, specifically in its zenith. Although he 
succeeds in providing guidelines for how dialogue within Arab politics is constructed, 
the main problem lies in his periodic measurement. He contends that the widely shared 
understanding of Arabism prohibited open alignment with Western powers, and yet, as 
we know, Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact, Saudi Arabia supported the Eisenhower 
doctrine, and Lebanon and Jordan invited American and British forces into their 
countries. The question as to how many exceptions would constitute a challenge to 
Bamett's classification of some periods as characterised by strong normative consensus, 
and others by normative fragmentation, remain unanswered.'^^ 
Despite differing methodologies in the study of Arab politics as they existed between 
1945 and 1990, the common focus of all the respected scholars documented above is 
essentially on inter-Arab conflict and rivalry. Having therefore inferred that there is 
evidence for the existence of a system during the period covered by this chapter of my 
study, nevertheless, for the sake of coherence the remaining section of this chapter will 
concentrate on delineating the specific properties inherent within that system. 
Cause, G. F. , I l l , Systemic Approach to Middle East International Relations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999), p. 17. 
133 Ibid., p. 16. 
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The properties of the system were; 
• Inter-Arab Conflict 
• The Arab-Israeli conflict 
Inter-Arab conflict 
Internal factors 
In actual fact, the scholars identified above who focus on the nature of Arab conflict do 
not regard these conflicts in a context outside that of the Arab League. They discuss, for 
instance, the conflictual nature of Arab states within the League and the challenges to 
the League's institutional role. For Kerr, for example, the main challenge to the Arab 
League came from Arab states or members of the League themselves. Kerr refers to this 
as the Arab Cold War ~ terminology which reflects the degree of conflictual complexity 
within Arab politics. 
Maddy-Weitzmann too considers the Arab League as the first step in the crystallisation 
of the system. But in his account, rivalry between the Arab 'sovereign' states in the 
League crippled Arab states and thus prevented them from dealing with the newly 
established non-Arab state- Israel. For Maddy-Weitzmann then, the League served to 
institutionalise Arab divisions. 
Similarly, Rabinovich considers the League as the grounds for its members to achieve 
their interests within a conflictual environment. In the same context, Ghassan Salame 
recognises the frustration which accompanied the foundation of the League: in his view 
'this frustration...was bom with the Arab League itself. The League has survived, and so 
has the frustration.''^'* For Bamett, as we have seen, the dialogue of rivalry within Arab 
politics which this frustration represents comprises the mechanisms of an Arab 'game' 
in which one Arab state vies for authority over the others. In this context, it is fair to say 
134 Salame, G., 'Integration in the Arab World: The Institutional Framework', in G. Luciani & G. 
Salame (eds.). The Politics of Arab Integration (London, New York: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 275. 
For a useful survey study on the efficiency of the Arab League See S. E . Ibrahim, Itijahat ar-Ra'i al-
Am al-Arabi nahwa Mas'alat al-Wahda [Trends of Arab public opinion toward the issue of unity], 
(Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity 1980). 
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that inter-Arab conflict makes up one of the major characteristics of the system. This 
latter point wil l reverberate throughout the coming chapter as I discuss the causes and 
consequences of the Kuwait crisis. 
External Factors 
Identifying in their study the constraints and pressures of the system, Korany and 
Dessouki focus clearly on its hegemony. In their view, the hegemony of the world 
system d la dependencia, put pressure on the making of Arab politics. In a similar vein 
to this argument, Jamil Matar and Hilal Dessouki also identify external factors as 
putting pressure on the making of the Arab system. Specifically, they cite the way in 
which the Arab system has increasingly seen intmsions from both the world system and 
even from the states peripheral to the system—namely, Iran and Israel, However, these 
authors characterise the influence of such external pressures upon the making of the 
system within the context of the specific period of their study - which is mainly the 
period of Cold War. 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict 
All scholars place this issue at the forefront of the making of Arab politics, and they all 
concur that this is a determinant factor in shaping the Arab system. Explicitly, Maddy-
Weitzmann considers the crystallisation of the Arab system as having come about as a 
result of the Arab states' going along with the existence of Israel. In this context he 
views the issue of balance of power as determining the shape of the Arab system after 
the establishment of the state of Israel. Thus, one of the characteristics of the Arab 
system, during the period or research within this chapter is that the system was 
influenced and affected by an Israeli factorial dimension. 
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Hypothesis 
This chapter has set out to demonstrate that there existed an Arab system based on 
different types of Arab interactions dominated by Arab conflict and rivalry during the 
period in question.'^^ My hypothesis is therefore mainly derived from those readings 
documented above, and will expand upon them primarily within the scope of discussion. 
Based on the nature of Middle Eastern political interactions and the huge degree of 
change that affects the academic arena, the absence of futurology studies should 
therefore be seen as justified. Thus, the hypothesis presented at this stage will serve to 
access the coming chapter, which will discuss the causes and consequences of the 
Kuwait Crisis and its impact on the form of system delineated above. 
In conclusion, it was inter-Arab rivalry which marked the making of their politics 
between 1945 and 1990. The Kuwait Crisis, which many regarded as a time of turmoil, 
brought about a change to the structural constraints of the existing conflict. My thesis 
regards this event on the one hand as a natural expansion of the existing regional order, 
so it does not define the Crisis as a period of turmoil. On the other hand, it considers 
that it is not the Kuwait Crisis itself which explains the relationship between Arab states 
and the superpower(s), but its aftermath. Put simply, the above paradigm of the Arab 
system as being the sum of Arab interactions flows naturally into the larger arena of the 
Kuwait Crisis. The failure of Arab 'diplomatic' capability to prevent the war in 1991 
has shown that there was an Arab system already in existence. The system itself, as a 
representative of the regional order, was equally responsible for the conflict in the 
region, because Saddam himself was operating within that system. 
From this hypothesis, I will proceed onto a discussion of the causes and consequences 
of the Kuwait Crisis. 
Between 1949 and 1967 Arab states had roughly ten militarised disputes (three of those coming in the 
Maghreb); they had nineteen militarised disputes between 1967 and 1989. In Barnett, M, N. 
Dialogue in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, 1998, p. 203. 
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Summary 
This chapter was designed to provide a comprehensive overview of the existing and 
relevant literature that discusses the background of the Arab system between 1945-1990. 
The findings of the chapter are that there was an Arab system in existence during this 
period. 
The literature discussed in this chapter is the most relevant to the study of the Arab 
system. In some cases, the concept "Arab System" was not mentioned, but the study of 
a given author revolve around this concept. However, critically enough, the concept 
identity—or Arab Identity- is clearly the dominant term in the period of study. The 
sense of Arab identity was strong throughout the 1950s and 1960s, especially during 
Nasser's leadership. This was represented by a sense of common cultural identity and a 
common political goal which was, at that time, to solve the Palestinian problem. During 
this period, power was not diffused but concentrated in Egypt's powerful political and 
military position in the Arab. 
In the early 1950s, a form of balance of power emerged in the newly independent Arab 
states' system. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were opposing every aspect of system re-
construction attempted by the Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq. Both King Abdallah of 
Jordan and Nuri Assaid of Iraq were proposing aspects of Arab unity that could change 
the existing balance of power. 
The late 1950s witnessed the emergence of Nasser's political status and power. Nasser 
tried to re-structure the Arab system according to the norms of non-alignment in which 
neither East nor West could interfere in Arab regional politics. During the 1960s, he 
introduced a new structural framework by which he could control and regulate the 
foreign policies of other Arab states. At this time, however, there was no diffusion of 
power in the Arab system. 
The 1967 war diffused Arab power, and a new regional balance of power emerged. This 
was represented by the shift from military power to diplomacy during the 1970s. The 
Arab system became less revolutionary. However, fragmentation in Arab politics had 
surfaced by the late 1970s, when Egypt signed its peace with Israel. During this period, 
a new power struggle emerged between Syria, dragging Lebanon and Libya from one 
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side, and Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan from the other. The system then became highly 
polarised to the extent at which diplomatic ties were broken between Syria and Iraq. 
Syria supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, and Jordan, for example, supported Iraq. 
At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq emerged stronger, a factor which, by political and 
military calculations, has changed the political face of the region. The ambitions of 
Saddam Hussein to play an Arab regional role, similar to that of Nasser, prompted him 
to establish the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the change in the international balance of power. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has brought the Arab system to an end. A new 
phase of Arab politics has emerged. I shall use the coming chapter to demonstrate the 
changes and developments in Arab politics as this is the main concern of this study. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
The Impact of the Kuwait Crisis on the Arab Regional Order 
Introduction 
The Kuwait Crisis' (KC) has undoubtedly had a huge impact on inter-Arab relations. 
The question is, however, whether the crisis created a new Arab regional order, or did it 
merely further the already existing type of inter-Arab relations? In answer to these 
questions, this chapter will argue that the most salient feature of the impact of the crisis 
was that it further fragmented the Arabs. In so doing, it furthered an existing order; 
moreover, it fully legitimised the American presence on 'Arab' soil and put an end to 
the Arab system to allow Arab states to integrate in a wider Middle East system. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: primarily, it will offer an examination of the 
relationship between the concept 'order' and the KC in order to investigate whether the 
KC ushered in an Arab regional order. Before that, however, it will examine whether 
the crisis had an impact on the making of the new international order. In so doing, it will 
draw upon the concept 'galvanisation' as defined in the early pages of this thesis. The 
discussion of inter-Arab relations and the structure of Arab politics in the region after 
the crisis will be subject to this concept. The main focus of this chapter will be as 
follows: firstly, that the crisis led to a direct, legitimate, uncontested, Arab-supported 
American presence in the ME, which automatically led to the galvanisation of the 
region; and secondly, that galvanisation of the regional political order was in itself an 
order within which Arab states had to operate. In turn, this led to the most immediate 
impact of the crisis, which was the triggering of the Arab-Israeli dialogue. This is 
On the concept crisis, definitions, debates, and arguments see Charles Hermann, International Crisis: 
Insights from Behavioural Research, (New York: The Free Press 1976). Phil Williams, Crisis 
Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, (London: Martin Robertson, 1976); 
Oran Young, The Politics of Force, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968). Michael Brecher, 
"Towards a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 
1, (March 1977); Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays of the Theory and Practice of 
International Politics, (London: Pall Mall, 1965). 
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something which will be discussed independently in Chapter Four, although it will also 
be alluded to in the conclusion of this chapter. 
The Concept Order between Change and Continuity 
In order for an existing order to be called a new order, fundamental changes should take 
place within that existing order. The question remains, however, how can we tell when, 
and whether, one order has replaced another.^ More specifically, how can we discern 
whether the Gulf War caused the generation of a new regional order? To answer such 
questions we are confronted with the issue of change and discontinuity.^ 
In this context, Olson argues that a new order occurs when there is a fundamental 
redistribution of power in the international system.'* For Hoffman, for a new order to 
occur, there must be new practices and new rules of play in the international system.^ 
Bull's conception of order is based on the existence of states as the starting point for 
relations within the system they constitute. Therefore, the contact between states 
constitutes the order: for Bull, contact means the goals behind the contact, which are 
survival, security, and stability.^ To this concept, Hoffmann has added the suggestion 
that order should be thought of as 'a construct and a condition'.^ This reflects the 
ambivalent degrees of conscious intention, as opposed to incidental by-product, that 
might characterise any particular order. ^  Moreover, speaking of a new world order. 
^ This form of 'question' is borrowed from Ian Clark, The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), p 17. 
' For Holsti, the concept of world order has as often muddied understanding of intentional politics as 
clarified it. The most common usage in diplomatic rhetoric is the idea that typical patterns of power, 
conflict, domination, and subordination are changing. But since change is a constant of most social 
contexts, difference is hardly an indicator of a new order. If difference is the only criterion, then we 
can hardly expect to generate any sort of consensus, for one person's significant change can be 
someone else's marginal alteration. One sensible way to think of an international order is to identify 
the foundational principles upon which it rests. K. J. Holsti, 'The Coming Chaos: Armed Conflict in 
the Periphery," in T.V. Paul, & Hall, A. John (eds.), International Order and the Future of World 
Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), pp. 283-84. 
* Olson, W., International Relations, Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation, (New York: 
Routledge, 1992) p. 4. 
^ Hoffman, S., "A New World Order and its Troubles", Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no 4, 1990, p. 115-
116. 
* Bull, H., (1977), p. 10. 
Cited in Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p. 20. 
* Cited in Ibid., p. 20. 
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Keale argues that '[it] would require a shift from a great power preferred order to one 
that reflects the interests of international society as a whole and which has regard for the 
justice due to individuals'.^ 
Thus, Clark poses the question: what are the interests of international society as a 
whole?'*' The basic dilemma, as Hoffmann has argued, is that once we move beyond 
minimum conceptions of order, we are confronted by the stark reality of conflicting 
choices." Therefore, we may ask, does change occur based on given choices, based on 
conflicting choices, or based on both?'^ Change is the main mechanism by which the 
new faces of a new order may be distinguished: the call for a new world order by 
George Bush senior coincided with or was part of the end of the Cold War's 
mechanisms. Thus, Clark maintains, for example, that the end of the Cold War created 
the necessary universal conditions, originally initiated in 1945 but stultified by the 
ensuing rivalry between the superpowers that would make this possible.'^ However, 
since there is no consent on a conceptual framework for an evaluation of the multiplicity 
of ideas about a new order, it is impossible to say that one is correct and the other 
incorrect. One author's order is another author's disorder.'"^ 
Nevertheless, for this study, the call by the United States for a New World Order was in 
itself a 'change': according to Clark, 'this applies above all the central question of the 
' Cited in Ibid., p 21. 
" Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p 21. 
" Cited in Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p 21. 
" The difference between given choices and conflicting choices in this thesis is based on the existing 
order. During the Cold War era, choices conflicted between the two superpowers - that is to say that 
each choice given to each superpower was in conflict, in that the other superpower would contest the 
choice. At the end of the Cold War, the only remaining superpower has led to choices being 
uncontested and therefore there was no conflict of choice. The end of the Cold War itself was a given 
choice not a conflicting one because it did not end by means of war dynamics and conflicting 
conditions. This distinction is useful because it explains the US decisions in the post-Cold War era. 
Regarding the ME, all choices the US has there are given ones. The reason behind that is that there is 
no coercion practiced on American diplomacy making, where 'power and deterrence' are coupled 
with the American presence in the region. 
" Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p 19. 
" Holsti, K. J. , "Armed Conflict in the Periphery," in T.V. Paul, & Hall, A. John (eds.). International 
Order and the Future of World Politics, 1999, p. 289. On the controversy about the world order, see 
Fukuyma, F. , 'The End of History?', The National Interest, 1989; Kaplan, R., 'The Coming 
Anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly, 1994; Armstrong, D., Revolution and World Order, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1993). 
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relationship between the end of the Cold War, and the shifts in the distribution of 
power ' .Put simply, the overarching framework of power distribution after the Cold 
War ended was channelled through an order, which itself was a regulator of relations 
between both the remaining superpower and the rest of the worid. It is, therefore, all 
about power distribution: the US remained as the only superpower and this in itself 
constituted an order. This had two dimensions, first, there was a change in the structure 
of power, which is the 'new-ness' of the new order. Second, the continuation of one of 
the superpowers as the only superpower was part of a previously existing order and 
these are the mechanisms of change and continuity of the new order. 
The Kuwait Crisis and the New World Order 
Wars and crises are often seen to be transitions between one type of international system 
and another or a turning point or watershed in relations between states.'^  This introduces 
the question of the impact of the KC on the international order: was it a watershed or a 
turning point on an international level? Did it cause a New World Order or was it its 
symptom? Although this question is not central to this study, to offer a brief discussion 
of it will facilitate a coherent understanding of the impact of the KC on the regional 
order. 
Clark argues that 'the Gulf War was both symptom, and further cause, of the changes 
under way [...] it seems reasonable to regard the war as evidence, and further 
confirmation, of Washington's unrivalled dominance as external power'.'''Similarly, 
Karsh suggests that it was not the end of the Cold War that shaped the New Worid 
Order, but the Gulf War. He describes the war in terms of a 'cataclysmic indigenous 
event'. He also argues, for example, that the [intended] Palestinian-Israeli peace was not 
a result of the Cold War but it was triggered by the Gulf War.'^ That means for Karsh 
Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p 33. 
" Mathew, K., The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, (London: New York, Routledge, 1993), 
p. 252. 
" Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p 127. 
Karsh, E . , "Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does it Make a Difference for the Middle East?" Review of 
International Studies, 23, 3, 1997, pp. 288-291. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process, by the time of 
his article, probably had meant peace for Karsh. 
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that the KC was the main force behind the change on both regional and international 
levels. 
Niblock concludes that the KC introduced a dynamic of its own but, equally crucially, it 
also helped to highlight the changes wrought by a transformed global o rder .Gow 
considers the invasion of Kuwait as a far-reaching question of international order, 
concluding that the big question raised by the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute was how much of 
the energy released, as disorder replaced the old Cold War order, could be harnessed in 
the creation of a new and better order.^° Andre Gunder Frank terms the [Gulf War] as 
the first war that aligned the rich North, the rich oil emirates and Kingdoms, and some 
bribed regional oligarchies against a poor third world country.'^' Cantori, however, 
considers the crisis as an interruption in an already ongoing process.^ ^ 
One could argue that the Gulf War would not have broken out under the old world order. 
In this context, Starkey asserts that the end of the Cold War^^ had tempted Iraq to 
embark on invading Kuwait. The calculation of the Iraqi leader was that United States, 
no longer beset by Soviet power, would be that much less inclined to exercise itself 
robustly in the region. '^^  Garrity argues that 'the KC, contrary to speculation at the time, 
did not lead to the creation of a New World Order, but the Gulf War remains the first 
real data point in the post-Cold War era.'^ ^ He proceeds to argue that the Gulf War 
" Niblock, T., "A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East?", in Jawad, H. (ed.), The Middle East in 
the New World Order, 1994, p. 4. 
^ Gow, J. , (ed.), Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and he World Community, Centre for Defence Studies, (London, 
New York: Brassey's 1993), pp. 3-4. 
" Frank, G. A., Third World War: A Political Economy of the Gulf War and The New World Order, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992. p. 1. 
22 The process for Cantori is that U.S. diplomatic and military activities have increased rather than 
declined (after the Cold War) as policy has been focused on access to oil and oil pricing and the 
value of regional stability in maintaining the free flow of oil. In the last months of the Reagan 
administration, a peace process was initiated and was pursued even more vigorously by the Bush 
administration. Cantori, L . , "Unipolarity and Egyptian Hegemony," in, Freedman, R., (ed.), The 
Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 339. 
For an assessment of the Arab perception and interpretation of the Cold War, see Shibly Telhami, 
'Middle East Politics in the Post-Cold War Era' in George W. Breslauer, Harry Kreisler, and 
Benjamin War (eds.), Beyond the Cold War: Conflict and Co-operation in the Third World 
(Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1992). 
" cited in Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p 127. 
^ Garrity, P., "Implications of the Persian Gulf War for Regional Powers", The Washington Quarterly, 
(Summer 1993), p. 166. 
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revealed to regional powers the essential irrelevance of the (then) Soviet Union.'^^ In 
any event, in the international tinderbox the 1990-91, the KC is usually treated as a 
watershed.^'' 
This study maintains that the crisis was an Arab crisis and was a blunt consequence of 
inter-Arab rivalry and mistrust between Arab states. Therefore, it was neither the 
symptom nor the cause of a new world order. It also was not a turning point on an 
international level. It merely helped the United States to demonstrate an asset of power, 
in practical terms, it already had. But, its impact on Arab politics is that it brought the 
Arab system into a definite end. 
The Kuwait Crisis and the United States 
The United States played the main role in the ousting of the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. 
On the one hand, as a superpower, the United States was in a position to do so: and 
having done so, the first reward gained by the United States was an international 
approval. On the other hand, as Garrity poses, 'what do the reactions of regional powers 
to the Gulf War imply for United States policymaking? First and foremost, it is essential 
to recognise the importance that regional powers continue to accord the United States as 
the organising force in international relations.' 
At the global level, the crisis increased the prominence of the United States in the 
Persian Gulf region and in world politics. This illustrates how the United States sought 
to continue to play its role in both world politics and in the ME. A role reflects a claim 
on the international system, recognition by international actors, and a conception of 
national identity. Role definition can help explain the general direction of foreign 
2« Ibid., 54-155. 
Korany, B., "The Arab World and the New Balance of Power in the New Middle East," in Hudson, 
M., (ed.), Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (London, New 
York: I. B. Tauris 1998), p 35. 
Garrity P., "Implications of the Persian Gulf War for Regional Powers," 1993, p. 166. On the United 
States and the Arab Middle East since 1945, see Douglas Little, Gideon's Band: America and the 
Middle East Since 1945, Diplomatic History 18, (Fall 1994), pp. 513-40; Leon T. Harder, Quagmire: 
America in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1992). 
^ Le Prestre, Ph., G., "Defining Foreign Policy Roles," in, Le Prestre, Ph., G., (ed.), Role Quests in the 
Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition, (London, Montreal: McGill University Press 
1997), p. 5. 
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policy choices,^*' and one of the main and effective potentials the United States 
possessed after the Cold War was/is its discursive belief in its own power. This is one of 
the factors which lead the United States to continue developing its power. In 1989, for 
example, James Baker claimed that the United States had a special role^' to play in the 
world because it still represented the 'last, best hope of earth'. 
George Bush senior identified the role of the United States as that of stabiliser, 'the 
United States is determined 
Similarly, James Baker stated: 
to take an active role in settling regional conflicts.' " 
We seek a stable Gulf in which the nations of this region and their 
peoples can live in peace and can live free of the fear of coercion. We 
seek a region in which change can occur and legitimate security 
concerns can be preserved peacefully.^'' 
In explaining the United States' global power interests, and in taking the KC as an 
example, Gowan explains why the United States administration repudiated both the 
offer to Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait ten days before the ground war started 
and the subsequent Soviet peace plan. He maintains that the need for a 'demonstration 
war', in which the United States had to demonstrate that it was no longer just a nuclear 
super-state with feet of clay when it came to fighting a conventional war against an 
enemy in the South. It had to show the will and the military capacity on the ground as 
well as in the air. This was to make America's main power asset, its military capacity, 
once again central to world politics.^^ Furthermore, as Krauthammer maintains, the Gulf 
War marked the beginning of a Pax Americana in which the world would acquiesce to a 
30 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
According to Holsti, 'Roles' refer to the 'policymakers own definitions of the general kinds of 
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33 
34 
Ibid., p. 72. 
Secretary of State James Baker as he addressed the senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 
4-October 18, 1990; See US government Printing Office, H38116, p. 10. 
Gowan, P., The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance, (London, New 
York: Verso 1999), pp. 160-161. 
75 
benign American hegemony. The impact of the end of the Cold War reached far 
beyond the European settings within which the war began and ended. Thus, the Pax 
Americana remains a product of the Cold War years, and American global presence can 
be measured by the same yardstick as that which gauges the extent to which the Cold 
War infiltrated and influenced the world. Put more succinctly, the globalisation of the 
American presence is part of that globalisation of the Cold War. Consequently, a New 
World Order must necessarily be a new American Order.^' 
Of the various types of interests of the United States has in the ME, two have 
consistently been deemed major or vital since at least 1973 - security and economic 
interests. Remarkably, these interests have remained paramount despite the dramatic 
changes throughout the globe.^^ Subsequently, according to Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 
the KC ushered in a new era of United States hegemony in the ME region.^^ In the 
1990s the ME regional system was subject to a new magnitude of penetration by the 
United States as the world hegemon. Although justified in the name of a 'NWO' or Pax 
Americana, its effects were far more ambiguous.'*'' Hudson concludes that 'the Iraq-
Kuwait crisis created a moment of opportunity for the United States to deepen western 
hegemony over the Gulf in particular and the ME in general.''*' Ghareeb and BChadduri 
conclude that the United States intervened in the KC on three grounds. First, she sought 
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to protect its own national interests in the Gulf region which appeared to have been 
threatened by Iraq. Second, the United States had certain commitments to a number of 
countries in the region whose security seemed to have been threatened by Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait. Thirdly, as Iraq had declared the jihad against Western intervention 
in Islamic lands, a number of American writers sought to rationalise Western 
intervention as a form of just war (justum bellum), in defence of Western (Christian) 
values.'*^ Garritty concludes that "for virtually every regional state, a central lesson of 
the Gulf War is that the United States is the only superpower; the Gulf War thus 
represented something of a turning point in foreign perceptions of the United States.'"^ ^ 
Most importantly, according to Murphy, in 1991, the United States was in a position to 
develop new and existing ties in the Arab world, unhindered by prior considerations of 
superpower competition. Equally, the Arab states no longer had a choice of patrons and 
were forced to come to terms with a new global balance of power in which 
confrontation with the United States would be a lonely venture.'*^ 
The crisis provided the United States with the opportunity to lead a collation to oust Iraq 
from Kuwait, succeeding in managing such a huge coalition, the United States was able 
to confirm its future 'role' in the making of international politics as a 'given'. Not many 
states would then contest the American role on an international level or regional levels, 
taking the ME as a case in point. 
However, whether the crisis generated or helped to generate or even was a consequence 
of a New World Order, the main question is how much impact it left on the Arab 
regional order. Before discussing this impact in detail, I will first offer a backdrop to the 
crisis, which will facilitate an understanding of the regional dynamics, specifically those 
which concentrate on Iraq's emergence as a regional power. 
*^  Kadduri, M., & Ghareeb, E . , War in the Gulf 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and its Implications, 
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), p. 252. The authors did not refer to any of those 
American writers and did not offer any content of such arguments. 
*^  Garrity, P., "Implications of the Persian Gulf War for Regional Powers," The Washington Quarterly, 
(Summer 1993), p. 154. 
Murphy E. C , "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order," in, Jawad, H. (ed.). The 
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Backdrop to the Kuwait Crisis 
One remarkable aspect of the crisis is that it was an Arab crisis; that is to say, the most 
salient feature of the crisis was its 'Arabness'. The Arab regional order, however, is not 
an enigma. In Chapter Two, I offered readings of the Arab system from 1945-90, the 
findings of which have shown that the main character of inter-Arab relations is conflict. 
However, prior to the crisis, the main actor of the KC - that is, Iraq - was engaged in a 
war with Iran, a non-Arab regional unit. This had its impact on the making of the crisis. 
Therefore, I will begin this discussion firstly by considering the impact of the Iran-Iraq 
war and its aftermath as a trigger for the KC, and subsequently, I will examine the 
period between the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the KC. 
The Iran-Iraq War 
The dynamics and connotations of the concept of 'war' in the modem history of the 
Arab world imply or define the enemy of the Arabs as Israel. However, the Iran-Iraq 
war left a different impression on the making of politics and altered the implications of 
the political term 'war' in the ME region. 
Arab-Israeli wars have tended to be intensive but b r i e f , b u t the Iran-Iraq war had 
become part of the political and strategic landscape of the ME throughout the decade, 
establishing or accelerating new alignments and forcing new priorities.'*^ The war 
caused the Islamic, Arab and Israeli spheres to overiap. During the war, it is widely 
known that the Israeli state supplied the Islamic state of Iran with American weapons,'*^ 
enabling Iran to fight the Arab state of Iraq, which was armed with Soviet weapons' 
systems. Pro-American Egypt supplied Iraq with Soviet weapons and spare parts, while 
Arab Syria, allied with the Soviet Union, supported non-Arab Iran against Arab Iraq.''^ 
*^  Rabinovich, I., 'The Impact on the Arab World," in, Karsh, E . (ed.), The Iran Iraq War: Impact and 
Implications, (London: Macmillan 1987), p. 101. 
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Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war shifted the 'order of conflict' from 'the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to a bi-focal conflict system'. 
In the opinion of Joffe, 'One of the most striking consequences of the Gulf War ha[d] 
been the way in which the Ba'ath regime in Iraq ha[d] been able to emerge from the 
conflict apparently strengthened and more stable than it was in 1979.'^ *' The war had the 
effect of reinforcing Saddam's autocracy in Iraq, by allowing him to demand complete 
submission to his will as the means of ensuring effective mass mobilisation to prevent 
an Iranian invasion.^' Moreover, shortly after the cease-fire, Iraq was seeking to 
emphasise the war's importance to the new Arab order and the solidity of its new 
alliances.^^ 
Nevertheless, inter-Arab relations during and after the war were governed by the 
dynamics of the war itself. This is because the war was not a brief event, but eight years 
of conflict. Therefore, the impact of the war on Arab regional order was multi-
dimensional. Ehteshami summarises four consequences: 
First, it marked the end of the collective pursuit of the radical agenda and its 
landmark, the steadfastness front. Secondly, their unambiguous support for 
the Iraqi war effort facilitated the transformation of the conservative-
moderate states into the Arab nationalist pretenders. Thirdly, with the 
convergence of superpower views (on the Iraqi side) the ties with the 'client' 
states were relaxed to such an extent that Arab actors were able to pursue 
their objectives without overriding external considerations. And lastly, the 
conduct and outcome of the war enabled Iraq to emerge as the champion of 
the Palestinian cause and the main ally of the PLO. This, by extension gave 
Saddam Hussein de facto 'leadership' of the Arab world.^ ^ 
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Examining the relationship between the Iran-Iraq war and the KC, we find that many 
scholars, to some degree, promote the KC as a consequence of that war. Sela, for 
example, argues that 'the origins of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait were rooted in the 
conditions under which the Iran-Iraq war had ended.'^ '^  Chubin concludes that 'Iraq's 
war with Iran was a major underlying "cause" of the second Gulf War'.^^ 
The Iran-Iraq war had conditioned the behaviour of all the major regional actors. In the 
absence of Egyptian hegemony, the war accelerated the scramble of the new alliances in 
the Arab world.^^ By virtue of not having lost his mantle, the Iraqi leader had come to 
dominate the emerging Arab order. But the end of the war had changed the rubric of 
intra-Arab and Inter-Arab state relations. With hegemony no longer guaranteed, Iraq 
sought to impose its own will on the shifting Middle East landscape.^' 
From Cease-fire to Crisis 
Whether Iraq had achieved any of its own war aims sufficiently to warrant a victory call 
was a moot point.^^ The jubilation surrounding the end to hostilities overshadowed the 
discussion of a number of serious outstanding problems regarding the virtues of the 
campaign in the first place, its costs to Iraq, and the multitude of difficulties its war had 
in fact created for the Arab worid in general.When the war came to an end, basic 
questions of security in the Gulf remained unresolved, a more permanent peace was 
elusive, and the actors were heavily armed. ^° On top of that, 'Iraq [found] itself 
^ Sela, A., The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional 
Order. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 321. 
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burdened with a heavy debt to foreign countries estimated then at seventy to eighty 
billion dollars.'*^' 
For Saddam, however, the war was won. He 'transformed what was essentially a 
restoration of the status quo antebellum into a victory. Furthermore, he emphasised that 
this glorious victory was a resounding vindication of his leadership and personal 
legitimacy.'^^ Moreover, the more forcefully Saddam believed that he won the war, the 
more threat he posed to his neighbours. That was mainly because Arab leaders in 
neighbouring countries were aware of the fact that 'dramatic change in the local arena is 
often the result of a charismatic leader's attempt to challenge the status quo through a 
platform that appeals to a large segment of the commonality.'^^ Therefore, reading the 
policies of Nasser of Egypt, and those of Saddam of Iraq, the outcome was that leaders 
stressed Arab national sentiments. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam 'began to 
consider returning to his earlier attempt to establish himself as the new hero of Arab 
nationalism.'^"* In the same period and in the same context, most Arab leaders were 
'allergic' to the term 'Arab nationalism' because of the impact the Iran-Iraq war itself 
had had on the making of their political order. The circumstances that dictated the scene 
at the end of the war did not encourage such sentiments. 
These circumstances are evidenced in alliances and groupings that emerged after the 
war to further divide the Arabs. The birth of Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) is a point 
in case. Ehteshami concludes that the birth of such a grouping is a direct result of the 
war.^ ^ Hinnebusch considers the ACC as 'a new moderate bloc of non-oil states that 
seemed poised to become the centre of gravity in inter-Arab politics.^^ Chubin considers 
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it as 'to some degree, competitive with the Saudi-led GCC. The ACC was designed as a 
vehicle for the extension of Iraq's new leading regional role and to Egyptian 
acquiescence in the fact.'^^ Similarly, Tibi argues that within the ACC, Iraq was hoping 
to reintegrate Egypt into Arab politics under its own leadership. However, Egypt did 
return to the council without laying claim to a leading role.^^ In this context, Chubin's 
term acquiescence is telling. Otherwise Mubarak would have told Saddam: 'brother', 
there is no need for such grouping; we have our Arab League.^ ^ 
In any case, the ACC was characterised by the political diversity of its membership. The 
Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, for instance, provided the territorial bond between 
Ba'thist Iraq and Pluralist Egypt. The geographical and political diversity of the ACC 
served as a strengthening feature of the organisation.^ *^ The ACC also increased Iraqi 
options and reduced those of Syria and Iran.^' However, Syria restored its diplomatic 
ties with Iraq's close wartime ally, Egypt, in December 1989.^ ^ But the establishment of 
the ACC on the ground did not lead Arab politics anywhere new. In fact, the crisis 
revealed intra-Arab differences in regional alliances. Although two of the ACC's 
members took Iraq's side, Egypt's anti-Iraq stance ensured its ineffectiveness.^^ 
Saddam Hussein was seeking supremacy over the Arab world. The atmosphere was 
inspiring, and two factors justify mention in this context. The first is Jewish 
immigration to Israel and the second is the Intifada. The region's problems were 
compounded by the remarkable political transformations in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 
the rapid erosion of the world 'progressive camp' upon which radical and nationalist 
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Third World regimes had become so reliant.'"^ The removal of pro-Moscow regimes in 
Eastern Europe had dramatic consequences for the foreign relations of those countries 
vis-a-vis the Middle EastJ^ At the same time as re-examining their close ties with the 
radical Arab states, they began to improve their relations with Israel, effectively still the 
enemy of all but one of the Arab states. Improvements in Israel's bilateral relations with 
Moscow's former European allies followed the same pattern already established 
between the Jewish state and the Soviet Union. Technical exchanges accelerated Jewish 
emigration to Israel.^^ 
Accelerated Jewish immigration to Israel (and the Occupied Territories) and the 
'changing international environment' afforded the Iraqi president the right atmosphere 
in which to launch his most pronounced bid yet for Arab supremacy.'''' Within the ACC, 
Saddam sought to dominate Middle East politics: he exploited both rising anxieties in 
the Arab world about Israel's immigration policy and sympathies concerning the West's 
'aggressive' campaign against his country.^^ In a major policy speech in April 1990, he 
put Iraq on the front-line of the Arab-Israeli conflict, declaring that his country's 
missiles were deployed 'in the direction of Israel'. 
Did the K C Create a New Arab Regional Order? 
Pan-Arabism 
The KC brought change to the political structure of the Arab ME. The most salient 
impact of the crisis on the structure of Arab political order was its impact on the concept 
'Pan-Arabism'.^° This assumes that this term possessed political connotations before the 
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crisis. Indeed, Barnett argues that the structure of Arab poHtics is comprised of both 
sovereignty and Arabism.^' Arab states were formally sovereign states, but they were 
also Arab states.^ ^ An Arab state that attempted to claim a sovereign prerogative when it 
sought a strategic alliance with the West was quickly reminded by other Arab states that 
such an alliance was a public and not a private matter because it concerned the Arab 
nation. In this context, Tibi considers the concept 'Arabness' as an ideological 
background to the understanding of Arab interactions. He argues that the main change 
that took place in the Arab order was 'the recognition of the strength of a policy-
oriented, rather than an ideology-oriented redefinition of Arabness.Moreover, it can 
be said that 'the defining idea of 'Arab unity' seems to have been the first major 
casualty of the war.'^^ Until the KC, the basic belief underlying Pan-Arab rhetoric was 
that all Arabs, being an 'imagined community' shared everything on all levels. Thus, 
the common assumption was that they only needed to be unified in one centrally 
governed nation-state.^^ 
However, the crisis proved that Arabs shared everything except their Arabism and 
demonstrated that this is exactly what Arab states did not want to have as a common 
bond between them. The concepts Pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism, and Arabism point 
towards the existence of an Arab nation. However, the more discussions were 
formulated or actions taken in the name of these terms, the less an Arab consensus 
existed. To illuminate this point one only has to look, on one hand, at the impact of 
Nasser of Egypt on the making of the concept of Arabism, and on the other hand, at the 
impact of the KC on the making of this concept. Sirriyeh concludes that 'the most 
central doctrine of the Nasserist version of Pan-Arabism (which was also advocated by 
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Ibid., p. 31. 
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the Ba'ath Party and the Arab nationahst movement) was the equating of Pan-Arabism 
with Arab nationahsm and Arab unity. Nasser had turned Pan-Arabism into an 
89 
ideology. Nasser's problem was that none of the Arab leaders on the ground wanted to 
be an ideologue. Sirriyeh adds that since the "Nasserist aspiration of transforming Arab 
nationalism into a unitary state entailed a most destabilising element in regional Arab 
politics in the 1950s and 1960s in view of implicit threat to state sovereignty'" 
However, what heightened the perception of threat by other Arab states regarding 
Nasserism was the convergence of these concepts of Arab sovereignty with the 
provocative approaches pursued by Nasserism to achieve Arab unity. ^' These 
approaches were called the Bismarckian (that is, employing coercive methods to 
achieve the goal of unity) and the revolutionary (seeking to promote Arab unity through 
internal upheavals in the other Arab country concerned), thus rendering the idea of Arab 
unity as a threatening and negative element in the eyes of the Arab states.^ ^ At the same 
time the major weakness of Pan-Arab movement was that 'even states ruled by 
nationalists advanced narrow state interests that were competitive with each other.'^^ 
The case of the KC is similar, although the impact of the crisis on the course of Pan-
Arabism has been interpreted in different ways. One argument is that the crisis had 
revived the collective Arab feelings and sentiments. The division, according to this 
argument, was between the people and the regimes.^ '* Another critical view of Arabism 
indicated that the crisis had delivered the coup de grace to the idea of a transnational 
Arab society.^^ Harnett, however, maintains that the crisis stressed that state sovereignty 
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and the Arab nationalist language is still to be heard.^ ^ Sirriyeh, too, insists on the idea 
of the 'multi-state Pan-Arab order'. He maintains that 'despite the shocking 
consequences of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing inter Arab war, the Gulf 
states, rather than abandoning the concept of Pan-Arabism, were still committing 
themselves to operating within a more flexible pan-Arab framework.'^^ For Sirriyeh, 
there was a new Arab form of consensus which emerged after the KC. Using the 
positions of Arab states which participated in the Damascus declaration as a basic 
example to illustrate the Arab consensus, he maintains that: 
The Arab positions suggest an increasing Arab agreement on a new concept 
of Arab consensus that is different from the earlier concept and that 
reconciles individualism and collectivism. It is possible to envisage this 
concept as consisting of two levels. One of general principles of parameters 
that the states are willing to commit themselves to as principles commanding 
consensus, and the other whereby Arab states would tend to fulfil their 
individual national requirements, but without violating the general 
parameters. For example, the general principle of boycotting Israel in the old 
version of Pan-Arabism has been replaced in the new version by the 
principle of not normalising relations with Israel undl a satisfactory Arab-
Israeli settlement or significant progress towards it has been achieved. Such 
a parameter can now be maintained, while allowing Arab states to follow 
their own individual economic or security interests.'^  
Pan-Arabism was, in one way or another, affected by the KC. The most salient feature 
of this effect was that the crisis itself was, to some extent, conducted in the name of 
Arabism. Saddam Hussein used Pan-Arab sentiment within the course of the crisis, 
which made it not only a crisis of invasion, but also a crisis of legitimising the invasion. 
In the text of the annexation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, he highlights the Pan-Arab 
perception that the 'major crime' the West has committed against the Arabs has been 
the division of their lands. Saddam reminded his fellow Arabs that the region was 'one 
entity when it was ruled by Baghdad'.'^ Saddam Hussein's rhetoric on the one hand 
attracted many in the Arab Street, although the Arab Street had no weight in making 
'* BarneU, M., Dialogues in Arab Politics, 1998, p. 163-4. 
^ Sirriyeh, H., "A New Version of Pan-Arabism?" p. 61. 
Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1998, p. 198. See also Ibrahim, I., (ed.). The Gulf Crisis: 
Background and Consequences, 1992, pp. 10-16. 
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politics.'"'^ On the other hand, his rhetoric left the question open: in the name of Arab 
brotherhood, in the name of Arabness, one Arab country could overnight swallow 
another Arab country. What could happen if these putative (i.e. so-called or debatable) 
'Arab-brotherhood' feelings did not exist? However, the failure of Arab states to find an 
Arab solution to the crisis is telling of how the order was, and how it, remained. 
Ehteshami frames it this way: 
the inability of the Arab states to present a united front in the face of the new 
crisis was not surprising... the divided Arab League's response to this crisis 
epitomised the paralysis of the organisation as a forum of Arab opinion and a 
vehicle for its action. More fundamentally, it illustrated the deep divisions 
within the Arab order as a whole.'"' 
Some scholars have argued that the crisis underlined or gave emphasis to the 
sovereignty of the Arab State. Bamett, for example, concludes that 'Sovereignty 
demanded that Arab states recognise each other's legitimacy, border, and the principle 
of non-interference. But Arabism held that Arab states were to defend the Arab nation, 
to uphold regional standards of legitimacy, to deny the very distinction between the 
international and the domestic.''*'^ After the crisis, he concludes, 'Arab states have 
generally converged on sovereignty to organise their relations and no longer deny each 
other's legitimacy: this in turn fostered regional order by encouraging them to limit their 
behaviour in a continuous and predictable manner.' 
The above arguments maintain that there occurred a change or an impact upon pan-
Arabism. Although it is valid to say that there was an impact, nevertheless the degree of 
the impact of the crisis on the state persona is overstated. Tibi maintains that 'one of the 
lessons of the [KC] is that existing Arab nation-states—regardless of their historical 
The Arab public opinion neither prevented the invasion from taking place nor the war. On public 
reactions to the K C and the Gulf War see Shibly Telhami, "Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War", 
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 108, Issue, 3 (Autumn, 1993), 437-452. 
101 Ehteshami, in Gow, (ed.), Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and he World Community, 1993, pp. 64-65. 
"^^  Bamett, M., "Regional Security after the Gulf War", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. I l l , issue 4, 
(winter 1996-1997, p 600. 
Bamett, M., "Regional Security after the Gulf War"', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, issue 4, 
(winter 1996-1997, p. 602; See also, Michael Barnett, "Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Regional 
Order in the Arab State System", International Organisation, 49, (Summer 1995): 479-510; Michael 
Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab State System", International 
Studies Quarterly, 37, (September 1993), 271-296. 
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background—are here to stay.''"'^ But Arab states were 'staying here' and since their 
emergence after World War I I , they had always been sovereign states. The KC did not 
change how Arab states perceived their Arabness. Arab states are aware of the degree of 
existing conflict across their states because they have other Arab states as neighbouring 
states. However, although Arab states wished otherwise, Arabism was not totally 
annihilated. 
The evidence is that some sources of the 'Arabness' of the Arab states continued to 
exist after the crisis. The Arab League for example, is the institutional source of Arab 
states. At the same time, however, the league is the source of the failure of the Arab 
states to be 'entirely' free from the restraint of Arabism because the league emphasises 
the Arabness of the state. The KC did not lead to the abolition of the Arab League: both 
Kuwait and Iraq remain members of the same league and both attend the same summits 
held by the league.'"^ The league's charter focuses mainly on the Arabness of the Arab 
states and of the Arab nation. But the division and fragmentation had reached the minds 
of those who believed that there would be a nation, a community which could be called 
Arab. Therefore, the crisis was a source of damage to pan-Arabism but did not abolish 
the shape and structure of the state as an Arab state, something which has had a severe 
impact on the unmaking of an Arab system, as wi l l be explained in Chapter Five of this 
study. In conclusion, the notion of change within the degree of sovereignty of the state 
is dependent upon the concept of galvanisation, in that galvanisation simultaneously 
protects the state and restricts its actions and its decision-making ability. This is 
something which wil l be illustrated below in the discussion concerning the Arab balance 
of power. 
New Version of Arab Security: 'Galvanisation' Guarantees Security 
Two complementary elements form the order of security for Arab states following the 
KC. First, the impact of the surprise Iraqi attack on Kuwait left the Arab states and other 
units in the region insecure. Secondly, the counter actions to this attack restored calm to 
the region, but not total security. The American intervention in the forcing of Iraq out of 
104 Tibi, In Hudson, (ed.). Middle East Dilemma 1998, p. 97. 
Iraq was first invited to an Arab summit only in March 2002, in Beirut. For more details on the 
outcomes of the summit regarding Iraq see, Al-Hayat (London), issue no. 14253, March 29, 2002; 
www.daralhayat.com. 
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Kuwait created the ground for new security mechanisms in the region. Galvanisation 
provides security, but when galvanisation becomes absolute hegemony, there emerges a 
new dimension of security dilemma. In the following pages, I will discuss first how the 
crisis had an effect on the security dynamics in the ME and then I will offer a discussion 
of the new shape of security dilemma in the region. 
This question of a new version of security for Arab states in the ME and for the entire 
region was initiated when, on August 2°'' 1990, all of the region's members were first 
apprised of the 'dimension' of the invasion. The first post-crisis security move on an 
Arab level was the Damascus Declaration (DD) convened in March 1991.'^^ The Gulf 
States, Egypt and Syria agreed on strategic and military co-operation which involved 
'subsidies for Egypt and Syria versus security for the Gulf states. 'Egypt and Syria 
argued, 'but not persuasively', that the 'invasion showed the dangers of too much 
Western reliance and that a pan-Arab military force and greater economic'"* integration 
should be the foundations of Arab security.'"*^ Nevertheless, the declared plans of the 
DD were not translated into action for two reasons. First, it was the shock of the 
invasion that had led the Gulf States to seek help from the Egyptian and Syrian forces. 
Since the origin of the threat was an 'Arab' state, the resort of the Gulf States to other 
Arab states seeking support and protection did not seem to correspond to the existing 
order, which was made up in part by the source of the threat - an Arab state. Therefore, 
this declaration did not live up to the factual expectations. In this context, Hinnebusch 
argues that 'once the Iraqi threat was reduced, the Gulf States' distrust of other Arabs 
surfaced.'"° By the summer of 1991, it had become clear to all the parties that the 
original ambitious interpretations of the DD were dead and that security cooperation 
rather than actual military alliance was what the Gulf States wanted.'" 
See Agha, H., & A., Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Pinter, 1995). 
Ajami, F. , "Shooting an Elephant: The Expedition and its Aftermath,"in Nye, J., Jr., & Smith, R., 
(eds.). After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War (London, New York: The Aspen Institute, 
Madison Books, 1992), p. 124. 
The Gulf States agreed that Egypt and Syria would station 65 000 troops in the Gulf, while the Gulf 
States provide $15 billion Arab development fund. Hinnebusch, "Egypt, Syria and the Arab 
System," in Jawad (ed.), The Middle East in the New World Order, 1994, p. 122. 
Hinnebusch, R., "Egypt, Syria and the Arab State System in the New World Order," in Jawad, H., 
(ed.). The Middle East in the New World Order, 1994, p. 122. 
110 Ibid., p. 122. 
Gause, G., "Saudi Arabia: Desert Storm and After". In Freedman, R., (ed.). The Middle East after 
Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993), pp. 215-216. 
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The second reason for the failure of the DD lies in the elegant description given by 
Maoz observing that the ME is 'a high-crime neighbourhood'."^ It was therefore a risky 
environment for the states of the Gulf Region to put trust in other Arab states to guard 
their security. Thus, the new major dimension of new security arrangements in the 
region was that Saudi Arabia invited the United States forces to station on the its soil. 
The Saudis abandoned their historical position of keeping their United States military 
connection 'over the horizon' and at arms' length."^ On the domestic level, there was 
hardly a substantial opposition within the ruling elite. Even the religious establishment, 
which might also have been expected to oppose the deployment of the United States 
troops, officially approved that policy line in afatwa (religious judgement)."'* 
The American presence on the Saudi soil had a far-reaching impact on the new face of 
regional security. Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) focus 
specifically on the psychological aspect of mutual suspicions and distrust between 
adversaries."^ CSBMs serve to reduce surprise attacks."^ But CSBMs cannot be 
imposed from the outside, and while they may benefit from a skilled and mutually 
trusted mediator, they require a measure of understanding and co-ordination between 
the concerned parties themselves."^ Nevertheless, the American presence after the Iraqi 
surprise attack on Kuwait constituted in itself a CSBM between the Arab states in that 
this presence reduced the possibility of further surprise attacks. Moreover, the fact that 
for the first time in history American forces had also to be stationed on Israeli soil to 
Maoz, Z., "Regional Security in the Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities and Future 
Challenges," in Maoz, Z., (ed.), Regional Security in the Middle East, (London: Portland, Frank 
Cass, 1997), p. 26; for more on regional Security in the Middle East see Ephraim Inbar (ed.), 
Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbours (Albany: State University of New York Press 
1995). 
Gause, G., "Saudi Arabia: Desert Storm and After," in Freedman, R., (ed.), The Middle East after 
Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 1993, p., 209. 
114 Ibid, pp. 209-210. 
Levite, A., & Landau, E . , "Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East," in Maoz, 
Z., (ed.), Regional Security in the Middle East, (London: Portland, Frank Cass, 1997), p. 144. 
"* On this issue regarding the ME see David B. Dewitt, "Confidence and Security Building Measures in 
the Middle East: Is there a Role?", in Ben-Dor and Dewitt, Conflict Management in the Middle East 
pp. 241-59. 
Levite, A., & Landau, E . , "Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East," in 
Maoz, Z., (ed.). Regional Security in the Middle East, 1997, p. 144. 
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protect the Jewish state from Arab attack, as Ehteshami argues, will have far-reaching 
consequences for the future of the Arab-Israeli balance of power. 
It also remains the case that Saddam's continuation in power had far-reaching effects 
upon regional security calculations. His ongoing presence served in some degree to 
occupy a great deal of the Arab states' foreign poHcies' capacities. This is illustrated by 
the way in which the United States maximised the situation in every context, reminding 
the leaders of the Gulf States that Saddam Hussein still existed and that any morning he 
could 'jump in their faces'. The reaction of the Gulf States was to attach themselves 
further to the United States in order to gain more protection. At the same time, 
Saddam's retention of power had an impact on the reverberations surrounding the 
invasion itself. Since Arab states associated the Iraqi leader with the invasion of Kuwait, 
the longer Saddam remained in power, the deeper the perception of the invasion 
remained in Arab minds - and specifically those of the Gulf State. 
In light of these considerations, it followed that the US emerged as 'redeemer' or 
'saviour' within the region, its presence being legitimised by the KC, and the arguments 
of the above scholars concerning American presence in the region as hegemonic are 
therefore justified."^ This state of affairs continued until September l l " ' 2001, which 
has shown that absolute power, no matter to whom it belongs, is not a welcome 
presence in the region. However, based on Gramsci's definition, hegemony is power 
achieved through a combination of coercion and consent .The American presence in 
the region was not to enforce promises but to perform the role which the United States 
had set for itself. The resultant galvanisation of the region secured both the American 
interest in the region and the security of the Arab states. Galvanisation also facilitated, 
to some degree, those weak and powerful states to exist side-by-side. However, in the 
long run, galvanisation rendered the security of the region dependent on the American 
presence, which in turn was also productive of negative effects, such as the 
transformation of the American presence in the region into absolute hegemony. 
Ehteshami in Gow, (ed.), Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and he World Community, 1993, p. 66. 
See footnotes 28, 36, 37, and 39 of this chapter. 
Gramsci draws upon Machiavelli as the latter suggested that power can be achieved through force 
and fraud. 
The American presence in the region is absolute when all, to use Ehteshami's expression, 'strategic 
interdependence[s]' within the region is dependent on the presence of the U.S., However, the 
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It is a commonplace, Clark argues, 'to suggest that US policy interests in the Middle 
East have, for decades, suffered from a serious contradiction. These interests centre 
upon oil, and Western access to it, and upon the support of Israel. Repeatedly, the latter 
dimension has threatened to impede the attainment of the former g o a l . ' T h e KC, 
however, helped the United States to overcome this issue. It created the ground upon 
which the United States could still support Israel and at the same time have access to oil. 
The relationship between this issue and security in the ME is explained in the 
intensification of the American power in the region.'^^ This leads again to the circle of 
galvanisation; the order which had developed dictated that whatever happened in the 
region, the first priority of the regional order would be the security of the individual 
units rather than the security of the region itself. 
Based on this, two characteristics of the Arab regional security order emerged. First, 
although after the end of the Cold War there was an intensification of regionalism and 
'regional behaviour' (i.e. trends towards regionalisation), the ME steered clear of this 
tendency. According to Hurrell and Fawcett, 'these trends towards regionalisation ha[d] 
been reinforced by the nature of security challenges.''^''Notably, although there is a 
multiplicity of security challenges in the ME, the region does not tend to have collective 
security measures and a tendency towards regionalisation. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the KC led to an absolute hegemony by the United States and this in turn led 
regional actors to seek more individual-state-oriented security rather than collective 
regional security. That means that as long as the United States was protecting Saudi 
Arabia for example, Saudi Arabia would not seek security alliances with Egypt or with 
Syria. Therefore, because the United States is the absolute power in the region, it is less 
American presence also is absolute when the states that invited the U.S. to come to the region can no 
longer invite the U.S. to leave. On the concept 'strategic interdependence', see A. Ehteshami, 'The 
New World Order: The Middle East," in Jawad, (ed.), The Middle East in the New World Order, 
1994, pp. 70-73. 
Clark, I., The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace, 2001, p. 129. 
On the intensification of the American power in the world arena, see the Neo-Realist version: Robert 
Gilpin, '"American Policy in the Post-Regan Era", Daedelus, Vol. 116, No., 3, (Summer 1987), pp. 
33-67: Also Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict form 1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 
'^ See Hurrell &Fawcett, "conclusion," in Hurrell & Fawcett (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics, 
1995. 
92 
likely for inter-regional units to go for security agreements or security pacts apart from 
the United States being a main player. 
The Arab Balance of Power 
The primary effect of the crisis was that it rendered Arab power and capability, to 
varying degrees according to the validity of that capability, null and void. Arab power, 
in realistic-mi/iransfic terms and in institutional terms (as represented by, for example, 
the GCC), neither managed to prevent the invasion nor to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. The 
crisis pushed Arab states to maximise their power, but within a galvanised region they 
no longer could use this power to balance with. That is because - in Neo-Realist terms 
of analysis - the 'regularities and repetitions' provide a clue to the operation of deep 
structural constraints.'^^ The main form of structural constraint on Arab states, however, 
was Arabism, and this form of constraint did not fade away. The relationship between 
Arabism and Arab power meant that Arab states were unable to rid themselves of their 
form and shape as Arab states, something which was exacerbated by the KC rather than 
reduced by it. The more Arab states feared other Arab states because they were Arab 
and because they use(d) Arabism as a pretext in interfering or manipulating other states' 
political businesses, the more the concept of Arabism became strongly present in the 
Arab states' political orientations. 
States balance their power so as to reach an order within which to function'^^ The order 
in this sense is not given but constructed.'^^ The construction of order is complete when 
interactions across units make up the system. In any event, when discussing the Arab 
balance of power, we do not measure that power in order to gauge the degree of a 
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On the regularities in World Politics see, Linklater, "'Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice," in Booth 
and Smith, (eds.). International Relations Theory Today, 1997, pp. 241-263. 
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definite balance, as we might do, for example, in assessing the power of the United 
States according to the size of its nuclear arsenals in comparison with Russia or China. 
Instead, we seek to unveil inter-relations between 'actors' under one single umbrella of 
power i.e. the United States. One issue is clear, however:'^^ a 'key component of a 
regional order is the distribution of military power among its members and the crisis 
was a decisive effect on this dimension of regional polities'. 
The main feature of the new power structure in the ME was that Iraq's military 
capability was eliminated and it was politically i so l a t ed .Af te r Iraq's power was 
severely destroyed, the question was how much power did other members of the region 
have? In answer, the Arab balance of power - or more precisely, inter-Arab balance of 
power - could not be shaped and formed in isolation from a consideration of the other 
non-Arab players in the region. 
For Iran,'^' the crisis was a mixed blessing. On one hand, it raised Iran's profile and 
highlighted its significance as a regional player (the crisis helped in opening up all the 
frozen channels of communications with Iran's Arab neighbours). On the other, the 
crisis raised regional tensions and provided the catalyst for the return of Western powers 
to the Gulf sub-region,thus weakening Tehran's ability to influence the policies of 
the GCC and to forge ties with the Gulf sheikhdoms aiming at collective security in the 
Persian Gulf.'^^ For Iran, the main expectation of the war was that it expected it to 
weaken significantly its most stubborn regional competitor.'^'* Most important of all, as 
See Taher, A., L'Irak aux origins du regime militaire, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989). 
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a consequence of the crisis Iran was to win the victory over Iraq that had eluded it on 
the battlefield. Iraq capitulated to Iran fully and accepted the full implementation of 
SCR 598 and the 1975 Algiers Treaty concerning their border dispute.'^^ Despite Iran's 
efforts to limit Western military presence in the Gulf sub-region, in the aftermath of the 
war, a series of bilateral defence pacts between the main Western players and a number 
of GCC states paved the way for a permanent Western military presence in the Persian 
Gulf— something Iran had thought its acceptance of SCR 598 would have avoided. 
Moreover, the creation in March 1991 of the "6-1-2" Gulf security pact between the GCC 
and Egypt and Syria worried Tehran that its backyard was being developed as an 
exclusively Arab area.^ '^ ^ 
The crisis, however, was of huge benefit to Turkey.'^' As Korany points out, "After the 
end of the Cold War, Turkey was in danger of losing its strategic importance between 
the East and West. The Gulf War gave Turkey a new strategic role at the expense of its 
Arab neighbours."'^* Robins too considers the crisis as being of help to Turkey in that 
Turkey gained substantial amounts of modem hardware for its armed f o r c e s . I n this 
context, Chubin recognises that the war served to underscore the return of Turkey to the 
Middle East in a militarily significant way: the now weak Iraq would no longer present 
a threat to Turkey."*" 
The overall beneficiary of the crisis was Israel. It used the crisis to improve further its 
military power. It did not feel compelled to make compromises on the Palestinian issue, 
and any concessions made in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict could not result in 
real losses for Israel, since the Arab side was expected to sacrifice much more than 
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merely 'an extra mile' for the few inches that Tel Aviv was prepared to travel.''*' 
Moreover, by destroying Iraqi military power, the challenge to Israel's military 
superiority was removed. In terms of regional balance of power, Arab divisions thus 
enhanced Israel's position. Paradoxically, Iraq's rapid military collapse in the war 
helped to cement Israeli-US relations, an unexpected development, given the coolness 
between the two countries in the pre-Kuwait crisis period.'"*^ 
Regarding Arab states, for Egypt, the crisis provided an economic outlet, and on the 
political level it was simultaneously a blessing and a setback.''*^ Aftandilian maintains 
that the defeat of Iraq allowed Egypt to emerge as the strongest Arab military power,''*'* 
and it certainly remains true that the return of the Arab League to Cairo symbolised 
Egypt's renewed centrality. The centrepiece of Egypt's bid was the Damascus 
Declaration,"*^ but when the Gulf states, led by Kuwait, concluded security agreements 
with the United States and invited Egyptian and Syrian troops to leave, the post-war 
vulnerabilities of Egypt's bridging strategy were exposed. The United States was now 
better positioned to bypass Cairo in securing its vital oil interests, and the Gulf States 
could rely on American guarantees which they were previously too timid to enlist 
openly.'"*^ This, of course, represented in long run a setback for Egypt. Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait hired Egyptian and Syrian soldiers but did not call upon the power of these 
states. Egypt's power, for example was no longer seriously calculated. One of the 
reasons for that is that Egypt had for a long time secured its peace with Israel, which 
automatically led to the belief that its power could not be deployed against Israel, the 
sworn enemy of the Arabs. Subsequently, it was not logical to consider Egyptian power 
strong enough to be deployed to resolve an inter-Arab matter. According to Aftandilian, 
'The Iran-Iraq war helped to accelerate Egypt's rapprochement with the Arab world.''"*^ 
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But, as mentioned above, by causing intensive American presence in the region, the KC 
hindered Egypt from fully recovering its central position in the Arab world. 
For Syria,'"^* the crisis served politically as a bridge for its political existence between 
the end of the Cold War (when its patron protector and arms supplier was no longer to 
be relied upon) and the new order which recognised the United States as sole 
superpower, or as Hinnebusch puts it, to gain United States recognition as a responsible 
power whose interests should be accommodated in any settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.''*^ On the regional level, the crisis gave Syria the chance to see its arch-rival -
Iraq - destroyed, and at the same time to gain subsidies for its faltering economy. Most 
importantly, 'assured there were no plans for permanent United States presence in the 
region and that postwar security would be in the hands of Arab forces, Assad gambled 
that participation in the coalition would give Syria a role in filling the power-vacuum 
once American forces withdrew.'^*' 
For Saudi Arabia, the crisis was not a blessing. The crisis reduced the 'Ansehen' or the 
status of Saudi Arabia within the GCC member states. 'While Saudi Arabia's policy 
with the world at large is generally pacifistic, its policy vis-a-vis its neighbours on the 
Arabian peninsula is hegemonic.''^' Thus, the KC rendered the Saudi position weak 
because the Saudi power could not match or provide a direct reaction to the Iraqi threat. 
Although helping Saudi Arabia to top up its military arsenals, the Saudi petrodollars 
proved irrelevant to the power structure in the region. On the ground, the Saudi power 
was not operative, which is why after the crisis all Saudi roads led to Washington. 
Wilson and Graham conclude that the American link proved in the final analysis to be 
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the only reliable thread in Saudi foreign policy.'^^ But this in turn affected Riyadh's 
post-invasion calculation. Prior to Operation Desert Storm, the Kingdom seemed 
unwilling to countenance any break in the facade of Arab unity. Now, Saudi Arabia, 
again with the American backing, has adopted a policy of almost intentional 
confrontation with its former close allies. Possibly this is a result of great bitterness 
towards those nations and groups that eagerly lined up to take Saudi money but did little 
when the Kingdom was in danger.'^ ^ 
The crisis for Jordan,'^ '* as Hamameh maintains, created severe economic hardships but 
also had some positive impacts too. The first was that it triggered the longest, most open 
and democratic period in the history of Jordan. The second was that the crisis furnished 
the ground-work for a genuine rebuilding of Jordanian-Palestinian communities within 
Jordan. For decades, the majority of the Palestinians had been under the impression that 
the Hashemite policies concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict were formulated in collusion 
with the Zionists. The king's stand during the crisis has been the most important factor 
in contributing to better relations between the two communities.'^^ 
Having considered the impact on individual actors in the region, the main impact of the 
crisis on the Arab balance of power was that "it provided further fragmentation in the 
Arab world and the prospect of the largest Arab force in the modem history being 
drastically reduced."''^ This refers mainly to the order which Arab balance of power 
serves to organise. If "[b]alance of power is the dominant way of securing order,"'^^ the 
Ibid., p. 131. 
Ibid., p. 131. 
For an eloquent analysis of Jordan's response to the K C , see M. B. Hamarneh, "Jordan's Response to 
the Gulf Crisis," in Bennis & Mushabeck (eds.). Beyond the Storm, 1992, pp. 228-241. On the 
relationship between Jordan and the Gulf see, Stanley Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 69, no. 5, (Winter 1990-91), pp. 20-35; See also A. Garfinkle, "Jordanian Policy from the 
Intifada to the Madrid Conference," in Freedman, R., (ed.). The Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of 
Kuwait, 1993, pp. 297-335. 
Hamarneh, M. B., "Jordan's Response to the Gulf Crisis". In Bennis & Mushabeck (eds.), Beyond the 
Storm, 1992, pp. 237,238,239. 
Ehteshami in Gow, (ed.), Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and he World Community, 1993, pp. 65-66 (my 
italics); See also Yezid Sayigh, "Globalisation Manqu6: Regional Fragmentation and Authoritarian-
Liberalism in the Middle East," in L . Fawcett and Y. Sayigh (eds.) The Third World Beyond The 
Cold War: Continuity and Change. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), pp. 201-234. 
See Rengger, N. J., International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order, 2000, p. 37. 
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crux of the question when using this analysis is whether Arab power was used during 
and after the crisis to balance Arab affairs and counter power. 
In fact, the balance of power was/is no longer a central tool of Arab statecraft. The crisis 
affected Arab states to the degree that Arab states could possess the power, but they 
could not balance with it. This was/is due to the restraint imposed upon their order. 
Egypt's and Syria's power(s) were deemed or denounced as unnecessary to be deployed 
to balance the Iraqi threat or that of Iran after the crisis, because the Arab 'order' - that 
is the governing style of relations between Arab states - was no longer purely an Arab 
matter. In effect, Arab states were no longer able to manage their own affairs, 
something which can be considered not only as one impact of the crisis, but also as an 
impact of the interrelations between Arab states. To illustrate this point, as Hinnebusch 
suggests, "The formation of the anti-Iraq coalition showed that decision-making in the 
Arab states was, by this time, driven almost exclusively by such factors as individual 
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geopolitical interest and/or Western dependency." 
Bull maintains that the primary goal of international order is the protection of the 
sovereignty of the state.'^ ^ The question, therefore, is whether an 'Arab' order was able 
to protect the sovereignty of Arab state operating in this order. The KC proved that this 
was not the case. The Arab order could no longer provide the 'ordering' or the overall 
patterning of inter-Arab relations because within inter-Arab relations 'balance' is not a 
solution, but a problem.'^" This illustrates the complex relationship which lies between 
Hinnebusch, R., 'The Middle East Regional System," in Hinnebusch, R. & Ehteshami (eds.) Foreign 
Policies of Middle Eastern States, (London, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 48. 
Cited in Smith, "Is the Truth out There?", in Paul and Hall, International Order and the Future. 
Remarkably, Smith is critical of Bull's argument. He argues that why should the state be privileged 
in a constructed order? "Critically, if order is constructed why should we accept the state as the 
analytical unit for our analysis and sovereignty as the primary goal to be protected? There could well 
be a host of other goals that we should advance, such as human rights, economic wellbeing, life 
chances, opposition to genocide, female genital mutilation, and so on". However, I defend the 
argument of Bull as my study considers the state as the core of order analysis. Smith seems to have 
overlooked the fact that all the goals he suggested were primary goals of advancement are mainly 
advanced within entirely sovereign states and within sovereign societies. States do not only reach 
their status as sovereign states when their borders are demarcated, but when the primary goal of 
states is those issues, and in the same time when states are able to imply sovereign solutions to these 
issues. That is why, although this is not my concern in this study, cultural boundaries still have an 
impact on the making of international relations. 
'** In Europe, balance was the solution to the problem of order that the European states system believed 
itself to have evolved, once the practices of sovereignty became embedded in European life and it 
became the central pivot of discussion about international affairs well into the twentieth century. For 
more on this argument see N. J., Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem 
ofOrder,2000, pp. 21-24. 
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power and security. With which powers should the Arab states balance? Israel, Iran, 
Turkey? Or should they balance with each other? The crisis placed the Arab states 
within a dilemma about how and what type of an option they should choose. The 
solution proved to lie in the galvanisation of the region by the United States. For Arab 
states, the American power is a sine qua non to maintain an 'order' in balance. 
The Arab state's problematique, as theorised in chapter one, is the Arab state itself. The 
survival of the Arab state had to be predicated on the cost to other Arab states because 
the existing Arab order could not guarantee the state's survival, something which the 
KC served to exacerbate. Also examined in Chapter One was the idea of the creation or 
invention of the Arab states as discussed by Owen and Springborg. Such an idea is 
exemplified by the rivalry between Egypt and Syria, as discussed in Chapter Two, a 
rivalry which culminated during and after the crisis. Hinnebusch expresses it thus: 
Egypt's paramount concern for its bridging strategy can be seen in 
Mubarak's choices during the crisis. Had Arab autonomy and security been a 
central concern, he would have sought a diplomatic solution and demurred at 
the destruction of Iraqi power needed in the balance with Israel and Iran. But 
Mubarak short-circuited Arab diplomacy in favour of US intervention and 
sent Egyptian troops to give it legitimizing cover. At the decisive 10 August 
1990 Arab summit, where the issue was the Saudi request for US help, 
Mubarak, as chairman, refused to allow discussion, amendments or votes for 
alternatives. The evidence is strong that Mubarak subsequently favoured a 
military solution over a negotiated one. This not only pleased his American 
patron but was a bid to fully re-establish the Egypt-Saudi alliance which had 
been enervated by Camp David. Mubarak also aimed to assume 
responsibility for post-war Gulf security, to sell the protective services of his 
large army to the Gulf rulers for petrodollars. In fact, Egypt won massive, 
globally unprecedented debt relief and a promise of aid from the Gulf, but 
was rebuffed in its bid to play Gulf gendarme 
From this, it can be seen that what made or could make an Arab order more stable is 
simply for that order to be less Arab. Consequently, the term 'balance' remains hostage 
to what had changed in Arab power formation after the crisis. Iraq's power, as pointed 
out earlier, was destroyed, but the Iraqi leadership remained in power; thus, the source 
of the 'threat' also remained. It has been argued that "the pattern of regional alliances 
has been characterised by the same pliability as it had been before."'^^ The crisis "did 
Hinnebusch, R., 'The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in Hinnebusch, R. & Ehteshami (eds.) Foreign 
Policies of Middle Eastern States, 2002, pp. 91-112. 
Niblock, 'A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East?', in Jawad, The Middle East in the New 
World Order, (ed.) 1994, p. 3. 
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not reduce the ongoing competition between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, but in absolute 
terms, Iraq was weakened to the benefit of the other two."'^^ The Kuwaiti leadership 
was brought back to govern as before, Egypt and Syria profited mainly economically, 
and Syria and Iran [temporarily] moved quickly from being international pariahs to 
valued partners in the Western-orchestrated coalition.'^"^ 
There were no impacts, however, on changing regimes. '^ ^ Only the 
'Durchsetzungsvermoegeri' of the Arab state became governed by galvanisation, which 
affected the performance of the state as a state. Almost all Arab states wanted to make 
peace with Israel. This confirms the dimensions of my discussion: part of Arab states 
history is that they are Arab states opposite to Israel. Once they have made their peace 
with Israel, they have lost one of the main mechanisms by which they operate on 
regional level; that is their opposition to Israel which gives them more legitimacy and 
Ansehen (respect) by their peoples. But still, Arab states had/ve no choices to make or 
unmake peace with Israel. 
Summary 
The KC constitutes a watershed in inter-Arab relations. The Arab regional order 
changed from being part of the dynamics of the impacts of the Cold War and from the 
dynamics of dominating Arabism, to the dynamics of galvanisation by the United States. 
The sum result of the KC was that all Arab states became coated by the American 
presence in the region. 
Nevertheless, the crisis left several types of impacts on the Arab regional order. First 
and foremost, it furthered the fragmentation of the Arabs. Secondly, the crisis helped 
Arab states to enter into an open dialogue with Israel. The crisis was a reason behind the 
creation of the order within which Arab-Israeli dialogue took place. However, this does 
not necessarily lead to peace in the region because the dynamics of the existing 'system' 
163 Ehteshami in Gow, (ed.), Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and he World Community, 1993, p. 67. 
Niblock, 'A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East?', in Jawad The Middle East in the New 
World Order, (ed.), 1994, p. 1. 
For more details on the study of the Arab regimes see Maurice Flory, et al., Les regimes politiques 
arabes, (Press Universitaires de France: Paris 1990). . 
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prevent the making of a peaceful order. Therefore, one of the major setbacks as a result 
of the crisis was that it strengthened the Israeli position in the Arab world through the 
peace process in the region. Thirdly, the crisis did not cause the death of Arabism as 
some scholars have argued. Had the crisis done so, there would have not been a process 
of peace between 'all ' the Arabs and Israel. Fourthly, the crisis proved that it was 
specifically an Arab crisis. Al l non-Arab parties in the region in one way or another 
profited from the crisis. The sole losers were the Arabs. And finally, the crisis 
legitimised the American presence in the region, which led to its galvanisation. It can 
therefore be concluded that the change in the Arab regional order which was brought 
about by the KC served mainly to further fragment the Arabs - and thus further 
strengthen the grip of Israel in the region. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Shape of Inter-Arab Politics in the 1990s and Beyond 
Introduction 
The concept of 'conflict' is a landmark within the ME and there are no considerable 
ambiguities surrounding the concept when it is connected to that region.' The main 
features of this conflict in the ME are first of all Israel, which is taken into account 
because of its continuing occupation of Arab land. The second is the Palestinians, who 
are taken into account because they are occupied by Israel and they do not cease by their 
own means to resist occupation. Iraq is also taken into consideration because President 
Saddam Hussein, who has remained in power since the KC, has, whether he likes it or 
not, become synonymous with conflict and war in the ME. Therefore, when speaking of 
the ME, one implies the degree of conflict in the region and in many ways the 
implications flow back to refer to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Meanwhile, at the regional level, the United States is a regional player. Thus, it would 
be to fall short academically not to calculate the American impact in the region as 
comprehensive. This chapter, however, apart from the section on Iraq, and in order to 
maintain the balance between the events and their makers, will not put the United States 
in the centre of each political measure in the region in order to avoid changing the focus 
to that of 'American domination'. Instead, this chapter will automatically recognise the 
American presence in the region and in the same time illustrate those events which are 
outlined below, to help achieve an understanding of the theoretical argument of Chapter 
Five. 
In everyday use, it is often taken to mean some dispute in which two or more parties are using violence 
as a means of winning, or more usually (as they perceive it) 'in self-defence'. Violence is normally 
used in the sense of damage, although it is becoming increasingly acknowledged that it is possible to 
speak of using psychological violence and causing psychological damage to an adversary. For more 
on this subject see C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, London, Macmillan, 1981 
from which this footnote is taken p. 15. 
103 
Since the end of the KC, the academic and political debates in the ME have revolved 
around two issues: the first is the peace process and the second is the isolation of Iraq 
from collective Arab, regional, and international policymaking. These two parallel 
issues made the political headlines in the ME until September 2000 when the al-Aqsa 
Intifada broke out. The al-Aqsa Intifada, particularly in its early days, occupied the 
headlines and constructed a new face of the peace process in the ME. Therefore, I shall 
take these events, marked as following, as signposts for this chapter 
The marginalisation of Iraq; 
The peace process; 
The al-Aqsa Intifada 
The marginalisation of Iraq was formed throughout economic sanctions and political 
isolation of Iraq from collective Arab policymaking. This chapter will not discuss the 
philosophy and the impact of sanctions on Iraq, since this is the not the concern of this 
study. It is taken for granted that sanctions have helped to weaken and isolate Iraq from 
the political order in the region and on an international level.^ This chapter will illustrate 
how Iraq became isolated and marginalised, which automatically indicates the strong 
hold of the United States on the region. The fate of Iraq could not be discussed without 
taking the United States into account. Thus, this section of this chapter will illustrate 
how the United States' political presence in the region impacted Iraq to the degree of its 
marginalisation. 
The peace process started between 'the' Arabs and Israel and ended up between Israel 
and the Palestinians while the Arabs took on the role of mediators. This chapter will 
elaborate on the relationship between making peace and the regional order and examine 
why each country including Israel chose to make peace. The question to be answered in 
this section is whether peace was a collective interest of the ME states or whether it was 
based on merely individual motivations of each party in the region. 
See Douglas M. Englund 'Lessons for Disarmament from the Experience of UNSCOM,' in Steven 
Mataija and J. Marshall Beier, (eds.). Multilateral Verification and the Post-Gulf Environment: 
Learning from the UNSCOM Experience (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 
York University, 1992); Ian Johnstone, Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action, 
International Peace Academy Occasional Papers (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1994). 
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This study considers the al-Aqsa Intifada as an inherent part of the peace process. The 
main structure of political order in the ME is conflict and violence. However, the peace 
process, as an ad hoc event, mitigated the perception of Israeli violence in the region 
which imbued the concept 'Israel' with more friendly connotations - being in a peace 
process with the Arabs rather than being the occupier of the Arab land. Consequently, 
when the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out, although it represents the counter-violence to the 
occupation, it is seen as the Palestinian violence. This chapter will elaborate on this 
point; the main issue here is that this chapter in its entirety is to facilitate the discussion 
in Chapter Five which comprises the main body of the entire study. 
The Regional Order and the Marginalisation of Iraq 
The subject formation about Iraqi politics is not similar to that concerning the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There are various factors which intervene when discussing 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are, for instance, two parties in conflict: the Palestinians 
and the Israelis. There are also Arab states involved, and there is the role of mediation 
by the United States. There are also factors which count in analysing the events which 
are the events themselves: the peace process, the succession of different governments in 
Israel, Arafat's continued role at the forefront of Palestinian politics. Such factors, 
however, are not applicable when discussing the case of Iraq within Arab politics. There 
is only Saddam Hussein the Iraqi president. The future of Iraq after the KC was tied to 
the fact that Saddam Hussein remained in power. Therefore, Saddam Hussein was the 
main figure to 'talk' about when discussing Iraqi politics. This study therefore treats 
Iraq as Saddam and Saddam as Iraq. 
The American insistence that Saddam was a threat gave him the position before Iraq, 
that says that the concern of the United States was that Saddam Hussein was a threat to 
his neighbours and he was still worthy of containment. This, however, gave the person 
of Saddam the weight over the actual Iraqi power. Iraq, however, did not possess the 
power to deter the American forces which marched into Baghdad. 
It was suggested in western debate that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction: even if 
Iraq had possessed the required power to claim a position in the region, Iraqi power 
could no longer shape the regional order. The American presence in the region was the 
yardstick by which to measure the Iraqi actions and behaviour and this does not require 
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deep analysis because the relationship between the United States and Iraq was identical 
to their relationship with Saddam as president of Iraq. In light of this consideration, this 
section of this chapter will describe the Iraqi position within the regional order in the 
ME and in Chapter Five, relating this to the absence of an Arab system, more analysis 
will be embarked upon. 
Security Council Resolution 687,^ which was passed at the end of the Gulf war in 1991, 
sought to involve Iraq cooperatively in the post-war measures to build lasting peace and 
stability in the region.''* More than [twelve] years after the initial sanctions were 
imposed on Iraq, it is clear that this objective has not been fulfilled. ' What was fulfilled 
primarily was the marginalisation or, in other words, the banning of Iraq from collective 
Arab and international policymaking. 
Iraq's location in the ME and on an international level was set with the outcome of the 
second Gulf War. President Bush, in his personal diary, stated that he had "no feeling of 
euphoria" over the outcome of the crisis: "it has not been a clean end; there is no 
battleship Missouri surrender. This is what's missing to make this akin to WWII, to 
separate Kuwait from Korea and Vietnam."^ National Security Advisor of Bush, Brent 
Scowcroft, viewed Iraq as a regional counterweight to a potentially resurgent Iran.^ 
Clinton administration's stance towards Iraq was not clear in the beginning. In an 
interview in mid-January 1993, Clinton stated that i f Saddam Hussein "wants a different 
relationship with the United States and the United Nations, all he has to do is to change 
4 
7 
For reference to economic sanctions before the K C see Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions in 
Contemporary Perspective, (London: Macmillan Press 1987). For an analysis of the security council 
resolutions against Iraq, see Tim Niblock, "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, 
Libya, Sudan (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner 2001). On sanctions and their effectiveness see Alan 
Dowty, 'Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order', Washington Quarterly, (Summer 
1994), Vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 179-198. On sanctions and international law see Christopher Joyner, 
Sanctions, 'Compliance and International Law: Reflections on the United Nations' Experience 
Against Iraq', Virginia Journal of International Law, (Fall 1991), vol. 32, no. 1. 
Niblock, Pariah States, 2001, p. 97. 
Ibid., p. 97. 
Walter Pincus, "Bush Says He Hoped Saddam Would Flee Iraq," Washington Post, September 2, 
1998, p. A2. See Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the 
Cold War, (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press 2000), p. 123. 
Litwak, R. S., Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2000, p. 124. 
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his behaviour."* But when this interview triggered a barrage of criticism, Clinton denied 
that there would be no fundamental differences between Bush and Clinton 
administration policies toward Iraq and that the new White House would not "do 
business" with Saddam Hussein.^ Dee Dee Mayrs, the presidential spokesman, [then] 
stated that the Clinton administration did not believe that Iraq could come into ful l 
compliance with Security Council resolutions while Saddam Hussein remained in power. 
Therefore, he stated, "there are no practical differences" between the Bush and Clinton 
policies.'" 
On May 1993, Martin Indyk, the special assistant to the President for Near East and 
South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, outlined the dual containment 
policy in a speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He said that the 
United States would no longer play the game of balancing Iran against Iraq. The 
strength of the United States and its friends in the region—Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey and the GCC— would allow Washington to "counter both the Iraqi and Iranian 
regimes; we wil l not need to depend on one to counter the other."" Furthermore, he 
stated that the administration's goal is "to establish clearly and unequivocally that the 
current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of the international society 
and, in our judgment, irredeemable."'^ 
It is clear from the above discussion that after the KC, the future of Iraq was in the 
hands of the United States. Iraq's problem was that the United States acted more as a 
regional player making the order. This gave it a greater role than a superpower on the 
world stage:'^ the United States in the ME has the role of what is termed here as the 
* Thomas L , Friedman, "The New Presidency", New York Times, lanuary 14, 1993, p. A l . See Litwak, 
Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2000, p. 126. 
* This sentence is borrowed from Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2000, p. 126. 
'* R. Jeffrey Smith, "U. S. Drops Demand for Saddam's Ouster, ''Washington Post, March 30, 1993, p. 
A17. See Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy. 2000, pp. 126-127. 
Sentence and citation taken from F. G. Cause III, The Illogic of Dual Containment, Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 1994, p. 57. 
Cited in Ibid., p. 57. 
" See Philip Robins, The Middle East: Current Trends - Future Realities, in Philip Robins, et al.. The 
Middle East in the Post Peace Process: The Emerging Regional Order and its International 
Implications, (Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economics 1996), p. 26. Notably, Robins rightly 
concluded that there are two areas which have seen remarkable consistency in the United States' 
position [since early 1990s]; namely, its military presence in the Gulf and its commitment to the 
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'absolute unipolarity'. Consequently, the decisiveness of the political achievement of 
the KC is far stronger than the military one: for the United States, Saddam was Iraq, and 
Iraq was Saddam and Saddam was a threat.''* Yet, categorising Saddam as a threat was a 
mandate for the United States to translate the already existing power into a powerful 
entity and this was the outcome of the crisis which is to be considered in this study as 
the long-term outcome. Authors like Lesch whose work entitled 'Inter-Arab Relations 
in the Post Peace Era' (1995),'^ regarding Iraq, focuses mainly on the immediate and 
direct outcomes of the KC, ignoring in the first place the political order which emerged 
after the crisis. However, for Lesch, the military outcome [of the KC] was decisive, but 
the political outcome was ambiguous.'^ 
The marginalisation of Iraq from regional poHtics with Saddam's continuance in power 
gave a further dimension to a mode of politics which existed for a long time amongst 
Arab states—that is the dimension of 'personalised polities'. The shape of inter-Arab 
relations since the KC is the deepening of 'personalised polities'. Inter-Arab relations 
are more of inter-leaders relations. What is notable in this case is that the United States 
as a new regional actor followed this pattern of regional behaviour. Bush's versus 
Saddam Hussein, Clinton versus Saddam Hussein and then Bush I I against Saddam. So, 
as Robins observed. 
Since the UN partition of historic Palestine and the creation of the state of 
Israel, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a single most important issue in the 
political dynamics of the region. Considering the extensive nature of its 
effect, political leaders as Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak 
state of Israel. Moreover, he maintains that there is no reason to believe that these priorities will 
change in the future. See pp. 26-32. 
" For a study of threats in the new world order see John Mueller and Karl Mueller, 'The Methodology 
of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 
23, no. 1, March 2000. pp. 163-187. 
Lesch considers the events that took place after the crisis without deep analysis. The title of the book, 
Inter-Arab Relations in the Post-Peace Era, does not really suggest any specific arguments about 
how inter-Arab relations had changed. My interest in the book was based on its title because of my 
interest in discussing inter-Arab politics in the era of the post KC. However, disappointingly, the 
book however has almost no relevance to the discussion of the post-peace era. 
" Anne M. Lesch, Inter-Arab Relations in the Post-Peace Era, (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Centre 
for Strategic Studies and Research, 1995), p. 25. Lesch maintains that Kuwaiti sovereignty was 
restored, but the Iraqi president remained in power. The uprisings in the north and south failed to 
unseat the regime; foreign no-fly zones provided limited—and temporary—protection for those 
peoples from the government's wrath. Iraqi opposition groups remain divided, functioning largely in 
exile or in the Kurdish zone, and unable to unseat the government. For these reasons, Lesch 
considers the outcome of the K C as ambiguous. 
108 
Rabin and Ariel Sharon were built on diplomatic and military success 
connected to the conflict, rather than on their ability as domestic 
politicians.'^ 
It is the same case with Iraq: the phenomenon of Saddam Hussein's presence deepened 
the order of personalised politics. The United States was dragged into this profile of 
political order. However, the longer personalised politics exist in a region, the less the 
opportunity for a stable system to exist. Therefore, inter-states political agendas depend 
mainly on leaders' political settings. The evidence to support this argument can be 
found in the time since George Bush I I was elected to the White House. 
The Iraqi position in the region, the American policy towards Iraq, and the United 
Nations position towards Iraq could be seen in Bush's summary to his nation on Iraq. In 
Cincinnati, Bush addressed the Americans, he said: 
Tonight I want to take few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace, and 
America's determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The 
threat comes from Iraq... understanding the threat of our time, knowing the 
designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume 
the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring... 
some believe we can address this danger by simply resuming the old 
approach to inspections, and applying diplomatic and economic pressures.... 
The world has also tried economic sancdons... the world has tried limited 
military strikes to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities... 
the world has tried no-fly zones to keep Saddam from terrorising is own 
people, and in the last year alone, the Iraqi military has fired upon American 
and British pilots more than 750 times. Eleven years during which we have 
tried containment, sancdons, inspections, even selected military action, the 
end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons 
and is increasing his capabilities to make more. Clearly, to actually work, 
any new inspections, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms will have to be 
very different. America wants the U.N. to be an effective organisation that 
helps keep the peace.'* 
The above remarks by President Bush outlined the process which, in his words, the 
world dealt with Iraq. More specifically, the United States and its ally, the United 
Kingdom, had been dealing with Iraq. The issue of dealing with Iraq culminated not in 
the bombs that were dropped on it, but on the political agenda set for Iraq and for the 
region in its entirety. The case of Iraq represents the true nature of the ME political 
" Philip Robins, The Middle East: Current Trends - Future Realities, in Philip Robins, et al. The 
Middle East in the Post Peace Process, 1996, pp.7-8. 
18 Excerpts are taken from Bush's speech to Cincinnati Museum Centre, Cincinnati Union Terminal 
Cincinnati, Ohio. October 7, 2002. For more on the speech see White House Press Office, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov. 
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order— conflict. During the war that began on 16 January and lasted until 27 February, 
Iraq was subjected to the equivalent of one atomic bomb a week. The dropping of some 
88,000 tons of ordinance, an explosive tonnage equivalent to seven Hiroshima-size 
atomic bombs, and which makes a scale of destruction that has no parallels in the 
history of warfare,'^ represents the achievement of almost eliminating the entity of Iraq. 
But Iraq remained present in the regional political order in a manner determined by the 
United States. 
Iraq was meant to embody the continuation of the structural bases on which ME politics 
are made: namely coercion and conflict. In this context, Abd al-Rahman Munif 
expressed the view that the United States' motive for using such overwhelming force 
against Iraq was more than just the liberation of Kuwait, or even the destruction of Iraq. 
"Iraq was hit with this mercilessness in order to make it an example to others, including 
friends, and to demonstrate the extent of the power of the United States at the present 
time and under conditions called the new world order. Therefore, all people must be 
aware of the dangers that await them in the future [in case of challenging the American 
power in the region] ."^ '^  
However, the political situation imposed upon Iraq by the United States through the 
United Nations also necessitated compliance by Iraq's Arab neighbouring states. For 
example, throughout the 1990s, Iraq and Egypt kept their diplomatic ties under the 
auspices of the Indian embassy. However, in September 2000, diplomatic ties were 
restored, but these did not amount to full embassy status with full diplomatic 
representation. ^' However, Mubarak voiced hope that Iraq would eventually return to 
the Arab fold: 'it is only a matter of time, nothing more.'^^ But the fact was that Egypt's 
position towards Iraq throughout the 1990s remained similar to its position towards Iraq 
during the war 1990-1991. The historical rivalry between Egypt and Iraq was the main 
" See Geoff Simons, Iraq - Primus Inter Pariahs: A Crisis Chronology, 1997-98, (London, New York, 
Macmillan 1999), p. 53; See also Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural 
Justice (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2"^ edition, 1998). 
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Munif Cited in Muslih, M., Palestinian and Other Arab Perspectives on the Peace Process. In R. 
Freedman (ed.). The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords, 1998), p. 
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Cited in Gulf News, online ed., http://gulf-news.com/articl/print.asp?articleID=2239, September 09, 
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character of the relationship between these two countries. Saddam's mistakes helped 
Mubarak's political agenda; Saddam's invasion of Kuwait helped Mubarak to achieve a 
gradual reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world without prejudice to Cairo's Israeli 
links. Iraq had criticised the peace process since its inception. Saddam Hussein 
criticised the Arab Summit, which was hosted by Mubarak, which denounced the 
excessive use of force against Palestinians, but left the door open to peace talks. 
Baghdad said that the summit should have taken a strong stand, calling for a jihad (holy 
war) against the Jewish state to liberate occupied Palestinian land.^ '* Even when the 
example of the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States is examined, it is clear that 
despite rhetorical opposition to it by Saudi Arabia and Eqypt, these countries still 
provided strategic military assistance to the United States in the war. Therefore, this 
clearly shows that the relations between Iraq and its key Arab neighbours were not 
rehabilitated to an extent that relegated their strategic co-operation with the United 
States. This conjecture shows a historical parallel with the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, 
where Saudi Arabia and Egypt provided strategic and military co-operation with the 
United States against a fellow Arab nation. Therefore, it is only appropriate to conclude 
that although moves were made towards a rapprochement between Iraq and its 
neighbours, this was only on a rhetorical level and thus was superficial. 
Jordan reversed its policies toward Iraq from 1995 and bandwagoned with the ascendant 
Israeli-American pole. Jordan was not balancing against an Iraqi threat or Iraqi power 
by moving closer to Israel; incremental shifts in Iraqi power were only marginally 
relevant for Jordanian policy.^' As the peace process developed, the payoffs of aligning 
with the Israeli-American coalition seemed to outweigh the dangers of the policy 
change. Abandonment of Iraq stood as the price of admission to an alignment with 
Israel and the United States. The goals of Jordanian policy were widely understood, 
both in Jordan and abroad, as a move to cement Jordan's position with Israel and the 
United States and to secure reconciliation with the Gulf States.Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait announced their position in April 1993 - that a normalisation of relationship 
" Raymond Hinnebusch, The Foreign Policy of Egypt, in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (eds.) The Foreign 
Policies of the Middle Eastern States, 2002, p. 107. 
^ Gulf News, online ed., http://gulf-news.comyarticl/print.asp?articleID=2239, September 09. 2000. 
Lynch, M., Abandoning Iraq: Jordan's Alliances and the Politics of State Identity. 
^ Ibid. 
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with Jordan needed more time.^^ Indeed, only in the late 1995, when Jordan's rupture 
with Saddam's Iraq had become more pronounced, did relations with Saudi Arabia 
begin to show signs of real improvement.^^ 
The Syrian position towards Iraq has become a well-known political discourse in the 
region since 1980. The Arab-Israeli conflict is the main priority in Syria's political 
calculations. Therefore, when Iraq was an effective power in this field, then strong 
Syrian-Iraqi ties could emerge. Bashar al-Assad, since his accession, cautiously, opened 
more channels with Iraq. But these ties did not reach to ful l diplomatic ties. Diplomatic 
representations were opened in the Algerian embassies in Damascus and Baghdad in 
2000 and 2001 respectively.^^ The relationship between Syria and Iraq, however, was 
governed by the galvanisation theory. The United States' policies towards Syria decided 
Syria's stance towards Iraq. George W. Bush put Syria within the 'Axis of Evil ' , Syria 
then found no choice, knowing that it was sitting in the same boat with Iraq, but to 
denounce the American policy in the region by coming, slightly, closer to Iraq. 
Regarding Saudi Arabia, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the 
United States, has been reported as saying that the reason Iraq did not invade the 
Kingdom was the presence [in Saudi Arabia] by October 1990 of more than 200,000 
American troops and more than 1,000 American airplanes. Throughout the 1990s, 
American troops remained present in the kingdom, based on the assumption that 
Saddam Hussein still represented a threat to the kingdom. Nonetheless, during the Arab 
summit in Beirut, which was convened in March 2002, it seemed that there was a Saudi-
Iraqi rapprochement symbolised by an embrace between Crown Prince Abdullah and 
Iraq's Vice President Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri. Moreover, Prince Abdullah said that "we 
are against an [American] attack on Iraq and we hope that the situation will not come to 
" Middle East International, 16 April 1993. 
^ Susser, A., The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: The Geopolitical Rationale of a Bilateral 
Relationship, (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1999), p. 8. For more on the 
Jordanian-Iraqi relations since the Kuwait Crisis see L . Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The 
Political Economy of Alliance Making, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994); See J. Nevo, 
"Jordan's Relations with Iraq: Ally or Victim?" In A. Baram & B. Rubin (eds.) Iraq's Road to War, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
'^ For more on Syria's foreign policy see Volker Perthes, 'The Political Economy of the Syrian 
Succession', Survival 43, no. I (Spring 2001); Raymond Hinnebusch, 'The Foreign Policy of Syria', 
in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (eds.) TheForeign Policy of the Middle Eastern States 2002. 
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that."'^ ^ To be sure, the Saudi-Iraqi relations could not be governed by any other 
mechanism rather than that of the presence of the American troops on Saudi soil. 
The Palestinians' position towards Iraq and even towards the entire outside world 
depended on how their peace process went and recently depended on the course of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada. It is said that ' i f the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch'. 
The Palestinian minister of work stated that "contacts between Arafat and Saddam 
Hussein have not ceased, not even for a moment."^' The sum result for Arafat was a 
similar isolation as that which Saddam Hussein was subjected to. Thus, no matter how 
close the relations between these two parts, it does not affect the course of Arab politics 
in the region. At the Islamic Summit in Tehran in December 1997, Arafat "called for 
lifting the cruel UN sanctions against Iraq and Libya and the Sudan."^^ In the same vein, 
Saddam Hussein continuously called for Arab collective action to liberate the 
Palestinian land.^^ 
In conclusion, Iraq's location in the ME throughout the 1990s was illustrated by its 
marginalisation. The main point is that, alongside the marginalisation of Iraq, the peace 
process was initiated, which caused further marginalisation to Iraq. Since 1980, Iraq had 
been at war with its neighbours. Yet, when Arab states got engaged in the peace process, 
they had little to do with the 'worrier' Iraq. But, because the United States treated Iraq 
as a threat, which meant certain power, Iraq remained in the calculation of the regional 
actors. On top of that, it remained in the calculations of the United States which 
ultimately became a priority in Bush II's administration, a matter which culminated by 
the war on Iraq in 2003. 
The Arab Regional Order and the Peace Process 
Since the peace process started, Arab politics had changed; however, the main change 
was not the inclination of these states towards peace with Israel since this existed before 
the initiation of the peace process. In fact, it was the collective Arab scramble for 
^ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 11, 2002. 
" Al-Ayyam, December 6, 1997. 
Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, (Palestine), December 10, 1997. 
" See, In the shadow of war: Iraq, Israel, Palestine, MERIP (Washington, D.C: Middle East Research & 
Information Project, 2002). 
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making peace with Israel. This is unprecedented in Arab politics since the establishment 
of the Jewish state in the region. The degree of scramble affected the peace substance. 
The main substance of peace in the region should be to regulate the relationship 
between Arab states on the one hand and between Israel on the other, including 
regulating this relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. The scholarly debate, as 
will be displayed below, is that the Palestinian question lies at the core of the Arab 
Israeli 'relations'. 
However, the peace process that was initiated in Madrid was not a consequence of a war 
between the Arabs and Israel. Since the establishment of Israel, the relationship between 
these two parties had been structured by a state of war. Nonetheless, these parties had 
decided to make peace without fighting the 'big fight'. Therefore, there had been no 
certain political order for peace to endure in the region because the 'state of war' 
between these two parties forms the structure of political order in the region. '^* Arab 
states gave up the idea of knocking Israel down for the sake of Palestine: from this point 
the Palestinian issue ceased to form a major conflictual link between Arab states and 
Israel.^' That, however, does not mean that the conflictual structure is ended between 
the Arabs and Israel. 
The peace process started as the Arabs and Israel decided to stop playing enemies. They 
had decided: we have played enough hostility, let us from now on play 'good friends' 
and 'good neighbours' - in some senses, they wanted to play good relatives. But to 
understand the mechanisms of the peace process in the ME, one could not take it out of 
the environment in which it was bom. Arab states found themselves coated within an 
order and acting, only acting, within this order could guarantee further survival for 
^ Yitzhak Rabin put it to the Labour Knesset faction: 'You don't make peace with friends. You make 
peace with enemies who are not at all nice. I will not try to prettify the PLO; the PLO was an enemy, 
it is still an enemy, but you negotiate with the enemy.' Address by Yitzhak Rabin to Labour Party 
Knesset faction on 9 September 1993. 
•"^  There is much literature written about the peace process. Prominent amongst those who have written 
about it is Edward Said. See, for example. The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for 
Palestinian Self-Determination 1969-1994, (London: Vintage 1995); The End of the Peace Process: 
Oslo and After, (London: Granta Publications 2000). This book consists of various articles which 
were published in different newspapers and journals. William Quandt, Peace Process: American 
Diplomacy and Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (Washington D. C : Brooking Institution Press 
2001). This book does not offer analytical perspective of the American involvement in mediating 
between the Arabs and Israel; it rather gives a historical account of events regarding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict since Johnson presidency until Bill Clinton's. I sought not to cite from this book because of 
the lack of analytical framework; therefore, I found it irrelevant to my study. 
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many regimes in the region. On March 6, 1991, George Bush addressed the American 
congress saying: 'we must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the 
Arab states and between Israelis and Palestinians... A comprehensive peace must be 
grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle 
of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security 
and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. 
Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to 
put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict.'^^ 
On October 30, 1991, the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid was opened.^ ^ The 
parties of the conference were a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Israel. From that time on, an open dialogue between Arabs and Israel was initiated, 
which became known as the peace process. In 1993, the Israelis and the Palestinians 
signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP). After the DOP was signed, a series of 
agreements known as Oslo agreements such as the 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement (Oslo 
1), the 1995 Interim agreement on the West Bank and Gaza strip (Oslo H, or Taba 
agreement), the January 1997 Hebron Protocol, the October 1998 Wye River 
Memorandum, and The September 1999 Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum were signed. 
More notably, within a year of the signing of the DOP was, Jordan became the second 
Arab state to sign a ful l peace treaty with Israel and exchange diplomatic relations. "The 
willingness of North African countries and the Gulf states to openly engage in dialogue 
with Israel and the progressive withering away of anti-Israel economic boycott is further 
evidence that a major turning point in the history of the conflict has been reached."'^ * 
After the initiation of the peace process, the scholarly discussion was of a new ME. Tibi, 
for example, considered the Arab-Israeli conflict as part of the shape of the regional, i.e. 
the ME system. He maintained that two conflicts, one regional and the other 
international, gave the Middle Eastern state system its shape: a subsystem of the 
international system. These were the regional Arab-Israeli conflict and the global East-
For full text of Bush's speech see www.brookings.edu/press/appendix/peace process.htm. 
There were many trips conducted by Baker, the then foreign secretary of the United States, to the ME 
where he met with the parties involved. On these diplomatic efforts and the preparations for the 
Madrid conference see J. A. Baker, with T. M. De Frank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, 
War and Peace 1989-1992. (Putnam, 1995). 
^ Peters, J. 'The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks and the Emergence of Regional Co-operation' in Philip 
Robins, et al. The Middle East in the Post Peace Process, 1996, p. 76. 
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West conflict.^^ However, he maintains that the end of the bipolar and the end of the 
Arab-Israeli conflicts, the latter combined with the Oslo Peace Declaration, had changed 
the character of conflict in the politics of the ME. Markedly, Tibi argues then that with 
the Oslo peace declaration, Arab-Israeli wars were part of a past era.'*° Moreover, the 
shape of the regional order for Tibi is bound by the making of peace in the region. 
Therefore, he maintained that i f the Palestinians make peace with Israel, then the Arab 
states have no legitimacy to wage wars against Israel any longer.'*' Joel Peters 
maintained that direct face-to-face talks between Israel and the Arab became the norm 
and not the exception. While the peace process still has a long way to travel, and its 
successful completion is not guaranteed, one irreversible consequence of the 
developments [the dialogue between the Arabs and Israel] is that the Arab-Israeli 
conflict wil l never again be the central issue around which much of the international 
politics of the Middle East has revolved.'*^ 
Tibi makes peace in the ME an order and not a symptom or an outcome of an order. 
Based on the argument of change and continuity in order which was promoted in 
Chapter Three of this study, there must be a change in power structures to decide that an 
order has changed, but the peace process did not lead to such shift in power structures. 
The shift of power had generated the peace process.'*^ The notable change was further 
fragmentation of the Arab states after the KC. But, although there was a great Arab 
participation in the conference, and it was blessed by those who did not attend, Sela 
noted that there was absence of an ideological debate or collective Arab fora to hammer 
out coordinated strategy toward Israel.'*'* The process, adds Sela, was marked by mutual 
suspicion between each of the Arab participants and everyone else, revealing each 
party's thrust to advance its own interests independently of other Arab partners."*^ The 
" Tibi, B., Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security' 1998, p. 190. 
Ibid., pp. 189, 191-193. Tibi maintains that the primacy of interstate conflict leading to interstate war 
in the ME is a past phenomenon. The Gulf War in 1991, he also maintained, was the last interstate 
war in that region for the foreseeable future. See pages 190-191. 
Ibid., p. 191. 
Peters, J. The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks and the Emergence of Regional Co-operation, in Philip 
Robins, et al. The Middle East in the Post Peace Process: The Emerging Regional Order and its 
International Implications, (Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economics 1996), p. 76. 
See Ajami, F. The Dream Palace of the Arabs, (New York: Pantheon Books), 1998, pp. 253-312. 
^ Ibid., p. 335-336 . 
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impact of the initiation of the peace process on the collective Arab behaviour, 
particularly on the Arab states in the ME is, as Sela concludes; 
It confirmed the significance of the Palestinian issue as the heart of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, regardless of its ever-declining weight in shaping Arab 
states' behaviour. Yet it also revealed the vast gaps of interest and attitude 
regarding Israel between the Arab states on the periphery, to whom the 
Palestine cause had been mainly a moral commitment, and those directly 
entangled in the Palestine conflict, to whom it still entailed real political 
stakes—by Israel's very existence as a neighbour—on both regional and 
domestic levels.'** 
Sela's argument begs the question, i f Arabs were not to stand all together in a war 
against Israel, then they could have formed a common Arab front for peace in order to 
achieve some of the goals aspired for the Arab nation. However, Arab states lacked a 
mechanism by which to resolve their own conflicts and thus they lacked at the same 
time a mechanism which could organise their peace with Israel.'*^ Giving an example, 
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch conclude that [Syria] still had some chance of achieving a 
ful l Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines i f it could [have] orchestrate[ed] a common 
Arab front and demonstrate[d] that Israel could not have peace without it.'** That means 
Arab states would have said to Israel: either you make peace with us all or with none. 
But the problem with Syria, or any other Arab state seeking such a stance from other 
Arab states, is that they are all Arab states. Put bluntly, because they are Arab states,'*^ 
they could not form a united front. That is a basic 'thing' in Arab politics, and this issue 
became significant since the KC. Murden concludes that the peace process did much to 
46 Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, pp. 338-339. 
There was Arab mediation within inter-Arab conflicts such as that in 1963 between Morocco and 
Algeria, the disputes between the two Yemens in 1972 and 1978, and between Libya and Egypt in 
1977. But still these mediations were yet to solve inter-Arab conflicts, since the mediator is an Arab 
within an Arab conflict and subject to the Arab norm of conflict and rivalry. 
Ehteshami, A., & Hinnebusch, R., Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a penetrated regional system, 
1997, p. 159. 
49 Chapter Two of this study had shown how fragmentation and rivalry ruled inter-Arab politics since 
the establishment of these states after World War II. This could be more explained by bringing the 
classic argument of Kerr. Kerr maintained that "It would be more accurate to say that when the 
Arabs are in a mood to co-operate, this tends to find expression in an agreement to avoid action on 
Palestine, but that when they choose to quarrel, Palestine policy really becomes a subject of 
dispute." See Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 114. 
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diffuse the constant pressure on Arab states to do something about Israel and made 
closer relations with the United States less difficult to explain.^'' 
There is definitely a significant degree of consent amongst scholars that Israel and the 
United States benefited from the peace process but not the Arab states. Brecher, cited in 
Lesch, concludes that the ME is a highly penetrated region, which made governments 
dependent on external military and economic aids.^' Lesch argues, therefore, foreign 
powers have imposed arms control regimes on the Arab states (but not Israel). 
Mohammed Mulsih states that some Arab scholars speak of a 'realpolitik' 
argument. The realpoUtik argument was that superiority of Israel's vis-a-vis the Arabs 
had significant implications for the negotiating process. He maintains that wide sectors 
of the Arab intelligentsia and Arab public opinion conclude that not only were the Arabs 
at a dangerous disadvantage in the peace process, but also that the United States aimed 
at exploiting the Arab weakness to achieve certain long-term regional objectives for 
itself as well as for Israel. According to Arab analysis, these included the tightening of 
U.S. control over the Gulf, the intimidation of the Arabs, and the integration of Israel 
into the region, not as an equal partner but as a hegemonic actor in the political, 
economic, and military fields.^'* 
However, the significance of such arguments is twofold: first, such arguments bring out 
the issue of balance of power in the region, which these scholars do not accept. Power is 
the only mechanism when maximising, states seek survival. As defined in Chapter One 
of this study, the system in international relations is not based on moral issues, but on 
the power distribution. Each unit functions based on its own power or based on alliances 
^ Murden, S. W., Islam, The Middle East, and the New Global Hegemony, (Boulder, Colorado, 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 50-51. 
Brecher, M., The Foreign Policy System of Israel, (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 
1972), 137, cited Anne M. Lesch, Inter-Arab Relations in the Post-Peace Era, (Abu Dhabi, UAE: 
The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1995), p. 13. 
Lesch, Inter-Arab Relations in the Post-Peace Era, 1995, p. 13. 
Muslih cited some scholars who deal with the realpolitik issue; Khayriyya Qasimiyya, al-watan al-
arabi wal-nidham al-alami, awda ila al-madi wa-waqfa inda al-hadir [The Arab Homeland and the 
world order, a retrospect and a look at the presen] (Damascus: al-Dawudi Press, 1994); Shafiq al-
Masri, al-nidham al-alami al-jadid, malamih wa-makhatir [The New World Order, characteristics 
and dangers] (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm Lil-malayin, 1992). 
^ Muslih, M., "Palestinian and Other Arab Perspectives on the Peace Process," in R. Freedman (ed.). 
The Middle East and the Peace Process: 1998, p. 86. 
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with other units. Thus, it is legitimate for the United States and Israel, as states, to do 
what benefits their national interests without taking those of Arab nations into 
consideration. This study does not defend the interests of the United States or Israel; it 
rather shows that it is legitimate for any state to seek to further and defend its own 
interests. Secondly, they show how some scholars still insist that there is a united Arab 
entity, which must be treated as a whole. In some sense, this is a dilemma for academics 
and politicians because since the emergence of the state of Israel, it has been treated as 
the traditional enemy of the Arabs. Therefore, the Palestinian issue was taken as the 
path through which Arab-Israeli relations were channelled. 
However, since each Arab state was seeking its own peace-deal with Israel, peace was 
no longer a collective concern, but was a focus of individual states. Therefore, the issue 
of Palestine ceased to be the axis of Arab politics. Despite this, Arab states have not 
washed themselves clear from the issue of Palestine because the impact of that issue is 
represented in the coercive and conflictual environment which creates tension in the 
whole region. Examining each state's intentions and interest in making peace in the 
region will show that peace is an individual matter rather than a collective one. 
However, Arab states collectively also have a common interest in solving the problem 
of Palestine, because they all belong to the Arab order. 
Zartman concludes that Israel and the PLO engaged in the Madrid Process in November 
1991 half-heartedly and for entirely different reasons. For Israel, it was clearly a matter 
of improving relations with the United States, which played a very specific role as a 
manipulator by withholding loan guarantees in connection with settlements in the 
occupied territories as a pressure on the Likud government of Yizhak Shamir to join the 
talks.^^ There was no Israeli intention of joining or producing any movement toward the 
process, only to register a presence. For the Palestinians, Madrid offered a golden 
opportunity for recognition and status improvement. The PLO itself was also 
interested in progress in the talks, given the squeeze of its current position and the fact 
that it was demandeur in the process.^ ^ However, the Israeli leader gave his conditional 
For an aspect on the relationship between the United States and Israel within the framework of the 
peace process, see N. Aruri, "The Road to Madrid and Beyond," MEI, November 8, 1991, pp. 16-17. 
^ On the Palestinian thinking within the framework of the peace process see, M. Muslih, "The Shift in 
the Palestinian Thinking", Current History, (January 1992), pp. 22-27. 
^ Zartman, W, p. 6 See also Paul Noble, 'The Prospects of Arab Cooperation in a Changing Regional 
and Global System,' in Michael Hudson (ed.), Middle East Dilemma, 1998, p. 63. 
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consent to the meeting because he did not want to antagonise Washington and because 
he concluded that Israel's interests would be better protected by being involved in the 
peace process than by being outside of it.^* 
In the peace process, and diplomatically in general, the Israelis have made their own 
peace with Jordan and, until the cooling of the peace process after March 1997, had 
established their own working relationships with Morocco, Qatar, and even indirectly 
with Saudi Arabia.^^ 
Taking Arab states individually, in discussing Egypt's foreign policy under Mubarak, 
Hinnebusch maintains that Mubarak sought to establish Egypt as the pivotal Arab 
country positioned to deliver an equitable settlement of the /\j-ab-Israeli conflict, 
something which was widely desired by all Arab states. It presented its U.S. alliance as 
a conduit for securing U.S. pressure on Israel and promoted itself as an indispensable 
facilitator of peace negotiations by virtue of its status as the only Arab country having 
good relations with Israel.^'' However, one could not overlook the fact that inter-Arab 
relations are governed by rivalry. The galvanisation of the region reduced this mode of 
interaction to the minimum. Also, because traditionally this rivalry had been between 
Egypt and Iraq, the destruction of the Iraqi power boosted Egypt's role amongst Arab 
states But that could not last for long. The peace process did not boost Egypt's role in 
the region, but reduced it to the minimum. 
This argument is based on the following points: the first is the inability of Egypt to 
further defend Arab security. In this context, Hinnebusch maintains that "Egypt 
promoted its large well armed army as a deterrent force, part of the Arab balance of 
power, against potential threats from Israel and Iran."^' But, he adds, "Israel's 
heightened military activism exposed the hollowness of Egypt's pretension to defend 
^ Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower 
Diplomacy (New York, Twayne Publishers 1996), p. 171. 
'^ L . Cantori in Robert Freedman, p 162. All GCC countries supported the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
In September 1994 they agreed to lift the secondary and tertiary boycotts on economic dealings with 
Israeli companies until the Syrian and Lebanese negotiations are completed. 
** Hinnebusch, R., 'Egypt's Foreign Policy,' in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (eds.) The foreign policies 
of the Middle Eastern States 2002, pp. 107-108. 
61 Ibid., pp. 107. 
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Arab security."^^ Therefore, Arab states then believed: once we have peace with Israel, 
there is no need then for the Egyptian 'shield'. The second point is embedded within the 
concept of galvanisation; all actors in the region are equally coated by the American 
presence in the region. Thus, Canton maintained that Egypt's role has receded from 
important interlocutor to useful facilitator." But, as Sontag put it, "in actuality, the 
"peace process" involved considerably more process than peace." Thus, Canton 
proved correct in suggesting that the deterioration of the peace process in 1997 has 
given Egypt new diplomatic opportunities, but that it has been losing its ability to do 
so.^ ^ The reason for Egypt no longer being able to do so is because neither in the time of 
war nor in the time of peace could Egypt have delivered to the Arab cause.^ ^ 
Saudi Arabia is 'famous' for its peace plans. The first Arab peace plan, which became 
known as the Fahd plan, was made public by Saudi Arabia in August 1981. "It proposed: 
the Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab 
Jerusalem, the dismantling of Israeli settlements established on Arab lands since 1967 
etc."^'' The taste of the peace process for Saudi Arabia is different from that of Syria, for 
example, because Israel does not occupy any Saudi lands: therefore, it is easy for Saudi 
Arabia to keep putting forward plans (see below for Prince Abdullah's plan) and when it 
wishes, to play a role as mediator. However, the galvanisation of the region gave Saudi 
Arabia a safe haven. "The close ties with the United States have led some analysts to 
* 68 
depict Saudi Arabia's role in the international system as one of classical dependence." 
In this view, Saudi Arabia has very little autonomy in terms of its foreign and economic 
policy choices. It is forced to follow the lead of the United States because its economic 
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and political stability is dependent upon U. S. support and goodwill.^^ This means that it 
is then simply possible to read Saudi Arabia's position towards the peace process form 
an angle to its relations to the United States. The KC brought Saudi Arabia to a closer 
relationship with the United States than it enjoyed before, leading the kingdom to 
vigorously follow its particular interests in cultivating this relationship.™ 
The Saudis played a central role in persuading Syria to accept the Madrid framework 
and attend the conference. They also made a salient effort to appear as strongly involved 
in, and willing to cooperate with, the Madrid peace process. In mid-July 1991, the 
Saudis announced that they were willing to l i f t the Arab boycott on Israel in return for 
Israel's consent to stop all new settlement activity in the occupied territories. Such a 
gesture, offered without linkage to the issue of East Jerusalem and its Muslim shrines, 
was an obvious shift from established Arab and Islamic attitudes and a clear message of 
assurance to the United States and Israel about the peace process. The Saudis continued 
to provide support for the negotiations in Washington through their ambassador to the 
United States, Emir Bandar Bin Sultan, and were apparently helpful, along with Egypt, 
in convincing the PLO to accept Israel's "Gaza-Jericho first" scheme. '^ 
A consideration of Syria's behaviour towards peacemaking in the region shows that 
Syria lacked choices since the state of Israel was founded. UN resolutions 242 and 338 
were the 'window of options' for Syria and all other Arab states. There were really no 
more options available for Syria but to cling to these resolutions or, as Arab states 
would put it, as a 'condition' to negotiate with Israel. Assad had long insisted, as 
'conditions' for a peace conference, (a) on a united Arab delegation so Israel could not 
divide the Arabs, (b) on UN sponsorship which could make 242/338 the basis of a 
settlement and (c) mobilise global pressures on Israel. However, since Israel occupied 
Arab lands, these UN Resolutions did not help in pushing Israel out of this occupied 
land, on the contrary these resolutions became only part of the political rhetoric of Arab 
states. Syria, while entering the peace process, accepted direct unconditional bilateral 
" Cause, G. Il l , 'The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia," in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (eds.) The foreign 
policies of the Middle Eastern States, 2002, pp. 194. 
"^ Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, p. 334. See also Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Saudi Arabia, Country Report, 3, 1991, pp. 10-12. 
See Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, pp. 333-340, 334. 
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negotiations without an Israeli commitment that UN Resolutions required ful l 
72 withdrawal from the occupied territories. 
Syria's entry into the Madrid peace process was determined by the advent of the New 
World Order.^ ^ As the Soviet Union's influence declined, so did the prospects a true 
international conference would bring pressure on Israel: increasingly, only American 
pressure seemed likely to count. Assad, therefore, attempted to get prior US 
commitment to require a ful l Israeli withdrawal, but neither George Bush nor James 
Baker explicitly promised a return of the Golan, only that the USA would abide by its 
commitments on UN Resolutions made over several presidencies.''* 
Therefore, the first unsettled outcome of the peace process for Syria was the imbalance 
between the Syrian demands and the Israeli offers. When the UN Security Council 
enunciated the equivalence formula of "territory for security" for the Middle East in 
Resolution 242 in 1967, it only started the process of determining what was territory 
and what was security in each of the occupied territories along the Israeli border, which 
was in turn the necessary prelude to the detail question of how much territory for how 
much security. Recent negotiations between Israel and Syria illustrate the concept; 
whereas one side wanted to gain total territory for partial normalisation (security), the 
other wanted to total normalisation as security in exchange for part of the territory.'^ 
It is true, as Drysdale and Hinnebusch conclude in examining the Assad regime, that 
championship of the Palestine issue, which is considered to be the heart of the Arab 
cause, is a major component of regime legitimacy.'^ The regime's Arab credentials, 
obtained from its vociferous defence of Arab territories, have served to justify foreign 
policy and unpopular domestic policies. Deviation from the Palestinian agenda, 
therefore, could be deemed to be betraying pan-Arabism, thereby risking regime 
Ehteshami, A., & Hinnebusch, R., Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a penetrated regional system, 
1997, p. 158. 
" Quilliam, N., Syria: Adjusting to the New World Order, (London: Ithaca Press, 1999), p. 175. 
Ehteshami, A., & Hinnebusch, R., Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, 
1997, p. 159. 
•'^  Zartman,W.,p. 11-12 
^' Drysdale, A., & R., Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 73. See also Quilliam, N., Syria: Adjusting to the New World Order, 
(London: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 175-228. 
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legitimacy. But, after the peace process was initiated, the rhetoric for the sake of 
Palestine or the sake of Arab nation declined, because there was no more the enemy at 
whose cost rhetoric could be made. 
After the Palestinian-Israeli agreement was reached at Oslo, Assad conceded that the 
Palestinians had the right to adopt any agreement they considered beneficial to 
themselves.^^ But still Assad told President Clinton in January 1994: "to me, there is no 
difference between the Golan, south Lebanon and the occupied parts of Palestine or 
Jordan... it is all one Arab land as far as I am concemed."^^ On 1 September 1994, 
Assad also told the Syria Parliament that Syria had been surprised by the Palestinian and 
Jordanian agreements with Israel. Although he would not discuss their results, he 
declared that "immense damage" had been done to the Arab cause by the pursuit of 
separate solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, there was little Syria 
could do about the Palestine issue. It had been excluded from negotiations over 
Palestine by the PLO as much as by Israel. Having said that, Syria then had to 
'believe' that Israel 's occupation of the Golan should be its prime concern. In this 
context, therefore, this study agrees with the argument of Quilliam: 
The Syrian population has carried the burden of Palestine for the last fifty 
years; furthermore, it attributes the absence of democracy within Syrian 
society to the omnipresent threat of the Israelis. Peace with Israel, 
irrespective of the Palestinians, would liberate Syria from its security 
dilemma and decompress the domestic political system. From this 
perspective, it is more likely that the Syrian population perceives the 
separate PLO-Israel deal as an opportunity to pursue state or domestic 
interests over Arab interests.^ ^ 
The issue of peace with Israel became then an issue of Syrian interest rather than an 
Arab collective interest. Vice-president Abd al-Halim Khaddam had left no doubt that. 
" Quilliam, N., Syria: Adjusting to the New World Order,l999, p. 176. 
Ehteshami, A., & Hinnebusch, R., Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, 
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for Syria, the conflict with Israel would be over once peace treaties had been concluded 
0-3 
between Israel and Syria as well as between Israel and Lebanon. 
Jordan's stance in the peace process represents a realist political undertaking. Based on 
its geographic position as squeezed between Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria and, 
on top of that, the West Bank, the calculations of the Jordanian peacemakers must 
reflect its regional location. One of the most remarkable characters of Jordanian foreign 
policy is that there are no abrupt shifts in this policy but rather realistic, prepared and 
oriented steps. However, after the KC, choices were few for Jordan. A senior Jordanian 
official reported that "we [the Jordanians] should not be surprised i f the Americans 
attempted to keep up the pressure on us until we have agreed to sign a peace treaty."^"* 
Moreover, in a speech in October 1991, King Hussein stated that there were no 
alternatives to attending the peace conference. Jordan could not oppose the United 
States in its drive to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.^^ 
The peace process gave Jordan self assurance and proved that its location could help in 
the making of its politics. The support of the Israeli Knesset to the Jordan-Israeli 
declaration was larger than for the peace treaty with Egypt. A member of the Likud 
government admitted that peace with Jordan meant the end of the "Jordan is Palestine" 
line.^^ 'This line is no longer a political principle... and we have to accept it."^^ 
Therefore, the gain for Jordan was big enough for it to embark on a role as mediator 
between the United States and other Arab states to such a degree that it has replaced the 
Egyptians' role in this sense. 
83 Al-Hayat, June 10,2001. 
" Middle East International, April, 15*, 1994. 
^ Middle East International, 27 September and 25 October 1991. 
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The conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel, however, dismayed Syria, Egypt, and 
Saudi Arabia.^" Syria considered its bargaining position to have been weakened both by 
the substance of the agreement and its conclusion without prior coordination with it. 
Saudi Arabia, which still had harboured antipathy toward Jordan from the 1990-91 KC, 
was both concerned with the impUcations for Syria and offended by the explicit 
reference in the agreement to Jordan's special status regarding the Muslim holy sites in 
Jerusalem. Egypt was unsupportive not only because it had been left out of the 
negotiations, and out of respect for Syria's concerns, but because it perceived its 
centrality in Arab affairs as jeopardised.^' 
However, the bottom line of the Jordanian policy regarding the peace process was that 
Jordan was doing what the Egyptians and the Palestinians had already done.^ ^ Jordan 
had endured more than any Arab state in the conflict with Israel and was therefore fully 
entitled to protect its own special interests.^^ Therefore, Prince Hasan told the London 
Observer, "The world is going to turn around and say 'bugger you' unless you get your 
act together.^ '* On 25 July 1994 at the White House in Washington D. C , King Hussein 
and Prime Minister Rabin signed the Washington Declaration.^^ 
It can be seen that self-interest has dictated the foreign policy of each Arab states to 
negotiate its own peace-deal with Israel. Such calculation was ultimately to 'secure' the 
state survival. That means to reduce and eliminate threats to pillars of the state like 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. Nevertheless, the state is secure only when the 
structure of the political order which leads to the formation of the system in a given 
*" Gera, G., 'The Middle East in Perspective," in A., Ayalon & B., Maddy-Weitzman (eds.), Middle East 
Contemporary Survey, 1996, p. 9. 
" Ibid. 
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Cited in Susser, A., The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: The Geopolitical Rationale of a 
Bilateral Relationship, (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1999), p. 13. 
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region is organised and governed by the anarchy of the system i t se l f .The scramble for 
peace, however, resulted from the lack of options on a collective 'Arab' conduct. Arab 
states, based on the weakness of their military power to win a war against Israel sought 
peace because they felt that it would represent a security factor to the state. However, 
using the term 'peace' is not simple as it sounds; the concept 'peace' is not simply a 
pedantic semantics. It should simply have shifted the region to an entirely new era or a 
new frame within which inter-Arab relations as well as Arab-Israeli relations are 
organised. 
The peace process did not shift the region to such new era because there was/is no basis 
for a new era. The ME did not enter into peace; it rather had witnessed peace-deals. '^ 
The peace process was an ad hoc event symptomatic of the KC. The degree of intensity 
reached its peak after the war against Iraq. Therefore, a counterbalance would be a 
peace deal between Arabs and Israel. Nevertheless, inter-Arab relations were based on 
rivalry over the past f if ty years and this rivalry 'aborted' the KC. The Arab-Israeli 
relations were conflictual over the last f i f ty years, and thus these relations, rationally 
and based on the dynamics of the regional order, would not have 'aborted' peace. As 
Gilpin writes: "throughout history the primary means of resolving the disequilibrium 
between the structure of the international system and the redistribution of power has 
O f t 
been war, more particularly, what we shall call a hegemonic war". He elaborates. 
The great points in world history have been provided by these hegemonic 
struggles among political rivals; these periodic conflicts have reordered the 
international system and propelled history in new and uncharted directions. 
They resolved the question of which state will govern the system, as well as 
what ideas and values will predominate, thereby determining the ethos of 
succeeding ages. The outcomes of these wars affect the economic, social, 
and ideological structures of individual societies as well as the structure of 
the larger intemational system.'' 
" On this see R. Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics 30/2 January 1978); 
K. Waltz, Man, State, and War, (New York: Colombia University Press 1954). 
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This statement by Gilpin leaves us with the question of what is specifically the 
normative force of the Arab states to make peace with Israel rather than of waging war 
against it. The main source of peacemaking was the norms which governed Arab 
regional order at the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, making peace is not a regional 
order, but waging war is the order. Within such an environment, peace is an unpopular 
'thing'. Put in simple terms, conflict is a 'daily business' in the ME. 
The Arab Regional Order and al-Aqsa Intifada 
When Arafat learned that right-wing leader Ariel Sharon was planning a deliberately 
provocative visit to what Muslims refer to as the Haram Al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary), 
which Jews call the (Temple Mount), he pleaded with Barak to block Sharon's plans.'"" 
Although this was in East Jerusalem which is Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory, 
Barak insisted it was an internal Israeli matter. To support Sharon's move, Barak 
brought in hundreds of Israeli troops to accompany him, resulting in violent 
demonstrations by Palestinians, which were brutally suppressed by Israeli occupation 
forces- with no public objection being made by the U.S. government.'"' 
Al-Aqsa Intifada therefore posed the question on the ground as to whether peace in the 
ME would be possible at all. The Intifada posed the question that i f peace was possible 
in the region, then who would to enter into peace with Israel? The Arabs, individual 
Arab states, or the Palestinians? Remarkably, the Intifada, this time differing from the 
first Intifada, which was triggered from 1989-1993, presents a problem of terminology: 
is it to be referred to as Intifada, violence, war, low-intensity war, or terrorism? One 
could identify al-Aqsa Intifada as the peace process under Sharon and Bush. It gives the 
Intifada a more physical meaning and it broadens its dimensions. It gives the Intifada a 
genuine meaning because it shows the greater relationship between violence and 
"° Zunes, S., "The United States and the Breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", Middle 
East Policy, Vol. VIII, no., 4, December 2001, p. 71; See also 'Palestinians Warn of Consequences 
of Sharon's Visit to al-Aqsa', Al-Ayyam, September 27, 2000, FBIS-NES-2000-0927. 
Zunes, S., 'The United States and the Breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", p. 71. 
Notably, Zunes further concluded that to this day, despite subsequent investigations reporting to the 
contrary, leading members of the Congress in both parties insist that these spontaneous 
demonstrations were actually pre-planned by Arafat and other Palestinian leaders to destroy the 
peace process. This accusation is particularly absurd since the demonstrators were primarily 
Islamists and young people, the two groups most alienated from Arafat's leadership and least likely 
to obey his requests. 
128 
counter violence. Different scholarly opinions have been promoted about the causes of 
the Intifada, and fewer about its end. This study considers the Intifada as the second part 
of the peace process. 
In the Palestinian submission to the Mitchell Commission, a huge part of the document 
was devoted to the roots of the Intifada, and was entitled, 'Why did Barak Instigate the 
Crisis?' Great emphasis was placed on the condemnation of the violent Israeli reaction 
to the Intifada after the day of September 29. One observer concluded that "the Intifada 
was not just a reaction to a provocative incident; it is a declared, unequivocal position 
by the Palestinian people on the bankruptcy of the negotiations and the full rejection of 
the overall Israeli conducts."'"^ However, the perception of the Intifada and; therefore, 
of its causes, is similar to that of the perception of the peace process: "the Palestinians 
saw the peace process as a means to end the occupation and establish a Palestinian mini-
state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By contrast, the United States and Israel saw it 
as a way of maintaining an Israeli occupation of major sections of these territories with 
the Palestinians.""'^ Yet, the Intifada is viewed in the same way: the Palestinians see the 
Intifada as a tool to end the occupation and the Israelis see it as a tool to keep and 
extend the occupation. 
The Israelis insisted/insist - with the American support - that there be a total end to 
Palestinian violence for an extended period before they resume talks. This gave 
extremist groups beyond the control of the Palestinian Authority and opposed to the 
peace process an incentive to use violence to make sure that the talks would not 
resume.'"^ Similarly, it bought time for the Israelis to further expand settlements.'"^ 
102 Qub'ah, T., 'Protection and Continuation of the Blessed Intifada is a Top Priority of All Palestinian 
Forces', Al-Ayyam, October 6, 2000. FBIS-NES-2000-1006. For more on the roots and causes of the 
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MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 154, November 20, 2000. 
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Even i f the negotiations were to recommence, the Israeli government had made it clear 
that they would take an even more uncompromising position than the previous 
government of Ehud Barak. However, despite all this, the United States administration. 
Congress, and media, plus the Israelis themselves, placed the bulk of the blame of the 
breakdown of the peace process on the Palestinians."^^ 
Theoretically, international law recognises the right of people under foreign military 
occupation to armed resistance against the occupier. The United States government 
repeatedly condemned the Palestinians for their violence while refusing to call for an 
end of the Israeli occupation. The Bush administration has spoken only of stopping "the 
cycle of violence".'"^ However, much of Israel's violence against the Palestinians has 
been justified as necessary to protect the settlers who have no legal right to be in the 
occupied territories. But, as Zunes puts it, leading democrats, such as Gary Ackerman, 
the ranking democrat on the House of Subcommittee on the ME, have criticised the 
administration from the right, claiming "it is not a cycle of violence. It is Palestinian 
violence and Israeli response.""** 
A cornerstone of the U.S.-led peace process has been to keep the United Nations out. A 
1991 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel explicitly 
stated that the United Nations would not have a role. Then-US ambassador to the United 
Nations, Richard Holbrook, claimed that a U.N. Security Council resolution from 
October 2000 criticising the excessive use of force by Israeli occupation forces put the 
United Nations "out of the running" in terms of any contributions to the peace 
process.Furthermore, the United States has continued the policy of the previous 
administration of undercutting the legitimacy of any entity - such as the European 
which of the occupied territories it would withdraw and from which it would not. Moreover, as long 
as Oslo and closure remains the defining policy framework for achieving a settlement, Israeli control 
over Palestine is assured. For more details on this statement see Sara Roy, Current History, (January 
2002), p. 10. 
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Union - which might take a more even-handed approach and challenge the legitimacy 
of the Israeli occupation."° 
Therefore, it can be understood that the Palestinians and their Intifada became trapped 
within the regional borders. There is no longer any impact from the outside. Ironically, 
the major Palestinian compromises - ending the armed struggle and recognising Israel -
were made up-front in the 1993 Oslo accords, with the naive assumption that the United 
States would pressure Israel to make needed compromises later.''' However, within the 
course of the 1990s, or rather within the course of the peace process, the term 
'occupation' lost its violent connotations simply because there was what was called a 
peace process going on. In reality, Israel has continued to extend its settlements, and not 
much has changed."^ Therefore, when the Palestinians have no bargaining chips left but 
their violence, this violence will not move them in the direction which they wish. This is 
simply because they are trapped within the regional borders and within the regional 
order. 
One of the main regional order markers since the initiation of the peace process is the 
peace process itself. The peace process mitigated confrontation lines between the 
Palestinians and Israelis. It created an environment, although a false one, in which there 
appeared to be peace, or hope for peace and, on top of that, negotiations. The hardest 
part of the reality which has driven the Palestinians to deeper frustration is that there are 
continuing negotiations; the process and myth of negotiations invented Arafat as the 
pillar of the Palestinian cause. He is always in the forefront of any 'Palestinian' action. 
Oslo accords were security-oriented and security-driven for Israel. It is as i f the United 
States and Israel had told Arafat: you are the 'guardian' of the future of the Israeli 
security. Therefore, "the repeated calls for Arafat by the United States and Israel to 
'stop the violence' not only implied Arafat's responsibility for starting it but were 
premised on the assumption that he was in violation of the fundamental role assigned to 
™ Zunes, S., The United States and the Breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks, p. 74. 
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him by Oslo.""^ Nevertheless, because Oslo mainly created Arafat, the Intifada, in the 
eyes of the Israelis, the Americans, and many others, is less legitimate than the first one. 
That is simply because Arafat represented the institutional order within the Palestinian 
territories."'* Arafat did not start the current wave of protests, but it is clear that he has 
encouraged them by, among other things, standing back and allowing them to 
escalate."^ On the other hand, "Arafat knows that since the 1996 Tunnel Intifada, the 
street will never again allow him to trade Palestinian lives for a mere resumption of 
negotiations.""^ From that point, Arafat could not do more than repeat what he always 
said: negotiations, negotiations and peace of the brave. 
On broader level, Arab attitudes towards the Intifada are channelled through the 
Palestinian leadership. There is no direct speech between Arab governments and 
Palestinian people based on the lack of Palestinian institutions which could encourage 
such partnership. Everything must go through the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, as 
Al-Shiryan rightly observes, "the Palestinian people are the victim of the lack of trust 
between the Arab regimes and the Palestinian Authority." "^ Furthermore, the 
Palestinians are the victim of their Intifada as well. Al-Fanek concluded that "the 
Intifada with its costs in human lives and in economic price, is not a goal in itself, but 
rather an expression of the national opposition to the continuation of the occupation, as 
well as means of pressuring Israel to hand over greater part of the Palestinian people" 
Hammami, R., & T., Salim, The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning? Journal of Palestinian 
Studies X X X , no. 2 (Winter 2001), p. 18. 
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rights to the Palestinian leadership [PLO]."^But, the Intifada, adds AI-Fanek, has not 
succeeded in expelling the Israeli occupation by force. It undermined the security of 
Arabs on both sides of the Green Line instead of undermining Israeli security. The 
Intifada helped to topple a government that was willing to reach an agreement with the 
government of Sharon— with its ideas of transfer.''^ 
Having said that, one could come to the question; what is the location of the Intifada in 
the Arab regional order? This question can be answered in two interrelated parts; the 
first part is to look at the Saudi Prince Abdullah plan and the second is to look at the 
Arab summit which was convened in Beirut March 28-30, 2002. 
Prince Abdullah's Initiative: 
The Saudi Crown Prince, Abdullah, thought of solving the problem between the Israelis 
and the Arabs once and for all. He then brought a plan offering Israel normal relations 
with the Arab world in return for full withdrawal from the land which Israel occupied in 
1967. However, Saudi Arabia, as mentioned above, is not a confrontation or 
bordering state and, remarkably, Saudi Arabia had always complained about countries 
rushing to establish 'normal' relations with Tel Aviv.'^' But, in times of crisis, such as 
the one the Palestinians have under both the combination of occupation and under 
Sharon's brutal grip, initiatives or plans are seen as solutions. I f the Security Council 
Resolution 242 had not brought a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, then the Saudi 
plan might, which was the context in which the Palestinians and Arab states viewed the 
plan. 
The first reaction of the Palestinians (as the main concern) to the plan was flirting with 
the Arab 'coUectiveness' of decision making; Palestinian International Planning and 
Coordination Minister Nabil Sha'ath explained: 
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121 See Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), February 16, 2002; Al-Quds Al-Arabi, (London), February 27, 
2002. 
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the initiative should be viewed as an Arab attempt to persuade the 
Americans that if the Israelis cease their aggression, if they comply 
with President Arafat and Bashar Assad and implement all their 
demands beginning with the demand for withdrawal from occupied 
Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese lands, and if solutions are found for 
all the problems stemming from the Palestinian cause, first and 
foremost the refugees issue and Jerusalem - then and only then will 
the Arabs be willing to maintain natural relations with Israel. The 
proposal is absolutely compatible with our positions. We want to bring 
about an end to the occupation, and we want to solve all problems, and 
then as far as we are concerned there will be no hindrance to 
establishing a comprehensive peace, if Israel meets all its 
obligations.'^ ^ 
The demands of Sha'th explain the dilemma in which the Palestinians find themselves 
and explain the deviation from the existing Arab regional order. The fact is that the 
Saudi initiative was nothing more than an attempt to get the Palestinians ~ and only the 
Palestinians - out of the increasing misery inflicted upon them by Sharon's rule. Atwan 
observes that the Saudi initiative deviated from the parameters of Resolution 242: 
'Prince Abdullah was overgenerous in his initiative, the [UN] resolutions do not 
demand normalisation, do not demand the establishment of diplomatic ties, and do not 
demand that all Arab countries should sign peace deals with the Hebrew state.''^^ 
Remarkably, the initiative was an offer not a demand; within the existing and the 
previous balance of power in the region, Saudi Arabia is unable to make demands from 
an Israel which is absolutely supported by the United States. However, for more 
understanding of the Saudi initiative, one should look at the Egyptian view of the 
Intifada. 
Immediately after the Intifada broke out, Egypt's stance towards Israel was stronger 
than a mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It was the recalling of its 
ambassador to Israel in November 2000. However, Amr Moussa maintains that the 
agreements with Israel seem to be void. He said that 'Israel is still stuck to the Sharm-
Al-Sheik agreement and to its security article...but this matter has fallen apart; even the 
Oslo accords have become obsolete. This is what Israel must understand.''^'^ Moreover, 
following his recall. Ambassador Bassyuni put three conditions for his return to Israel: 
Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority, Palestine), February 26, 2002. 
Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), February 19, 2002. 
Al-Ahram (Egypt), November 29, 2000. 
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Israel should stop using force, Israel should resume negotiations based on 242 and 338, 
and Israel must implement on the ground the principles of land for peace.'^ ^ 
However, Egypt viewed its role in the ME as necessary and the most vital for any 
solution on the ground. Before President Mubarak was due to visit the United States to 
discuss with the Americans the crisis in the ME, Ibrahim Nafie, of Al-Ahram weekly 
wrote: 'besides reaffirming the strengths inherent within Egyptian-American relations, it 
is widely anticipated that President Mubarak's upcoming visit to Washington will give 
rise to significant developments on the Palestinian Front.' '^ ^ Nafie, sees the 
consequences of Mubarak's visit to the United States as the end of the misery of the 
Palestinians: he asserts that 
Palestinian president Arafat has no doubt commenced on the groundwork 
necessary to undertake the reforms in question, and it is expected that he will 
hold elecdons within six months. Reliable Egyptian sources indicate that 
Israel will immediately withdraw to the 28 September, i . e. pre-Intifada 
borders, whereupon negotiations for a final setUement will commence. These 
negotiations should last no longer than two years. It is absolutely essential 
that they avoid the open-ended agreements that have allowed Israel to elude 
its obligations in the past. The same source indicates that a Palesdnian state 
will be declared prior to 2003. Following elections that Palestinian 
legislative council will draft a constitution, while the state's institutions will 
undertake the task of negotiating such issues as Jerusalem, the refugees, 
settiements and borders, in the light of the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. It is 
likely that, following Israel's withdrawal, security reforms will be 
undertaken immediately and in the wake of these reforms, probably next 
year, the independent state will be declared - following which negotiations 
will be undertaken between two independent states, UN members, rather 
than an occupier and a representative national authority - in the hope of 
securing a final agreement... another positive consequence'^^ of President 
Mubarak's visit to Washington is that it will contribute significantly to 
engineering an improvement in the image of the United States in the 
region... in seizing the chance offered by the President Mubarak's visit, 
Washington will not only promoting Middle East security and stability but 
protecting its own interests.'^ ^ 
For more details, see Al-Ahram (Egypt), November 29, 2000. 
126 Ibrahim Nafie, 'Measuring the Steps: President Mubarak's U.S. visit will be essential in kick-starting 
the peace process and securing regional and international stability,' Al-Ahram Weekly. 30 May - 5 
June 2002, issue no. 588, http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2002/588/opl.htm . 
My italics. 
Ibrahim Nafie, Measuring the Steps http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2002/588/opI.htm. 
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Nafie's statement is based on the fact that there are no hard lines between Egypt and 
Israel. The first reactions towards Israel after the Intifada broke out faded away quickly. 
In an interview with Mubarak, he stated that "the Egyptian army has no interest or goal 
except defending its country, safeguarding its borders, and deterring any aggression 
against Egypt.";'^^ "...we do not regret our sacrifice, and we make sacrifices and will 
continue to make sacrifices for our Palestinian brethren, and we will continue to invest 
faithful efforts in order to eliminate their suffering and help them, as best we can, to 
regain their rights and their sovereignty over their territory, which is internationally 
recognised."'''" 
The president's view of the situation and the help he is able to offer the Palestinians is 
an initiative rather similar to that of the Saudi prince. This is mainly part of the Arab 
regime's political culture. As Quandt observes, "the Palestinian cause has always been 
manipulated by Arab regimes. Each Arab leader who has made a bid for regional 
influence has presented himself as defender of the Palestinians."'^' However, as the 
Intifada is a reaction to the failure of the peace process, the term 'defending' no longer 
applies to the Palestinian cause because the regional order does not allow it. The 
Intifada is not an Arab issue but a Palestinian one. Therefore, the concept of defence 
became confined to the Palestinians in their own way. 
The Saudi initiative is similar to the Egyptian vision of events and vice versa: it is Arab 
in its shape and making. More to this point, as Atwan puts it, " i f Mubarak does not want 
to fight to defend the honour of the Arab nation, it is better i f he refrain from declaring 
it morning and evening. By doing so, he reassures Sharon that his southern borders with 
Egypt are safe, and he can go on with his massacres without fear."'''^ Therefore, the 
Arab perception of occupation is no different from that of the Israelis. That is why the 
Saudi initiative, as with many other Arab initiatives, is no longer relevant. When the 
concept occupation it its immoral application is used in any context, it immediately 
indicates to brutality, injustice and illegal use of force. But it became, regular to the ear. 
For full view of the interview, see Akhbar Al Youm (Egypt), April 13, 2002, see also 
http://ahram.org.eg. 
*™ Akhbar Al Youm (Egypt), April 13, 2002. For more details on the Egyptian stance towards the 
Palestinian cause, see Al-Gumhuriya (Egypt), April 10 2000; Al-Ahram (Egypt), April 12, 13,2000. 
Quandt, W., 'The Middle East in 1990', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 7, No., 1, 1991, p. 53. 
Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), April 15, 2002. 
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to hear the concept occupation in the context of the Israeli occupation to Arab land. This 
is mainly due to the fact that Israel, after the peace process was initiated, lives alongside 
its Arab neighbours in the shadow of its peace with the Arab neighbours rather than in 
the shadow of its occupation to the Arab land. 
All Arab states were/are ready to go down to the negotiations table. Even the 
Palestinians put that clearly: Marwan Bargouthi, Fatah Secretary and head of the 
Tanzim in the West bank, who was captured by the Israeli troops and put to trial, stated 
that 'the goal of the Intifada is not to destroy the peace process, but rather to rebuild it 
on new foundations which include the UN resolutions and ending the United States 
monopoly on the peace process and to include international forces such as china, the EU, 
Russia and Arab parties.' 
Understanding the approach of the Palestinians to the Intifada makes it easy to 
understand the Arab approach to it. Al l parties are confirming that at the end of the road, 
peace is the ultimate choice, but can only come by ending the occupation. But the peace 
process taken as Arab-Israeli peace process was peace while Israel was still occupying 
Arab land. 
When Amr Moussa, as Egypt's foreign minister, for example, was asked, "might 
relations deteriorate to the extent that Egypt would sever all relations with Israel?" his 
answer was: "this is not the point. The point is: is Israel ready to change its policy and 
present to the Palestinians an offer they cannot refuse, by returning to the basic tenet of 
the process of peace, land for peace?"'^ "^  Moussa's answer stemmed from norms in Arab 
politics. Put straightforwardly, that is, as discussed in Chapter Three of this study, the 
Arabness of the Arab states. Even academics working on the ME use the same familiar 
rhetoric as Arab regimes would use, especially when Israel is involved. As G. Fuller 
concludes. 
The fact that Jerusalem is now at stake gives it not only a local flavour or 
even an Arab flavour, but also a Muslim world flavour. We are seeing 
pressures and concerns on that issue. We have a more candid Saudi Arabia 
Al-Quds (Palestine), November 2,2000. 
Middle East Insight, January 200L http://www.mideastinsight.org/l_01/mousa_interview.htm. See 
also an interview with Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri; here he states that he still believes in 
peace. See http://www.mideastinsight.org/l_01/hariri_interveiw.htm. 
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than we have ever seen before. It is fascinating to see Crown Prince 
Abdullah speak out on these issues, and I suspect he will grow more candid 
rather than less. His perspective is more pan-Arab than have seen from Saudi 
Arabia for a very long time... Egypt is very uncomfortable and unhappy. So 
I think we are going to see a somewhat more forceful voice from all these 
states as well, which may encourage others to come into this game. I do not 
think any of the Arab states are happy or comfortable with the American 
monopoly of the peace process.'^ ' 
Considering Fuller's expectations and confident comments, one can understand that the 
perception of 'initiative(s)' in Arab politics as solutions is due to the lack of structural 
bases on which Arab politics could operate. In the coming chapter of this study, I shall 
extend this argument. However, the key point is that while the Intifada is continuing, 
Arab regimes keep reminding their societies that there is no affordable military solution 
to the conflict with Israel.'^^ M. H. Heikal points out that there is neither a purely 
military option {hal askari), because of the severe asymmetry of power, nor a purely 
diplomatic solution (hal diplomasi), which could not succeed for the exact same reason. 
It is not simply a case of sending able diplomats to a meeting or skilled generals to the 
battlefield: it is the relative power capability that a state or a group of states can put 
behind them. In between these two courses of action, as Heikal stresses, is a political 
solution (hal siyasi), a complex and prudent utilisation of a blend of power capabilities 
to reach attainable objectives.''^^ 
The Arab Summit in Beirut 2002 
In October 2000, an extra-ordinary Arab sunmiit was held in Cairo after the outbreak of 
the Intifada at which it was decided that Arab summits to be convened annually in 
March. Then an ordinary summit was held in Amman on the l?"* and 28* of March 
2001, and then in Beirut on the 27"" and 28* of March 2002. It is this latter summit 
which is of concern to this study. 
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Fuller, G., 'The Future of the Peace Process', in Al-Aqsa Intifada: Causes &Iimplications for U.S. 
Interest, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, October 25, 2000); source 
for this paper from http://www.ccasoline.org. Remarkably, this was before Prince Abdullah 
announced his plan. However, Fuller was right, Prince Abdullah grew more candid and announced 
his initiative in 2002. 
Karawan, I., "Implications for the Arab World: The Intellectuals and the Street," in Al-Aqsa Intifada: 
causes & implications for U.S. Interest, (Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown 
University, October 25,2000), pp. 8-9. Source for this paper from http://www.ccasoline.org. 
Cited in Karwan, "Implications for the Arab World: The Intellectuals and the Street," in Ibid., p. 9. 
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The first characteristic of the Arab summit in Beirut, which was held in March 2002, 
was that many Arab leaders decided not to attend. The second characteristic of the 
summit was the invitation of Iraq to the summit, (see above), and the third characteristic 
was the support of the Saudi initiative which was called 'the Arab peace initiative'. 
As at the previous summit, which was held in Amman in March 2001, this summit 
concentrated on al-Aqsa Intifada, but did not result in many changes in the ongoing 
political events. The declaration of the summit will help to analyse inter-Arab politics 
within the regional order: 
We the kings, presidents, and emirs of Arab states meeting in the Council of 
Arab League Summit in Beirut, have conducted a thorough assessment of 
the development and challenges... relating to the Arab region and more 
specifically to the occupied Palestinian territory. With great pride, we 
followed the Palestinian people's Intifada and valiant resistance. We 
discussed the Arab initiative that aim to achieve a just and comprehensive 
peace in the region... based on the pan-Arab responsibility... we announce 
that we will continue to protect the pan-Arab security and fend off the 
foreign schemes that aim to encroach on Arab territorial integrity. We 
address a greeting of pride and honour to the Palestinian people's 
steadfastness and valiant Intifada against the Israeli occupation and its 
destructive war machine. We greet with honour and pride the valiant martyrs 
of the Intifada... 
It was mainly the Intifada which brought about the convening of the summit; the direct 
link, however, between the Intifada and the summit was mainly the Saudi plan which 
the summit unanimously endorsed. As argued above, the Saudi plan was seen as a 
solution. That is because there were/are no other options for Arab states. Yet, the United 
States was the country which the Prince thought could put pressure on Israel to accept 
his plan. The Prince maintained that "the United States is the one that supports Israel 
militarily, economically and politically. It is the only country that can wield influence 
on Israel." He said, urging the United States to lean on Israel Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon: "this is the time where sense must be talked into Sharon. War and conflict now 
are in his head. This has to be removed from his mind and only the United States can do 
that."'^^ 
All quotations and citations from the Summit Declaration are taken from www.al-
bab.com/arab/docs/ieague.htm. Issued in March 28, 2002. 
See www.arabic.news.com. March 2002. 
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Since the idea of Arab summits came to existence, and since the idea of extra-ordinary 
summits was put to summits, the many extra-ordinary Arab summits became the 
ordinary. In the 2002 summit, thirteen Arab presidents did not attend. Amr Moussa, the 
Secretary General of the Arab League, briefed the summit about the situation of the 
Arab world: 
It is a privilege to introduce to you my first report about the situation which 
the Arab world reached in the year between March 2001 and March 2002. I 
do not think the Arab world was in its best situation. From the collapse of 
the peace opportunities on all tracks, to an aggressive attack on the 
Palestinian people in the occupied territories, to the threat of using force 
against Arab states, to many other political, economic, social and human 
problems which our Arab societies face. Adding to that is what we faced and 
we are facing of an attack on the Arab and Islamic culture, and the cultural 
sanctions which some try to impose on us.''"' 
Yet, after the summit was convened, the declaration had denounced Israeli actions and 
asked Israel to deal 'just' with the Palestinians and that was all. Ironically, the vision of 
the future delineated by Ibrahim Nafie, mentioned above, is more confident concerning 
the Palestinian people's future than the Arab summit. Moussa's description of the 
situation of the Arabs is stated in the shadow of peace with Israel. The situation which 
the Arab world reached is that the Arab league is still in existence and still convening 
summits. The student of international relations is left with one choice when studying 
Moussa's comments; that is to question where they are made! The convening of the 
Arab summits is part and parcel of the failure of the Arab states. 
The Arab summits fail to result in any concrete action because there is no coercion in 
the Arab League resolutions, and also because Arab meetings in Arab summits are a 
heritage of a past era where rhetoric was the 'norm' in Arab politics. Sadly enough, this 
norm will still exist as long as the Arab League exists. Arab summits are seen by Israel 
as directed against it. Therefore, once an Arab summit is convened, it sends the message 
that Arab states are forming a hostile environment against Israel. 
In conclusion, the al-Aqsa Intifada revealed that Arab states, although weak to react to 
the Israeli violence against the Palestinians, and the Arab leaders, or put more 
moderately, some of them, still believe that convening summits help to resolve the 
Al-Hayat (London), March 28 2002, issues no 14252. for more details see 
www.daralhayat.com/ALHAYAT/Data /2002/3/28/art_26465.XML. 
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misery of the Palestinians. This would form the minimum of Arab reactions to the 
Israeli occupation, mainly by denouncing Israel again. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have examined the events that make Arab politics since the KC. I 
considered the marginalisation of Iraq from regional politics as important because this 
will facilitate the framing of my argument in the coming chapter. 
However, I also illustrated how Iraq became marginalised or banned from Arab 
policymaking. Iraq did not constitute any weight in the making of the regional order in 
the 1990s because Iraq and all other Arab states in the region became coated within the 
American presence. The United States became a regional player more than ever before, 
Iraq could not escape the political 'design' that the United States set for it. This was 
represented mainly by the economic sanctions, which I did not refer to as a main theme 
due to their economic rather than political significance in the case of Iraq. This says that, 
within the American presence in the region, countries who were not even economically 
sanctioned by the UN still could not challenge the American domination in the region. 
Therefore, sanctions ultimately have political significance of demonstrating a dimension 
of the U.S. power. 
The peace process occupied the main body of this chapter. It was illustrated that the 
peace process has no grounds for success because conflict is the main structure on 
which Middle East politics are based. Israel, although it has signed a peace deal with 
Jordan, negotiated with Syria, and made various forms of ties or contacts with other 
Arab countries, did not end the occupation of Arab land. But still, there was a belief that 
the peace process was going on which ultimately would lead to the full Israeli 
withdrawal from the Arab land. This, however, did not happen. What happened was that 
the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out and served to bring out the ordinary structure of political 
order in the region - which is conflict. The al-Aqsa Intifada is not the conflict itself, but 
it is dimension of the broader conflictual structure that governs the region in its entirety. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Absence of an Arab System and the New Middle East System 
Introduction 
The academic work about the ME in the 1990s ends by focusing on the American 
presence in the region. It is galvanisation that explains inter-Arab relations. The sum of 
this study is that there has been no Arab system that governs inter-Arab relations since 
the KC. This is due to the fact that Arab states are fully galvanised; the initiation of the 
peace process, the al-Aqsa Intifada, and the war on Iraq are indicators to the absence of 
a consolidated Arab regional system that could govern political agendas of the Arab 
states. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the scholarly debate on the ME focused on a new 
concept— 'the new Middle East'. Scholars such as Hinnebusch', Bamett^, and Tibi^ 
recognised an end to the Arab system and the emergence of a wider ME system."* 
In this chapter, I intend to show that there is no Arab system that governs inter-Arab 
relations. My study agrees with Hinnebusch's argument in particular because of his 
' Hinnebusch, R., 'The Middle East Regional System," in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A., (eds.), The 
Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2002. 
^ Bamett, M., Dialogue in Arab Politics, Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998). 
^ Tibi, B., Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security, 2"^ ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1998). 
•* Tibi, B., "From Pan-Arabism to the Community of Sovereign Arab States: Redefining the Arab and 
Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War," in Hudson, M., (ed.), Middle East Dilemma: The 
Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (London, New York: I. B. Tauris 1998). 
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clear conclusion that the process of consolidation constitutes a wider ME system.^ My 
study however concludes further that consolidation is also dependent upon the United 
States as being a regional player. 
Arabism constitutes a main body on its own because of its importance to the study of 
Arab politics. The actual conflictual character of the concept lies in the question of 
whether Arabism is dead or is still alive. Arab states are still called Arab states, they are 
still members of the Arab League, and they still hold Arab summits. On top of that, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is the heritage of an era during which Arabism 
constituted the high of political rhetoric, is not yet solved so that one could say it is over, 
or there is no longer any need to hold Arab summits to denounce Israel and/or to 
support the Palestinians. Therefore, Arabism still exists not as an ideology, but as a 
political refuge for Arab states. 
However, despite the fact that Arab states are members of the Arab League, of which 
Iran, Turkey, and Israel are not members, their policies have come to be governed by 
the newly emerging ME system. The war on Iraq, alongside the continuing Israeli 
occupation of the Arab land demonstrates this. 
This chapter is divided into two interrelated parts: in the first part, I shall offer the 
scholarly debate about the making or unmaking of an Arab system in the 1990s and 
beyond. From this I shall proceed onto the second section which will discuss two issues. 
The first will be focusing on how galvanisation—U.S.-Arab relations determine the 
absence of an Arab system and create an insecure environment for Arab states. This will 
mainly discuss the security dilemma in the ME. The second will focus on Arabism 
assuming that this concept did not fade away, something which causes severe confusion 
for Arab states. The sum of these two sections will focus on the regional order again, 
offering a description of the consolidation of the system which was enhanced by the war 
on Iraq. 
5 
Hinnebusch, "Introduction: The Analytical Framework," in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A. (eds.). The 
Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2002, p. 1. 
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The Absence of the Arab System since 1990 
The main change that took place in Arab politics in the aftermath of the KC was that 
these politics were no longer characterised mainly by the Arabness of the state but of 
wider regional mechanisms. In other words, there were no longer 'Arab' politics, but a 
wider range of politics, which are neither completely Arab nor completely Middle 
Eastern. What remained of the 'Arabness of Arab politics' were the titles of the states, 
the Arab League, and Arab summits, which all in all, on the one hand proved ineffective, 
and on the other remain a cause of confusion in Arab politics. 
The change in Arab politics was structural, once and for all. It was structural because 
the units' (i.e. Arab states') stand toward each other in the region had changed, 
operating, as just mentioned, on a new basis. This discussion is based on two 
interrelated elements; the first one is that the ordering principles of Arab politics had 
changed from being articulated by Arabness to being ruled by galvanisation. Secondly, 
compared to other non-Arab states in the region, the capabilities of Arab states are 
weaker. 
Before advancing to offer the form of security dilemma in the ME in the light of the 
events discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to offer the scholarly debate on 
the Arab system since the crisis. The scholarly debate about the new political thinking 
of Arab states is characterised by their collective acknowledgment of Arabism's 
dysfunctional qualities, which led to the contemplation of new policies based on 
'interests' and realism.^ None of the studies, however, apart from that of Hinnebusch 
* Barnett, Dialogue in Arab Politics, 1998; Tibi, B., "From Pan-Arabism to the Community of 
Sovereign Arab States: Redefining the Arab and Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War," 
in Hudson, Middle East Dilemma, 1998, pp. 92-107. There are various scholarly works in which the 
concept of the Arab system was mentioned. But it was mentioned neither in analytical nor in a broad 
frame which could cause me to headline it in this chapter. Still, I will use this literature where I see 
relevant and vital. Y. Sayigh mentioned the concept Arab system but did not elaborate on it. He 
concludes that little time has passed since the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Iraq in the second 
Gulf War, but one of the most important regional consequences of this is the introduction of Israel as a 
full member of the ME state system, as distinct from the strategic system of which it was always a 
member due to geographic location and active, albeit negative, interaction with its neighbours. See Y. 
Sayigh, "Structural Crisis in the Middle East," in Philip Robins, et ai. The Middle East in the Post 
Peace Process: The Emerging Regional Order and its International Implications, (Tokyo, Institute of 
Developing Economics 1996); Paul Noble, 'The Prospects of Arab Cooperation in a Changing 
Regional and Global System," in Michael Hudson (ed.), Middle East Dilemma, (London; I. B. Taurus, 
1999); L . Cantori, also mentioned the Arab system but as Sayigh, she did not discuss the concept but 
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and Ehteshami (eds.) The Foreign Policies of the Middle Eastern States (2002) had 
offered the combination of theoretical and empirical analysis using the concept of 
system to explain the change in the behaviour of Arab states since the KC. Their focus 
on the concept system in an analytical manner is an unprecedented step in writing about 
the ME politics.^ 
Hinnebusch's argument is that the Gulf War further enervated the remnants of Arab 
solidarity giving an example of how Saddam Hussein used Arabism to justify his 
invasion of Kuwait while anti-Iraq regimes manipulated the Arab League to engineer 
Western intervention against another member of the League and abort an Arab solution 
to the crisis. Furthermore, he showed how the crisis weakened Arab institutions, mainly 
the Arab League. The lack of an agreement about enabling an Arab summit to be held in 
1990-96 showed the degree of paralysis inter-Arab coordination reached.^ The collapse 
of Pan-Arab solidarity and institutions left littie restraint on the realpolitik of individual 
offered it as it is. She maintained that 'the Arab state system had already been raven by the 1967, 1980, 
and 1982 wars'. The Gulf War of 1991 fundamentally ended the usefulness of the concept "Arab state 
system" even Arab observers now have noted that the concept has been replaced by that of the Middle 
East (and possibly North African) state system. The non-Arab states of Turkey and Iran are now 
active international players, and the peace process has now accomplished the same thing for Israel. 
The ME is now a system of conventional international relations. See L . Cantori, "Egypt at the 
Crossroads: Domestic, Economic, and Political Stagnation and Foreign policy Constraints," in R. 
Freedman, (ed.), The Middle East after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, (Florida: University Press of 
Florida 1993); Roger Owen mentions the concept system in which he asked 'A new post-cold war 
system? The Middle Bast in a realigned world'. R. Owen in Middle East Report, (September-October 
1993), pp. 3-7; Maddy-Weitzman mentions Arab system as crystallised in the 1990s, on which see 
Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1994, pp. 81-83. See also G. Kramer, "Order and Interest: The 
Kuwait War and the Arab State System," in, Danspeckgruber W., & C. Tripp, (eds.), The Iraqi 
Aggression Against Kuwait: Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press 1996). 
Hinnebusch in explaining the emergence of Arab system discussed issues like foreign policy 
determinants, the foreign policy making, and the foreign policy behaviour. Chapter Two of his book 
entitled as The Middle East Regional System is more relevant to the analysis I shall embark upon later. 
He concluded that the ME regional system is taken in the book to be comprised of the Arab League 
members, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Arab states with shared identity, intense interactions, and 
membership in a regional organisation make the core of the system The non-Arab states - Turkey, 
Iran, and Israel - comprise, by virtue of their relative exclusion from the core community, the 
periphery of the system, but they are, nonetheless, members by virtue of their geographic contiguity 
and intimate involvement in the region's conflict. This makes them integral parts of the regional 
balance of power; in particular, they have tended either to constitute threats to the weaker Arab core or 
have acted to contain its instability in alliance with external powers. See Hinnebusch, "The Middle 
East Regional System", in Hinnebusch R. & A., Ehteshami (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Middle 
East States, 2002, pp. 29-53. 
Hinnebusch, "The Middle East Regional System," in Hinnebusch R. & A. Ehteshami (eds.). The 
Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2002, p. 49. 
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actors, which, however, only made it easier for hostile periphery states to exploit Arab 
divisions.' Subsequently, Hinnebusch observed that 
In the wake of the Second Gulf War, there was much talk about the 
dissolution of the Arab core in a wider ME system embracing the 
none-Arab periphery as full members. No such formal or 
institutionalised new system emerged, but the enhanced postwar 
fragmentation of the Arab core meant that reference to an "Arab 
world" sharing interests and identity appeared obsolete for much of 
the 1990s. No Arab concert existed to provide leadership and the Arab 
League rarely met, and never effectively. U.S. penetration of the 
region reached levels comparable to the Western presence of the pre-
Nasser age. While U.S. stewardship of the Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiation was sharply biased in Israel's favour, and although U.S. 
force was regularly directed at Arab targets, above all Iraq, 
Washington's influence was not seriously jeopardised in Arab capitals. 
At the same time, Israel and Turkey, though continuing to employ 
military superiority against Arab states and interests, were 
nevertheless increasingly accepted as players—even partners—in 
regional politics, only at the turn of the millennium were there some 
tentative signs that Arab institutions were reviving. But, as no new 
Arab or "Middle Eastern" security system emerged, states continued 
to rely on realist self-help manifest in unrestrained arms races and/or 
on U.S. protection.'° 
The sum result of the weakening of Arab autonomy over their own issues caused a 
security situation which served western interests. The quasi-permanent U.S. military 
presence in the Gulf, the devastation and siege by which Iraq's power was destroyed 
and its revival prevented, the neutralisation, through economic and security dependency, 
of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the Israeli-Turkish encirclement of Syria, all keep any 
regional state or coalition that might seek to reorganise the regional system for 
collective indigenous purposed effectively hobbled. The notion of an autonomous Arab 
system has been virtually nullified." 
Hinnebusch argues that in the ME the state is the main actor in foreign policy and that 
state elites have an interest in maximising the autonomy and security of the state.The 
10 
Ibid. p. 50. 
Ibid. p. 50. 
Hinnebusch, R. & El-Shazly N., "The Challenge of Security in the Post-Gulf War Middle East 
System," in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A., (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 
2002, p. 87. 
Hinnebusch, R., "InU-oduction: The Analytical Framework," in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A., 
(eds.). The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2002, p. 1. It is important to differentiate between 
the theory of international relations and theory of foreign policy so that my study will not do 
violence to Hinnebusch's argument. K Waltz, divided theories of international relations up into two 
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book accepts the realist claim that a built-in feature of a state system, anarchy, has 
generated profound insecurity and a pervasive struggle for power. Moreover, he 
maintains that the ME is one of the regional subsystems where this anarchy appears 
most in evidence: it holds two of the world's most durable and intense conflict centres, 
the Arab-Israeli and the Gulf arenas; its states are still contesting borders and rank 
among themselves; and there is not a single one that does not feel threatened by one or 
more of its neighbours. Finally, the book accepts that states seek to counter these threats 
through "reason of state," notably power accumulation and balancing, and that the latter 
is a key to regional order.'"* 
Bamett mainly focuses on the impact of the Gulf War on inter-Arab relations. He 
concludes that the post-Gulf War policies are characterised by fragmentation of the 
Arab states. After the war the conversation between Arabs was dominated by pleas to 
alter their conduct, free themselves of sentimentality, and base their politics on 
"realism". The retreat to the state was unmistakable. He emphasises the death of 
Arabism: 'Arabism had encouraged Arab leaders to coordinate and harmonise their 
policies, sometimes against their better judgment and personal preferences, but now 
[after the second Gulf War] their collective acknowledgment of Arabism's 
13 
15 
types, those which see causes operating primarily at the 'state' (second-image) level, which he terms 
'reductionist' theories and those which see causes operating primarily at the systemic (third-image) 
level, which he terms 'systemic'. The former group, which Waltz thinks have been dominated in IR 
theory, explains international politics, therefore, in terms of the interactions and characteristics of 
the major units which make it up, that is states. He further argues that reductionist theories do not 
just, as a matter of fact, mistake or ignore certain aspects of international politics - the systemic 
aspects - they must do so. For reductionist theories to be true, Waltz famously says, 'we would have 
to believe that no important causes intervene between the aims and actions of states and results their 
actions produce. In the history of international relations, however, results achieved seldom 
correspond to the intensions of actors. The result of this argument, of course, is that there must be a 
set of factors which are properties of the system, not of the units, and which represent the 
'structural', 'constraining' factors that make international politics what it is. It is these factors. Waltz 
thinks that a systemic theory should address. A theory of international politics. Waltz says, should 
be systemic; theories of foreign policy, in contrast, must be reductionist. It follows, then, that a 
theory of international politics as such is different form a theory of foreign policy. The problem is 
that virtually all previous theories of international politics (he specifically discusses Aron, 
Morgenthau, Mortan Kaplan, and Richard Rosecrance) have been reductionist in that they have 
failed to appreciate this distinction and its implication. For more on this distinction see the elegant 
book by N. J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order, 2001 
(op.cited) from which this observation is taken. Pages pp. 41-47. 
Hinnebusch, R., 'Introduction: The Analytical Framework', in Hinnebusch R. & A. Ehteshami, (eds.), 
The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2002, p. 1. 
Ibid., p. 1. 
Bamett, Dialogue in Arab Politics, 1998, p. 212-216. 
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dysfunctional qualities lied to a wholesale contemplation of new policies based on 
'interests" and realism.''^ 
Moreover, Bamett observed that 'because Arabism seemingly brokered only hostility 
and suspicions, Arab officials began to publicly confess their exhaustion from its 
demands and its unfulfilled promises. Therefore, 'all this [the end of Arabism] 
suggests the end of the Arab states system.' By "Arab politics", he adds, 
I have meant the existence of certain core issues— the Arab Israeli conflict, 
autonomy form the West, and unity among Arab states— that are expressive 
of the Arab political identity, that help to define the Arab state's interests 
and the legitimate means to pursue those interest. A dominant concern of 
the 1990s has been the need for Arab reconciliation, the possibility and 
timing of Israel's integration into the region, and even the possibility of 
closing the Arab League. To be sure, Israel's place in the region remains in 
dispute pending a final treaty with the Palestinians, but the retreat on these 
"Arab" issues as they directly pertain to inter-Arab acdon has been 
impressive, calling into quesdon the organisation—indeed, the existence— 
of Arab politics. This conversadon was produced by the insult of Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait, the indifference that marked the 1980s, and the decades 
of an Arabism whose most memorable contribution were injury and 
rivalry.'^ 
Furthermore, Bamett focuses on the reorganisation of Arab-Israeli politics starting in 
Madrid talks as a turning point in these politics: the Madrid conference and its 
subsequent events reflected a shift from Arabism to realism, from an ideological to an 
interstate struggle. Then he focuses on the changing security order, where he 
concludes that the changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict parallel a change that has 
occurred in Inter-Arab security relations since 1990.^° Security for Arab states became 
an emphasis on sovereignty.'^' However, Bamett concludes that any notion of Arab 
collective security lay in ruins after the Gulf War as Arab states began emphasising 
individual over Arab security and began demonstrating a strong preference for bilateral 
Ibid., p. 213. 
" Ibid., p. 214. 
'* Ibid., pp. 214-215. 
" Ibid., pp. 221-226. 
^ Ibid., pp. 227-228. 
Ibid., p. 227. 
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security pacts with Western states.The apparent consensus was that Arabism had long 
outlived its usefulness, that the region should sober up and embrace sovereignty, and 
that Arab states should be allowed, within reason, to consort with whom they wanted.^'' 
The future of Arab order occupies a space in Bamett's discussion; this future is bound 
to the fact that the ability of Arab states to develop and further their interest in the future 
depends on reaching agreement and cooperation with the non-Arab regional states. The 
future regional order should embrace Arab and non-Arab states including Turkey, Iran, 
and, most controversially, Israel.^ '* 
Similar argument came from Tibi: the vision of a pan-Arab state, as it had prevailed 
until the Gulf crisis, was related to the ideology and rhetoric of pan-Arab nationalism, 
but not to an existing citizenship pattern nor to a model of integration of regional 
states.^' Furthermore, Tibi argues that 
Pan-Arab ideology was directed against the existing institution of the 
nation-state, along whose lines all discrete states of the region are organised. 
In the political language of pan-Arab ideology, existing Arab states were not 
accepted as nations-states. They were downgraded and labelled al-dawla al-
qitriyya (the domestic state). The term meaning "the Arab nations-state" {al-
dawla al-qawmiyya), was used only to refer to the visionary pan-Arab state 
aimed at, and allegedly hitherto impeded by. Western conspiracies. Thus, 
pan-Arab ideology, even though it negates the existing Arab nation-states, 
remains imprisoned in the nation-state idea. It simply aspires to a larger 
pan-Arab state that unites all Arabs. In fact, harmony and brotherhood were 
the central rhetorical theme of pan-Arab ideology, while real interstate Arab 
politics, as with any other politics, has been characterised by sever 
conflict.^^ 
Therefore, for Tibi, considering the Arab system, the first lesson of the KC was that any 
effort to induce the boundary change in the existing Arab state system will erupt in 
violent conflict.^^ That is why Tibi suggests that redefining Arabness must be aimed at 
" Ibid., p. 228. See also B. Korany, "National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism," 
in D. Tschirgi, (ed.). The Arab World Today (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994). 
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developing a new design for inter-Arab relations: an intestate structure of sovereign 
states based on mutual respect.^ ^ Tibi, however, considers the ME to be a regional state 
system and a part of the international system.^ ^ 
The Security DUemma 
The above discussions beg the question that i f there is no Arab system that governs 
inter-Arab relations, what then is the system that governs these relations? Based on 
Hinnebusch, there is a ME system in consolidation.However, the main character of 
this system within consolidation is that Arab states are shifting from being the core of 
the pre-KC system to being on the periphery of the emerging new system. Hinnebusch 
maintains that 
In the wake of the second Gulf War, there was much talk about the 
dissolution of the Arab core in a wider Middle East system embracing the 
non-Arab periphery as full members. No such formal or institutionalised 
new system emerged, but the enhanced post war fragmentation of the Arab 
core meant that reference to an "Arab world" sharing interests and identity 
appeared obsolete from much of the 1990s. No Arab concert existed to 
provide leadership and the Arab League rarely met, and never effectively. 
U.S. penetration of the region reached levels comparable to the Western 
presence of the pre-Nasser age. While U.S. stewardship of the Arab-Israeli 
peace negotiation was sharply biased in Israel's favour, and although U.S. 
force was regularly directed at Arab targets, above all Iraq, Washington's 
influence was not seriously jeopardised in Arab capitals. At the same time, 
Israel and Turkey, though continuing to employ military superiority against 
Arab states and interests, were nevertheless increasingly accepted as 
players—even partners—in regional politics.^' 
It is, as Hinnebusch concludes above, the American presence in the region which 
dictates the discussion about the regional political shape. A discussion of the security 
dilemma in the region starts from there. Hinnebusch further concludes that 'as no new 
Arab or "Middle Eastern" security system emerged, states continued to rely on realist 
self-help manifest in unrestrained arms races and/or on U.S. protection.'''^ 
^ Ibid., p. 94. 
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The security dilemma for Arab states in the ME differs from the commonly understood 
concept of security dilemma. What characterises this dilemma is the absence of a 
coherent Arab system within which Arab policies could be channelled, and which could 
back up the foreign policy capacity of Arab states. The second is the generated order 
from the KC, or what could be termed here as the absolute order. The 'absolute order 
implies no change; and where there is no allowance for change there is unlikely to be 
justice, and without justice there is the potential for conflict.'^^ 
The relationship between these two factors is interlocked: security complexes, in 
theoretical terms, can be derived from both the state and the system levels. Security 
complexes result from interactions between individual states.^ '* Arab states' interactions 
became channelled through or blocked within the orbit of galvanisation, which 
determines their behaviour more than merely being locked into geographical proximity. 
Each state relied on the fact that the United States is present in the region which could 
hinder an attack on one of the states by another.To be sure, this has hindered the 
emergence of an independent regional security complex. In the same time, the 
emergence of a wider ME system, which Hinnebusch describes as 'in consolidation', is 
emerging with the United States as a regional player. 
The 1990s and beyond are characterised by the collapse of what is termed as 'Arab 
security'. The then Egyptian foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, stated that "the painful 
realities resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its usurpation of the territory of a 
fraternal Arab state include the collapse of the traditional concept of pan-Arab 
security."''^ The concept of pan-Arab security was not replaced by a pan-middle eastem 
one, for example, because the American strong hand in the region after the KC was 
quick to form itself as an 'institutional reference'. That means that other than the Arab 
Booth, K., "Security in Anarciiy", International Affairs 67, 3 (1991) p. 539. 
*^ Buzan, People, States, And Fear, p. 191. 
See Geoffrey Kemp, "Tiie Middle East Arms Race: Can it be Controlled?", Middle East Journal, Vol. 
45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 441-456. 
^ Cited in FBIS-NES-91-095, March 27, 1991, pp. 9-10. 
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League no strictly indigenous security-related institutions existed in the ME. 
Subsequently, it is the regional dynamics that guided American foreign policy in the 
region.^* The more the United States is needed in the region, the more its role becomes 
institutionalised; it is no longer only oil, or Israel, that drags the United States into the 
region, but the United States' security became part of the region, which ultimately 
makes the form or type of Arab security. 
Neo-Realism contends that capabilities rather than intentions are what determine the 
way states seek to help themselves.Arab states' capabilities are measured by their 
Leistung (efficiency) as Arab states in defending their interest as Arab states. But in the 
case of the absence of a collective Arab security, the Leistung of Arab states is restricted 
to each individual one. Therefore, galvanisation, seen from the angle of individual 
security matters, is a healthy concept 
Yet, remarkably, the lesson from the war on Iraq shows that Arab regimes would allow 
more intervention and they would fully cooperate with the United States. Therefore, the 
capacity of the Arab state is restricted to regime survival, which in turn affects the 
making of the security system. Therefore, all security matters in the region revolve 
around regime survival. The regime survival dilemma stems from the fact that the 
United States, as a regional player, does not have the same level of relations with all 
'Arab' regimes. The degree of closeness of Arab regimes to the United States is not 
only judged by how many visits an Arab leader will undertake to the White House, but 
also by the degree of how this regime, composing a single unit within the emerging 
system, functions within the systemic settings. The regime-by-regime differences in 
relationship with the United States define the dilemma of the regime. A clear example 
of this is the relationship between the United States and individual Arab states like that 
of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
" Maoz, Z., "Regional Security in the Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities and Future 
Challenges," in Maoz, Z. (ed.). Regional Security in the Middle East (London: Portland, Frank Cass, 
1997), p. 19. 
*^ See Michael Scott Doran, "Palestine, Iraq, And American Strategy", Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1 
(January/February 2003) pp. 19-34. 
'^ See Robert Jervis, 'The Future of Wold Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" International Security, 
Vol. 35, No.. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 39-73. 
For more on this discussion See D. Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary 
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The close ties between Saudi Arabia and the United States have led some analysts to 
depict Saudi Arabia's role in the international system as one of classical dependence.'*' 
In this view, Saudi Arabia has very little autonomy in terms of its foreign- and 
economic-policy choices. It is forced to follow the lead of the United States because its 
economic and political stability is dependent upon U.S. support and goodwill.'*^ 
However, the dilemma for the Saudi state is embedded in two factors: the first factor is 
that Saudi Arabia knows well that it cannot depend on what is called the Arab nation or 
on other Arab states in executing Arab politics. Therefore it must further depend on the 
United States as a strong ally who provides it with protection."*^ The second factor 
which is the important for this study is the experience Iraq witnesses in its confrontation 
with the United States: the American emphasis on regime toppling in Iraq leaves Saudi 
Arabia and many other Arab states questioning their own relationship with the United 
States especially after the attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001. 
Furthermore, the presence of large numbers of American troops on Saudi soil irritates 
nationalists and Islamists alike and eventually may come to threaten the stability of the 
Saudi regime.'*'* Therefore, the American presence in the region decides very much of 
the domestic mood in the region. The American presence has become merely a force. 
The United States is demonstrating forcefully that challenges to its authority in the 
region will be defeated.'*^ Saudi Arabia's and many other Arab states' dilemma then is 
in their lack of force to keep up with the domestic pressure against the American 
presence on an Arab soil and to keep up with, say, the overall force the United States is 
using in the region. On the light of this, for example, the rapprochement between Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq during the Arab League summit in Beirut was irrelevant; it does not 
Cited in G. Cause, 'The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia," in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A. (eds.). 
The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2002, p. 194. See also Helen Lackner, A House Built on 
Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, (London: Ithaca Press, 1978); Fred Halliday, Arabia 
Without Sultans, (New York: Vintage Press, 1974). 
*^  Cause, 'The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia," in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A. (eds.). The Foreign 
Policies of Middle East States, 2002, p. 194. 
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make sense if the United States is unhappy with Iraq that Saudi Arabia would forge 
closer ties to it. 
However, the American presence in the region does not exist without there being "side 
effects" on America itself. The United States was militarily attacked throughout the 
1990s: the bombings in Saudi Arabia, one in Riyadh in November of 1995, and the 
other on the Khobar towers near Dhahran in June of 1996; the bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998; then the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen 
in October 2000, on top of that the attack on the twin towers in the 11"' September 2001. 
Yet, since September 11* 2001, the security dilemma of the United States became part 
and parcel of the security dilemma of the Arab states in the region."*^ For decades prior 
to 9/11, the United States basically had a deal with repressive governments throughout 
the Arab world: they could run their countries more or less however they wanted, as 
long as they were willing to sell oil at reasonable prices to the West, act as strategic 
allies of the United States and not threaten the Middle East regional order.'*^ However, 
barring any long-term negative fallout from the events of 11 September, regime change 
became an established part of U.S. strategic thinking towards Middle East.'*^  To change 
regimes in the region, the United States' political agenda became based only on using 
forceful means to make this new form of politics possible. 
To change a regime in the region means the spread of a pattern of force usage for a new 
purpose in an unprecedented way which causes a threat to other regimes. This has a 
double-sided effect on regional security: the first one is in the way the United States 
tends to guard its existence in the region, and the other lies in the way Arab states 
respond to the United States' policy. The United States uses its absolute power to 
change regimes, yet these regimes are, or were, the very allies of the United States.'*^ 
On changes the 11* of September has brought see Robert Jervis, "An Interim Assessment of 
September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1 
(2002), pp. 37-55. 
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Affairs, Vo. 79, no. 1 (January 2003), p. 54. 
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The cooperation between the United States and these regimes is then tied to how much 
the United States uses force, not to how much it uses diplomacy to keep these regimes 
good allies. Moreover, the United States started bluntly dictating its will to most Arab 
govemments.^° Its intervention in domestic political issues of these countries, such as 
bringing democracy to the region, changes the thinking of Arab states towards the 
power on which they rely to further exist. In an interview with the Financial Times, 
National Security Advisor to President Bush, Rice, stated the United States wishes to 
bring democracy and freedom to the Arab world.^' The Jordanian daily Al-Dustour 
wrote that 'Rice claimed that the United States intends to be a liberating force and 
dedicate itself to liberating the Islamic world, starting with Iraq, and to establish 
democracy and freedom. She ignores more than one and a half billion Muslims who 
suffer from America's greed and oppression. ... Will the black Rice free our Muslim 
world by the same method that Americans have used against Muslim prisoners in the 
Giangi Fort in Afghanistan?'^^ 
The Arabs became the problem of the United States and the United States is the 
problem for the Arabs. The first consequence of this political environment is the failure 
of foreign policy in any matter which concems the two sides. Hinnebusch for example 
concludes that: 
The failure of regional institutions, multilateral or bilateral alliances, 
and of the regional power balance to give local states security, brutally 
exposed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, opened the door to 
acceptance of a heightened role for the non-Arab periphery states and 
for the U.S. hegemon in the region, in the post war era, inter-Arab 
disputes continued to paralyse the Arab League/summits system as an 
arena for collectively addressing security threats. The result is a 
security situation that serves Western interests and narrows Arab 
autonomy in a way the architects of the Baghdad Pact could only 
dream of. The quasi-permanent U.S. military presence in the Gulf, 
partly funded by Arab oil and aimed at Iran and Iraq; the devastation 
and siege by which Iraq's power was destroyed and its revival 
prevented; the neutralisation, through economic and security 
dependency, of Egypt and Saudi Arabia; and the Israeli-Turkish 
encirclement of Syria, all keep any regional state or coalition that 
50 See George Crom, "Avoiding the Obvious: Arab Perspectives on U.S. Hegemony in the Middle East", 
Middle East Report (Fall 1998), p. 23. 
^' The Financial Times, September 23, 2002. 
" Addustour, (Jordan), September 23, 2002. For more on the reactions to Rice's remarks, see Al-Hayat, 
(London), October 6, 2002. 
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might seek to reorganise the regional system for collective indigenous 
purposes effectively hobbled. The notion of an autonomous Arab 
system has been virtually nullified. Was this price of increased 
regional security? Pax Americana, far from uniformly enhancing the 
security of the Middle East, has a contradictory effect. On the one 
hand, the United States exacerbated power imbalances, sowed the 
seeds of future Iraqi revanchism and Palestinian frustration, and 
encouraged the spread of strategic weapons, arguably the single most 
serious challenge to Middle Eastern security. Instability was contained 
largely by the deterrent power of the hegemon and its ties to the 
pivotal Arab states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, plus the 
counterbalancing of the Turkish-Israeli and Syro-Iranian axes. As 
such, rather than a stable new Middle Eastern system replacing the old 
Arab-centred system, security rests on fluid ad hoc arrangements. 
This "system" has several potentially fatal flaws. As Bamett argues, a 
stable order depends on congruence between the normative 
expectations of the society and those of state elites.'' While the 
international hegemon and key state elites may believe there is no 
viable altemative to the status quo, significant parts of indigenous 
society retain visions of an Arab-Islamic order free of Western 
intrusion and Israeli dominance; this taints the legitimacy of those 
states seen to support a status quo order devoid of these 
expectations... To a very considerable extent, the status quo, lacking 
indigenous popular legitimacy, is erected on hegemonic external force 
and on economic and security relations that benefit a relative few. The 
continued application of U.S. force in the region is thus essential to 
maintain the status quo, but paradoxically further undermines its 
legitimacy. As such, should that force falter, it seems likely that the 
regional order would again face destabilising challenges from below 
and within.'"* 
With this all, the United States' security is bound to the ME security. The emerging 
system dominates the type of security the United States puts itself in. The dilemma for 
the United States, however, is that it does not acknowledge, or barely acknowledges, the 
emerging system of which it is itself a part, by not helping to solve the very core 
problem in the ME—the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is because the United States is 
mainly seeking security for itself, apart from the security of the regional players who are 
standing, whether they like it or not, shoulder to shoulder with the United States in its 
policies in the region. 
As Hinnebusch puts it above, the continued application of U.S. force in the region is 
essential to keep the existing order. However, the same methods applied by the United 
States to keep the status quo are the same methods which destabilise the order: the 
53 See Barnett, "Regional Security After the Gulf War", pp. 614-616. 
^ Hinnebusch, R. & El-Shazly N., "The Challenge of Security in the Post-Gulf War Middle East 
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continuous use of force by the United States keeps it in extreme need to use this force 
over and over again because it is only force that distinguishes its presence in the region 
from any other international power. Thus, there will be no co-binding security 
arrangements between the United States and any Arab state because of the huge gap 
between the superiority of the American power and the extreme weakness of Arab states. 
From this point, whenever the United States needs the support of Arab states in order to 
curb any terrorist groups, Arab states will feel unable to do so because the amount of 
force an Arab state would apply to do the job would not suit the United States' demands. 
Arabism: a Drowning Man Will Clutch At a Straw 
Strictly speaking, the concept 'Arabism' never stopped being a part of inter-Arab and 
Arab non-Arab relations. Arab politics are Arab because of Arabism and they remained 
Arab politics after the KC.^^ Hinnebusch maintains that 'pan-Arabism continues to have 
a residual affect on foreign policymaking because states' identities are still no good 
substitute for Arab identity. In most, i f not all, of the Arab states, the legitimacy of 
regimes continues to be contingent on being seen to act for Arab or Islamic interests, 
and political Islam.^^ Bamett also maintains that the same Arabism that compelled Arab 
states to work in concert and to identify with each other also represented a source of 
conflict and competition.^^ 
Indeed, the test of the impact of Arabism on the making of the regional system is mainly 
addressed through scrutinising the Arab League's performance as a body within which 
Arab states hold their political activities as Arab states. When speaking of the Arab 
states, we mainly mean their political body, and that is represented by their League. 
Since its establishment and beyond the KG, the Arab League failed to perform in any of 
the key tests of conflict management and conflict resolution among Arab states -
starting with the 1948 meeting on Palestine, going through the conflicts between radical 
and conservative Arab regimes in the 1950s and 1960s, deahng with the civil war in 
Yemen (1962-67), and again in 1994, Jordan (September 1970, July 1971), and 
Bamett, Dialogue in Arab Politics, 1998, p. 239. 
Hinnebusch, "Introduction," in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (eds.). The Foreign Policies of the Middle 
Eastern States, 2002, pp. 9-10. 
Barnett, Dialogue in Arab Politics, 1998, p. 255. 
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Lebanon war, and finally, deahng with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In none of 
these cases was there any sign of effective management of the conflicts, let alone any 
type of resolution. Thus, "the Arab League is seen by its own leading members as a 
dead horse."^^ 
Regarding the issue of Iraq, there were various summits held: the Franco-African 
Summit in Paris, the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Kuala Lumpur, The Islamic 
Summit in Doha March 5* 2003, and the Arab League Summit held in Sharm EI Sheik 
on March 1, 2003. The concern of this section, however, is the Arab League Sunmiit 
which was held in Egypt in March 2003. 
- The Arab Summit in Sharm el-Sheik March 2003 
The Arab League Summit of Sharm el-Sheik in March 2003 was controversial even 
before it opened. Some Arab leaders signalled that they thought the meeting was 
unnecessary because the resolution from the previous summit in Beirut in March 2002 
voiced sufficiently united opposition to a war on Iraq. 
In the concluding text of the Sharm el-Sheik Summit, Arab states concluded that the 
summit dealt with the dangerous threats Iraq faces... and the impact of that threat on the 
Arab national security.^^ Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for example, declared that the nation 
is facing "fateful and momentous" threats.^*'This is also based on the fact that Arab 
leaders are aware of the importance and necessity of Arab solidarity to protect the 
highest interests of the Arab nation, achieving the nation's aims...etc."^' Put simply, 
Arab leaders verbally declared that they are against any military action against Iraq 
because there is a threat to the entire Arab nation's interest.^^ The Syrian president, 
differing from the others, accused the United States of seeking to secure Iraq's oil and 
Maoz, Z., "Regional Security in the Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities and Future 
Challenges," in Maoz, Z. (ed.). Regional Security in the Middle East (London: Portland, Frank Cass, 
1997), p. 19-20. 
'^ www.al-jazeera.net/special _coverages/Iraq_crisis/2003/3/3-2-l.htm . 
^ For full text of the Arab states speeches at the summit see www.al-jazeera.net/special 
_coverages/Iraq_crisis/2003/3/3-2- l.htm. 
" Ibid. 
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redraw the region's map. He commented that "we [the Arabs] are all targeted... we are 
all in danger."^^ However, the summit was marked by heated accusations between Saudi 
Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and the Libyan leader, Qaddafi 64 
The summit was also marked by the Emirates initiative calling on Saddam to step down. 
United Arab Emirates proposal was clearly stated by Sheik Zayed: 'the entire Iraqi 
leadership must step down and leave Iraq with all the appropriate advantages within two 
weeks of adopting this Arab initiative.'^^ 
Furthermore, in describing the summit, Salama Ahmed Salama, writing in Al-Ahram 
Weekly, observed that "[Arab leaders] come, they meet, they talk, they eat and drink, 
they issue statements, then they go each his way as if nothing had taken place. As a 
consequence, no one gives much attention to these summits." Shafeeq Ghabra 
described the summit as "a stunning failure."^^ 
Yet, the fact that Arab states resort to holding the same form of Arab League summits 
allow them to act out a regional role which they formerly used to play. Put simply, Arab 
states have been helpless in the face of IsraeH force against the Palestinians since the al-
Aqsa Intifada broke out in September 2000. They are also unable to contest the 
continuous American use of force against Iraq. Therefore, their regional role has been 
eradicated. In this case, holding summits offers the minimum reminder to themselves of 
their being 'states' and belonging to an organisation such as the Arab League.^ ^ 
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Therefore, it can be argued that Arab states found themselves being more states in their 
'Arabism' than states in their regional and international orbits. Offering Egypt as an 
example, Atwan maintained: "We believe that Egypt still bears the biggest Arab 
national and moral responsibility: Egypt did not achieve victory for Palestine, did not 
take up arms to defend Iraq."^^ Therefore, Atwan considers its 'Arab'-regional role as 
unnecessary and unneeded. He further observes that during Arab Summits in the past, 
the Palestinian question was the backbone of these summits. But, in the latest Arab 
summit[s] this issue is no longer decisive; it became a matter in the hands of Tony Blair 
and George W. Bush. He adds. 
The Palestinian president, the good friend of all Arab leaders, each of 
them has thousand kisses on his cheeks from him, isolated on his own 
in a small room in RamAllah. What could Arab leaders offer in their 
new summit? They have offered normalisation of relations with Israel 
and they got nothing in return. Before their [summit(s)], Arafat was 
free, the West bank was under self-rule, and the summits used to fund 
the Intifada, even the Summit used to issue statement appraising the 
Intifada and the heroic actions of the Palestinians. All this evaporated; 
Arab states in the coming summit will not dare to mention the Intifada 
because this will anger the United States and will consider this 
terrorism.™ 
However, Ghabra suggests that 
the Arab world, especially the larger Arab states, has invested heavily 
in trying to stop a war and prevent regime change in Iraq. Yet if the 
reigon (along with the French and the Germans) had invested similar 
energy into persuading Hussein to leave power, the Arab world (along 
with the French and Germans) would have a better reception in 
Washington and more influence during the next stage of events, both 
in the rebuilding of Iraq and on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab 
leaders hold out a vision of Iraq's reintegration with its neighbours 
after a change of regime. Events are moving fast, and the summit was 
behind on every issue.^ ' 
But as Murqah eloquently puts it, "the biggest crisis the summit faced is the loss of clear 
channels of communication with Baghdad whereas this is not the case with Washington. 
The United States maintains a significant military, political and economic presence in 
*' Abd Al-Bari Atwan, Alquds Al-Arabi (London), February 21,2003, quoted from www.alquds.co.uk 
™ Ibid. 
Shafeeq Ghabra, "An Arab House, Openly Divided", www.washingtonpost.com, March 9, 2003. 
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most Arab countries, having previously established agreements, mutual interests, and 
72 Strategic alliances.' 
- More Arabism? 
Bamett observes that Arabism is a resource of identity. Arab leaders can be expected to 
genuinely care about issues identified as matters of concern to the Arab nation, but Arab 
leaders had another arguably more immediate and pressing concern: regime survival.^^ 
Moreover, i f Arab leaders competed for regional leadership, they did so in part because 
they could exchange such titles for political capital at home and financial and military 
concessions from abroad.^ "* Bamett also analyses that 
Arab leaders pursued both private and socially determined interests. 
As Arabs they were likely to closely identify with Arab national 
concerns; as leaders they were likely to closely identify with regime 
survival. And as Arab leaders they were likely portray and fashion 
their policies in ways consistent with the norms of Arabism because 
doing so was instrumental for regime survival.^ ^ 
Similarly, Tibi maintains, "The rhetoric of pan-Arab unity has been the prevailing 
pretension in inter-Arab politics."^^ Yet, conflict, not cooperation, has been the hallmark 
of highly competitive Arab state policies, and interstate relations have been 
characterised more by divisive coalitions than by cooperative integration.'^ 
Tibi's argument clearly puts the point in place. Arab states still hold summits and even 
while the war on Iraq was at its peak, the foreign ministers of Arab states met in Cairo 
to discuss an Arab solution to end that war. Arab states held their sununit (as discussed 
above), following which the American march towards Baghdad began and the Arab 
states decided to meet up again to discuss the challenges that are facing the nation. The 
Jarir Murqah, Al-Rai, (lordan), March 2, 2003. Iraq remained a member of the Arab League but he 
was excluded from some Arab summits after the crisis. Some of the Arab states kept full diplomatic 
representation in Baghdad (Oman, Jordan, and the UAE). 
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secretary general of the Arab League emphasised the necessity to "review the 'Arab 
78 
order" after its failure to deal with the current developments in Palestine and in Iraq,' 
emphasising that "to substitute the Arab League with another organisation is not an easy 
task especially while the Arab league has gathered all Arabs together despite their 
disputes."^^ 
Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo on March 24. They issued a resolution to condemn 
what they called U.S.-British aggression against Iraq, and the resolution was passed by 
O A 
all those present, except for Kuwait. However, all attempts to create a united Arab 
front against an attack on Iraq degenerated into name-calling between countries hosting 
United States forces, like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and those vehemently 
opposed to any action, like Libya, Syria, Lebanon and of course Iraq itself.^' The Qatari 
Foreign Minister left before a vote was taken saying he did not believe such meetings 
were useful and that they were organised to appease Arab public opinion. The 
outcome of the meeting was that the foreign ministers stated that the Arab League 
would now seek an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to "stop the 
aggression and secure an immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq."*^ Arab 
foreign ministers forgot that George Bush said "we [the United States] created the 
United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our 
deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes." '^* 
Therefore, these meetings support the above mentioned argument that these meetings 
are for some states to play a role - but merely a regional role - and this would not be 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Stated in al-Ahram, Egypt, April 2, 2003, Vol. 42485, Quoted from 
www.ahram.org.eg/index.asp?CurFN=Arab4.htm&did=7713. 
Stated in al-Ahram, Egypt, April 2, 2003, Vol. 42485, Quoted from 
www.ahram.org.eg/index.asp?CurFN=Arab4.htm&did=7713 . 
Quoted from ABC online, March 24, 2003 www.abc.net,au/news/newsitem/s815516.htm See also 
'Arab Foreign Ministers Urge U.S. Withdrawal', New York Times, March 25, 2003, quoted from 
www.nytimes.com/2003/03/25. This meeting was the first since the War started. 
Quoted from ABC online, March 25, 2003 www.abc.net,au/news/newsitem/s815516.htm. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Cited in Brian Whitaker, The Guardian, September 24, 2002. 
162 
possible without Arabism which is not an ideology in this case, but a political tool, as 
the Qatari foreign minister put it, to reach to the public opinion. 
Furthermore, it is in some Arab states' interest to keep Arabism surfacing within the 
regional order. In October 2002, Qaddafi announced that his country was pulling out of 
the Arab League. He questioned, "why should we stay in the membership of a futile, 
ineffective League?"^^ The first reaction by an Arab state (apart from the reaction of the 
League's Secretary), to Qaddafi's announcement came from Egypt. President 
Mubarak travelled to Tripoli to dissuade him from his decision. After a meeting in 
Tripoli, Mubarak stated that "should every country pullout from the Arab League, this 
Arab League will end."^' 
Egypt's fear was that Qaddafi's withdrawal from the Arab League could encourage 
other Arab states to follow suit. In the case of the League being dismantled, Egypt 
would lose leverage over other Arab states and the Egyptian regime would lose leverage 
domestically, since these meetings organised by President Mubarak tend to add to his 
own prestige. 
In conclusion, the League's summit, or the Intifada Summit, was held in Cairo in 
October 2000, followed it another Summit in Amman in March 2001. Then a Summit 
was held in Beirut in March 2002 from which many Arab Leaders were absent. Then 
the Sharm el-Sheik summit reinforced Arab states' need for Arabism. However, after 
the convening of the 2002 summit, Israel re-occupied the most of the West Bank and 
laid siege to Arafat in his compound in RamAllah. After convening the 2003 summit, to 
deter what the summit called "the aggression on Iraq", the war on Iraq started. Still, 
while the American troops were moving into Baghdad in April 2003, Arab foreign 
*^  Cited in Arabic News (on line), November 1, 2003 'Qaddafi: Arab League is useless; Arab leaders just 
talk to appease citizens about Arab unity, www.arabicnews.com. 
After Libya announced its withdrawal from the League, Amr Moussa, the Secretary General, 
announced his deep concern about Libya's decision. The Secretary announced that he, within hours, 
would head to Libya to discuss the issue with Qaddafi. However, the Libyan decision had been 
expected since the League's Summit in Beirut in March 2002, within which the Saudi Peace initiative 
was approved by Arab states, a matter which angered Libya as it considered it as ignoring its own 
peace initiative which it provided to Arab states during the previous Arab Summit which was held in 
Amman March 2001. Cited in Al Khaleej (UAE), issue no. 8559, October 25, 2002 
http://194.170.160.33/2002-10-25/f%2006.html. 
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ministers held an urgent meeting in Cairo to denounce the aggression. Arab states like 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar attended this meeting with American troops based on 
their lands. Moreover, Egypt, the organiser of the event, supplies these troops with 
access to the Gulf via the Suez Canal. The question, then, is why these states continue to 
hold the same form of summits and meetings. The answer lies in their need to 
demonstrate more Arabism in order to practice the state's form of static action. 
Another reason behind the convening of the summit and adherence to the Arab League 
is summarised by the saying that 'a drowning man will clutch at a straw'; within 
galvanisation inter-Arab conflicts and coalitions were reduced and the orientation of 
states' foreign policies was dictated by the fact that Arab system was ended. The 'gate' 
to the new ME system was opened when pan-Arabism ceased to be a constraint on Arab 
states to negotiate peace with Israel^* because Israeli occupation of the Palestinian land 
accompanied the entire process of inter-Arab relations and of Arab-non-Arab relations. 
Therefore, while the peace process was at its peak, a Middle East System could be 
spoken of as the dominating force that organises all foreign policies of almost all 
regional units involved in this endeavour. But as the American force in the region 
became more absolute and peripatetic, changing regimes by force, Arab states found 
themselves again in need of an institution within which they could at least seek 
institutional refuge. Arab states then found refuge in Arabism. Arabism, however, in 
this case constitutes nothing but a 'political refuge' in the face of their losing control 
over their actual static role in the region. 
The Middle Eastern System 
Hinnebusch's hypothesis that the Gulf War 1990-91 had shattered the Arab system and 
caused more foreign intervention in Arab states' affairs confirms the reasons behind the 
war on Iraq and also describes the circumstances within which the ME system is 
emerging. 
The consolidation of the Middle East system confirms the role of the United States in 
the region; the United States' might is not to play with, and the nature of the system 
evidences the power of the United States. The march of its troops into Baghdad 
Hinnebusch, 'The Middle East Regional System," in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A. (eds.), The 
Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2002. 
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demonstrated the nature of the international system and thus set the regional one in the 
light of that international system: what lies ahead for countries which have the temerity 
to take on the United States in a similar scenario. Thus, the newly emerging system in 
the region will encourage leaders to think twice before they do anything to upset 
Washington. It might not be done by military might, however—the United States has 
89 
many other potent weapons at its disposal. One of these potential Mittel (means), 
specifically in the ME, is its presence in the region and that is to say its galvanisation. 
Drysdale and Hinnebusch maintain that after the KC, the Middle East entered a period 
of fluidity and uncertainty, a time in which both opportunities and dangers multipHed. 
Now, after the war on Iraq, the regional order has become clearer as a consolidated 
system is emerging. The United States, like Arab states, behave within a system. The 
galvanisation of the region over a decade gave the United States a sense of foreign 
policy orientation and the war on Iraq was the sum of this orientation. 
What is clear about the system is that conflict is the mechanism by which to measure the 
degree of interactions in the region. Haas argues that a Regional system means the 
interdependency among composites where a change in one part affects the whole 
system.^" Indeed, the development on the fronts between the United States and Iraq has 
brought the system into ful l consolidation. The concept 'conflict' is a landmark of the 
ME and there are no considerable ambiguities surrounding the concept when it is 
connected to the ME. 
Underpinning the American policies and motivations in the region can be understood 
within the framework of the system, which means further conflicts are likely to be on 
the way. 'The talk is of using Iraq as a model for future operations to pre-empt security 
threats and to impose democracy and free market economics.'^' The former CIA 
director James Woolsey had bluntly told UCLA students that to reshape the ME, the 
United States would have to spend years and maybe decades. He identified the United 
States' enemies as the Islamist Shiites who run Iran, the Iranian supported Hezbollah, 
See Sunday Herald, April 13, 2003, www.sundyherald.com. 
Haas, E . , 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorising," 
in L . Lindberg & A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Search (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 8. 
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the fascist Baathists in Iraq and Syria, and the Islamist Sunnis who run al-Qaeda and 
affiliated terrorist groups.^ ^ 
The fall of Baghdad sent Shockwaves through the ME, where some of Iraq's neighbours 
fear that their regimes could be next.^^ Convinced that the United States wants to 
reshape the ME and gain control of the region's oil reserves, many Iranians felt that they 
are slowly being encircled.^'* 'Iran feels it is going to be strangled gradually by the 
United States; yesterday it was Afghanistan, now it is another regime like that in 
Baghdad... the whole scenario is moving to strangle Iran.'^^ 
Syria is a case in point. Dowd expresses it thus: 'as U.S. forces made their first 
armoured thrust into Baghdad, visions of a strike on Damascus danced in the hawk's 
heads [in the Bush administration].'^^ John Bolton, the US under-Secretary of State, 
added his voice to a chorus of warnings from the hawks against states in the ME. He 
said, " I think Syria is a good case where I hope they will conclude that the chemical 
weapons programme and the biological weapons programme they have been pursuing 
are things they should give up."^^ 
As part of the framework within which war against Iraq was waged is the war on 
terrorism. The undertaking (the war on Iraq) dovetails conveniently with the 'phases' of 
what President Bush calls the 'war on terror' and his pledge to go after all countries 
(JO 
accused of harbouring terrorists. Hawks in and close to the Bush White House have 
prepared the ground for an attack on Syria, raising the spectre of Hezbollah, of alleged 
Syrian plans to welcome refugees from Saddam Hussein's fallen regime, and of what 
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the administration insists is Syrian support for Iraq during the war.^^ Furthermore, 
Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated that 'the Syrians have been shipping 
killers into Iraq to try and kill Americans... we need to think about what our policy is 
towards a country that harbours terrorists or harbours war criminals.' He adds, 'there 
will have to be change in Syria.' 
Saudi Arabia's role in the system is conflictual in nature because since most of those 
who attacked New York and Washington in 9/11 were Saudis, one can speak in terms of 
the Saudi state's fear of its own people. In the scenario of new such acts being 
undertaken by more Saudis, Saudi Arabia would be the recipient of further 
condemnation from the United States.Furthermore, the monarchy is concerned about 
a declared American aim to spread democracy through the region, which worries the 
Saudi regime. It is worried about the prospect of Shia'a Muslim leadership taking 
control in Baghdad, challenging the Sunni Muslim domination throughout the Arab 
world. 
Within the dominant conflictual environment surfacing in the region, Arab states 
became less concerned about how much peace could be achieved in the region, but 
about how much conflict could be managed or saved. The focus on terrorism in the 
region, mounted by the war on Iraq, has reduced and averted the interest in peace. 
Within Arab calls for peace lies their call for avoiding more conflict. 
Amr Moussa, the chief of the Arab League, after the fall of Baghdad, called for an 
international conference on how to preserve world peace and security in the post-Iraq-
war era. He stated that "international and regional security cannot and should not be left 
" Ibid. 
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to be defined by one state alone or even a group of states away from the United 
Nations."'"'' He also stated that "we cannot accept that the council be held in contempt. 
We cannot accept that its role be confined to repairing the damage of war, thus reducing 
it to an executing arm of policies which it had not designed...'"'^Foreign occupation, 
[indicating the United States in Iraq] no matter in what cloak, will sooner or later lead to 
a revolution that will haunt i t . . . people are enraged and infuriated."''^^ 
However, Moussa's Arab League, as an institution, came to operate outside the system 
boundaries, consequently envisioning the system of peace and security by Moussa still 
based on the dynamics of pre-war rhetoric, mainly, "the decline of the hegemonic state 
or its withdrawal from global affairs is seen as likely to lead to disorder and chaos."'"^ 
Within the disorder in the ME lies the order: i f conflict is to be considered as disorder, it 
is still forms the order, i . e. the system on which structure states operate. It is notable 
that in a system which is not demarcated by democratic Rahmen (framework), the lack 
of war over time reduces the importance, the demarcation, and the actual sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the state. In some regions where states are not fully integrated 
within an overall democratic system, states need war to still play a role in regional 
politics because war in this case represents an institution-like environment within which 
states seek self-confirmation. That shows how in the ME war is still necessary for states 
to actually survive. Before the KC, it was the traditional conflict between Israel and the 
Arabs, and after it the crisis came to be one taking place amongst Arab states. The 
United States entering the circle of conflict makes it the overall Rahmen for regional 
settings. Therefore, a 'balance of power' must emerge because 'balancing power 
preserves the system but does not necessarily keep the peace.'*°^ 
The balance exists in the 'spinal cord' of the system. It was mentioned above that the 
American presence in the region was many times attacked in the region and the biggest 
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attack was of 9/11. Within the war on terrorism lies the balance: the more the United 
States gets involved in the region, the more it puts groups like al-Qaeda at the centre of 
the existing system. Therefore, such groups, although without static basis, represent a 
power, and then a force, as force is considered as a means of consolidating the system. 
Subsequently, this group can be treated as a unit in the system. What is remarkable then 
is regional cohesion: as force is the overall mechanism with which to preserve the 
system, no one then is better than the other. There is force applied against the 
Palestinians, Palestinian suicide bombers use force against Israelis, the United States 
uses force to guard its interest in the region and the al-Qaeda, for example, uses force 
against the United States for its siding with Israel and for 'occupying Arab and Islamic 
land'. 
It is then, as Neo-Realism puts it, the structure of the system which determines the 
systemic interactions in the region and thus labels the emerging regional system as the 
Middle East System. That means that the regional order is represented by the system 
and the system represents the regional order. Waltz has argued that 
Each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its 
own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very 
presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.'"^ 
What applies here is the argument of Tibi in which he maintains that inter-Arab states' 
relations are based on their individual existence as states, not based on their belonging 
to Arabism."'^ Astonishingly, there is a fundamental difference between politics within 
each Arab state and politics of these states in the system: within each Arab state, politics 
tend to be Arab. This says that Arab states hold summits, for example, to denounce the 
Israeli aggression against the Palestinians and also to call for a stop to the aggression on 
Iraq. These are politics within the states, but those within the system are of full 
cooperation with the United States in facilitating the war on Iraq. For example, Egypt 
allows American warships to pass through the Suez Canal, Saudi Arabia allows the 
presence of American troops and logistics on its soil and at the same time call for a halt 
to the aggression on Iraq...etc.'"* 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 60-61. 
See Tibi, War and Conflict in the ME, 1998. 
These two examples are mentioned above. 
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This confirms the Neo-Realist vision of system building: the structure of the system and 
the set of interactions determine the system, not the internal politics within the state.'" 
The first character of the structure is the ordering principles; Arab states exist in an 
anarchic system where, for example, there is no longer a room for Arab Wisayah 
(guardianship) and Arab Muzayadah (outbidding). Egypt could no longer consider itself 
as the 'mother of the Arabs'. Egypt, for example, did little for the Arab cause and was 
the first state to make a peace-deal with Israel while Israel was still occupying other 
Arab lands.Therefore, Egypt is no longer able to play a hegemonic role in the Arab 
world. The only heritage Egypt has from the era of Arabism being 'em MitteV (a mean) 
to shape inter-states' conflicts and relations in the Arab world is that the Arab League 
headquarters are still in Cairo, the secretary of the League is Egyptian. These factors for 
Egypt serve merely for prestigious purposes. The main issue however is that the 
ordering principle of the structure is the state of anarchy which is essentially a self-help 
one. 
Furthermore, structural realists argue that changes in perceived status will lead to 
change in role"^definition."'* Roles define interests."^ To behave logically, based on 
the degree of their power, states seek to help themselves by improving their role 
'foundations' on regional and world power structures. That is because 'in the 
international system, there is a competition dominated by the self-help mechanism. Self 
See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979 especially page 80 where Waltz is quoting Meyer 
Fortes describing the concept structure. 
Louis Cantori expresses it thus: "The Arabism of Egypt's assumed leadership role in the past has 
now been transformed from a political ideology into a meaningful cultural identity. As a 
consequence, Egypt's ability, as recently as perhaps the Arab alliance of 1990-9L to be the Arab 
leader and also to be the interlocutor between the U.S. and Arab states is now significantly ended. 
Egypt's present and future diplomatic role is likely to be based on its geopolitical position, the size 
of its population, its military capabilities, its economic strength, and its continued leadership of Arab 
culture - all of which are conventional factors of international power." See Louis Cantori in Robert 
Freedman, The Middle East and the Peace Process, p. 158. 
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According to Holsti, ' "Roles" refer to the 'policymakers own definitions of the general kinds of 
decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their states, and of the functions, if any, their 
states should perform on a continuing basis in the international system', cited in Le Prestre, P., G., 
"Defining Foreign Policy Roles," in, Le Prestre, Ph., G. (ed.), Role Quests in the Post-Cold War 
Era: Foreign Policies in Transition (London, Montreal, McGill University Press 1997), p. 4. 
Le Prestre, P., G., 'The United States: An Elusive Role Quest after the Cold War', in Le Prestre P. 
(ed.). Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition, (London, Montreal, 
McGill University Press 1997), p. 67. 
Ibid., p. 66. 
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help is taken for granted as every state is responsible for its own security and economic 
welfare.'"^ However, the nature of the international system determines the basic foreign 
policy orientations of any particular state, and, as Morgenthau holds, whether a state 
follows a policy of status quo, imperialism, or prestige depends on its location in the 
international power structure."^ 
Therefore, the nature of the system dominated what one state could or could not do to 
another. Egypt could no longer for example dictate to any Arab state what to do 
regarding Arab issues. In other words, there wil l no longer be a space for leaders like 
Nasser or Saddam Hussein in the newly emerged system. Arabism does not govern 
inter-state relations, but a system of survival which determines the behaviour of states. 
It was legitimate, based on the dynamics of the system, for Kuwait to ally with the 
United States in order to topple Saddam Hussein's regime because Kuwaitis still had 
fears that Saddam would repeat the same form of aggression against their country. 
The second characteristic simply refers to the functions that are performed by the units 
in the system. The units in the system are states and all states have to carry out the same 
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functions. However, Waltz explicitly concludes that states are not, and have never 
been, the only actors. They have, however, been the most important ones. Crucially, all 
states possess the attribute that is axiomatically linked to the anarchical structure of the 
system - namely, sovereignty."^ The states in the ME are the main actors, while al-
Qaeda network, for example, after the huge impact it left on the American foreign 
policy in the region, can be added to the list. The sovereignty of al-Qaeda is represented 
by its borders which are also mainly the ME region; the war in terror concentrates 
mainly on the Arab ME from where al-Qaeda's leader, Osama Bin Laden, and its most 
members stem. However, treating al-Qaeda as a body of force left it forceful. That 
means that the United States' exercising of a huge amount of effort to fight al-Qaeda 
gives it the status of being strong enough to undermine the United States' might. It must 
thus be treated as the last member of the ME system. 
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See Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, 1979. 
See Hollis M., & Smith S., Explaining and Understanding International Relations (London: 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), p. 97. 
See Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
Ibid., p. 109. 
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The third characteristic of the structure is the distribution of capabilities among the units 
that comprise the system. We do not look at the ideologies or beliefs of leaders, but to 
their power situation. Indeed, this is the case of the ME system: relations between units 
are not based on leaders' beliefs but on the clear capabilities of the states in the system. 
That is why al-Qaeda, for example, constituted a capability in the actions of its leaders 
and members, like their attack on the United States on 9/11, which however has made 
the difference in treating beliefs as force. 
The emergent ME system is highly characterised by the structure on which the units 
conduct their behaviour. Self-help is the main mechanism by which to read into the 
politics of regional units. The regional order has become complete since force became 
the common denominator that makes the change in the region. 
Summary 
It has been argued throughout this chapter that there has been no Arab system that 
governs inter-Arab relations since the Kuwait Crisis. The Arab system was broken up 
by the crisis and Arab states entered the orbit of galvanisation by the United States. 
Throughout the 1990s and beyond, Arab states faced a new form of security dilemma: 
the pressure put on them by the heritage of the crisis made them feel insecure within the 
changes that took place. Iraq remained marginalised until its regime was toppled by 
force. The peace process did not bring the hoped-for results which could have brought 
stability to the region. Therefore, more pressure mounted on Arab states as these states 
lost their regional role. 
Their role became irrelevant even when 'Arab' issues were at stake, such as the 
Palestinian problem. However, with the diminishing of the Arab system, and with the 
consolidation of a wider Middle Eastern one, Arab states started functioning within this 
orbit. This made Arab issues like that of Iraqi people and the Palestinian people more of 
a wider regional issue rather than a specific Arab one. 
This means that the faith of the leaders of al-Qaeda—Islam - has become a 'force'. Those who sat in 
an aeroplane and killed themselves for a cause did not do that for an economic profit; by killing 
themselves, they have shown that belief can be treated as a force. 
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The war on Iraq helped to bring the ME system into full consolidation. This system, 
however, is characterised by the continuous use of force. Therefore, further political 
order in the region could no longer be managed without the use of force. Finally, all 
political events and changes in the region, especially those concerning Arab states, 
could no longer be conducted out of the bounds of the new system of which the United 
States and Israel constitute a main part. Therefore, future conflicts will be the main 
Mittel (mean) to keep this system further operating. 
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CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
A study of the international relations of the Arab states requires a consideration not only 
of their behaviour as independent actors but also of their continuous group dynamics, 
and multilateral interactions which are shaped by both their conmion Arab identity and 
their distinct interests.' The concept 'system' therefore is essential for explaining the 
international behaviour of Arab states as a group and also as separate actors. 
However, the concept 'order' has been central to this study in which it is identified as 
the main orbit within which Arab states in the Middle East function. It is also critical for 
comprehending the theoretical 'path' leading to the understanding of the system. An 
existing order does not mean necessary that a system exits. There is an Arab order but 
there is no Arab system. The definition of the 'order' and the 'system' has therefore 
constituted the cornerstone of my study. 
The end of the Cold War marks the end of the inter-state conflict that has dominated the 
world since 1945 and of the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation.^ This change had 
affected the international system which was changed from being bipolar to unipolar: the 
United States emerged as the sole superpower on the world stage. Therefore, the 
dominant discourse since then has been decisively about the rise of a new world order 
under the aegis of the United States. 
Thus, a new concept emerged, which has imprinted world politics since the end of the 
Cold War—that of 'The New Worid Order'. The 'New World Order' was defined in 
' Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, p. 9. 
^ Halliday, F. , "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical 
Conclusions," in K. Booth, & S. Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, 1997, p. 41. 
174 
this study as an outcome of the change in the Balance of Power. Therefore, this study 
continued to consider the balance of power as an orbit within which power politics 
operate: the United States' new position in world politics became the overall referential 
focal point of the discussion of the new 'order'.^ This is based on the assumption that 
the United States retained its 'power', with its powerful position in the World System.'^  
Regarding the Middle East, the concept 'New World Order' emerged during the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. The concept heralded a new era of the Middle East where the 
political life of the region became hostage to the connotations of this new concept.^ In 
this context, unipolarity became the political pattern for Arab states to deal with. 
Throughout this study, the American role in the region after 1990 has been presented as 
a 'galvanisor'. This concept referred to the outcome of the political relationship between 
the United States and Arab states. 'Galvanisation' was defined as Arab states being 
coated within the American powerful presence in the region. Foreign policy of Arab 
states could not overlook the American strong hand in the region. Therefore, i f the 
inputs of Arab politics have remained 'Arab', the outputs did not necessarily remain so. 
In other words, the ultimate decisions taken by Arab states had to take note of the 
American presence and interests in the region. 
Subsequently, the Arab system was re-examined on the basis of regional mechanisms. 
But from 1945-1990, an Arab system did exist, which was characterised by the 
domination of pan-Arabism in the making of Arab politics. 
The Arab System 1945-90 
The period from 1945-90 was marked by intensive Arab interactions driven mainly by 
pan-Arabism. It has been identified in this study as follows. There is a circular logic in 
inter-Arab relations: in the period from 1945-90 the more Arab states interacted - and 
their interactions were mainly based on their Arabism - the more they conflicted with 
^ See Ikenberry, J., After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
See Ikenberry, J., After Victory, 2001, particularly pages 215-256. 
^ See Snow, D., Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
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each other. That means, there were certain irreconcilable matters across Arab states and 
these were mainly the domination of their identity upon their politics. The source of 
political interaction is their Arab identity and the source of their conflict was that of 
their Arabness. 
Put in other words, the Arab League was established as an institution of Arab states to 
make collective Arab policies. But the League became the ground for Arab rivalry. Ken-
observed that the simple definition of an Arab Cold War was the Arab rivalry in the 
Arab League, the symbol of Arab system. This was also the forum in which inter-Arab 
battles of the Arab Cold War were fought.^ 
The issue of Palestine was the hub of Arab interactions. Pan-Arabism was the drive 
behind Arab states' foreign policy towards this issue. Kerr describes Arab states' 
policies toward the issue of Palestine as serving their own interests. He maintains that 
Arab rulers used the Arab-Israeli conflict as a stick with which to beat one another.^ 
Hence it would be misleading to argue that the Palestine cause united the Arab states 
when they were divided on all else. As Kerr asserts: 
It would be more accurate to say that when the Arabs are in a mood to 
co-operate, this tends to find expression in an agreement to avoid 
action on Palestine, but that when they choose to quarrel, Palestine 
policy really becomes a subject of dispute.^  
Pan-Arabism was dominated by the wave of Nasserism until the 1967 war.^ But 
Nasserism was a devastating movement in the modem history of Arab states and the 
military outcome of the 1967 war still dictates Arab-Israeli regional conflict. 10 
* See Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasser and His Rivals. 1958-1970, 3'" ed., (New 
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasser and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3"* ed., (New 
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p 61. Cited in Gerges, The Superpowers and the 
Middle East, ^ 11. 
* Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1971, p. 114, as cited in Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p 
11. 
' Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, p. 41, This quote is repeated, it was quoted in 
chapter two of this study footnotes 20 and 21. 
'* Including the issue of east Jerusalem, which was occupied by Israel during that war. 
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The Arab system in this period was dominated by its structure, which was mainly the 
consolidation of the state's features. Arab states competed for regional hegemony. But 
with the existence of Israel in the region, they tended to share the same burden, which 
brought them always together to make collective Arab policies regarding the issue of 
Palestine. This pattern, however, ended when Egypt signed its separate peace-deal with 
Israel in 1979 and was consequently excluded from the Arab system until 1988. 
Arab states, however, were incapable of either liberating Palestine or admitting to their 
powerlessness so that they could dare to adopt a peaceful strategy. Their divisions and 
jealousies made secret and separate diplomacy the only practical option for an Arab-
Israeli dialogue." Therefore, when the peace process started in 1991, the ground for 
"talks" between the Arab states and Israel was already asphalted. 
The Kuwait Crisis 1990-91 
The Kuwait Crisis started with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. It was a 
turning point in which a new dimension to the meaning of conflict was added. First of 
all, the 'concept' of conflict before the crisis, apart from the Iran-Iraq war 1980-88, used 
to indicate the Arab-Israeli conflict. The invasion of Kuwait oscillated the concept and 
made its application differ. It also became an indicator of an inter-Arab conflict. The 
'personality' of the crisis was that it was an Arab crisis in as much as it left a negative 
impact on the Arab states. 
It was argued in this study that the crisis did not create a new Arab order. It further 
fragmented the Arabs, which meant that it had reinforced an already existing pattern of 
inter-Arab politics. However, it had an impact on the very use of the concept Arabism. 
Furthermore, the crisis revealed a deficit in Arab military power and in Arab diplomatic 
assets. Neither militarily nor diplomatically were Arab states able to solve the problem 
within the 'Arab house'. Consequently, foreign forces were invited to do the job. The 
United States, along with a broad coalition, ousted Iraq from Kuwait with costly 
consequences for all Arab states in the region. 
" Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, p. 51. 
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The presence of foreign forces in the region since the crisis undermined, or made it 
unnecessary, for inter-Arab security co-operation. The existence of the Damascus 
Declaration as a 'paper agreement' substantiated the degree of Arab fear from each 
other. Arab states, particularly the Gulf Arab States, felt that a protective U.S. military 
umbrella was an absolute necessity for deterring any future aggression from any Arab 
state.'^ 
The American presence in the region, termed in this study as 'galvanisation', quickly 
developed into an institutional point of reference. The weakness of institutions, such as 
the Arab League, to act as an umbrella for collective Arab politics made Arab states 
more vulnerable to American power. Therefore, Arab states lost their regional 
orientation. They lost their manoeuvring space and therefore lost a central part of their 
legitimacy. It has, therefore, been argued in this study that the Arab system was ended 
by the Kuwait Crisis and was replaced by a wider Middle East regional system. 
The marginalisation of Iraq, the peace process and the al-Aqsa Intifada are issues that 
demonstrate the regional setting since 1990 and factors that helped the consolidation of 
the new regional system. 
Arab Politics Since 1990 
Two parallel issues have dominated politics of the Arab states since 1990: the 
marginalisation of Iraq, and the peace process. The marginalisation of Iraq was 
economic and political on regional and international levels. Economically, sanctions 
were imposed on Iraq which required all UN member states to prevent any trade of 
financial dealing with Iraq.'^ Politically, Iraq was marginalised, and effectively, its 
regional role was dramatically declined.''* 
Muslih, M., "Palestinian and Other Arab Perspectives on the Peace Process", in R. Freedman (ed.). 
The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords, 1998), p. 83. 
Niblock, T., Pariah States & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Boulder, London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 99. 
" See Marr, P., "Iraq after the Gulf War," in R. Freedman (ed.), The Middle East and the Peace Process: 
The Impact of the Oslo Accords, 1998), p. 213. 
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The survival of Saddam Hussein in power after the crisis affected the outcome and 
furthered the impact of the crisis on inter-Arab relations. Saddam was considered as a 
symbol of aggression, and hence, a threat to his neighbours. 
However, it was clear after the war 1991 ended that the future of Iraq was to be in 
American hands. The severe impact of the economic sanctions on Iraq had taken a toll 
on the regime's support base.'^  Therefore, the rapid success of the Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003 was mainly because of the weaknesses of the Iraqi political and 
military infrastructures. 
In conclusion, Iraq's marginalisation since 1990 did not paralyse a 'given' Arab 
consensus because there was none. The absence of Iraq, however, profited non-Arab 
countries like Israel, since with the elimination of the Iraqi power, Israel was rid of one 
of its strong opponents. Therefore, a space for the peace process was already being 
created. 
The peace process started with the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. The 
entire politics of the region revolved around this concept almost throughout the 1990s. 
The peace process provided the first signs of a new Middle Eastern order. The bilateral 
talks between Israel and each of the Arab parties had shown that Arab states were 
veering towards self-help mechanisms rather than 'gunoming' in the 'Arab house'. 
Making separate peace-deals with Israel demonstrated the decline of the Palestinian 
issue in inter-Arab relations. The declining commitment of Arab states to the Palestine 
conflict was, for the most part shaped by regional rather than global processes. Still, the 
end of the Cold War was crucial in paving the road to the Madrid peace conference, 
which sanctioned the principle of bilateral talks between Israel and each of the Arab 
parties, including a Palestinian presence. This procedure restricted the possibility of 
cross-Arab interference in each other's negotiations. Unlike the post-1973 peace 
process, the Madrid negotiations were marked by meagre involvement of the Arab 
League or the summit conference and a near-absence of any inter-Arab political 
struggle. In fact, the Palestine conflict returned to its original dimension, involving the 
Ibid., p. 225. 
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immediate neighbouring Arab states and the PLO, with minimum mutual intervention— 
even on Syria's part—in each other's affairs.'^ 
Inter-Arab pohtics was put to the test when the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out in September 
2000. Initially, the success of reaching the negotiation table affirmed the triumph of the 
state in Middle East politics. The state was the viable actor to do the 'job'; therefore, the 
outcomes of the peace process - negative of course - were bad for the state. The al-
Aqsa Intifada confirmed that the peace process initiation was, as mentioned above, 
governed by regional dynamics rather than international ones. These dynamics were 
mainly an outcome of the new balance of power mechanism in the region. It is as Ajami 
put it, 
the gradual evolution of Arab states' policies in favour of a 
contractual peace with Israel did not grow out of a feeling of national 
pride or collective cohesiveness. Rather it took place in an atmosphere 
of overall weakness, fragmentation and inferiority vis-a-vis Israeli and 
American power, which seemed able to impose a political settlement 
based on what for the Arab world was an unfavourable balance of 
power. 
So, the circle of politics in the region flows back in power mechanisms: only the 
powerful actor can enforce his politics. Therefore, the behaviour of Arab states, which 
became based on Realpolitik, was governed by self-interest, which in this case meant to 
make peace-deals with Israel. Israel's power superiority, backed by the United States, 
dictates the terms of peace. 
The consequences of the al-Aqsa Intifada were severe for the Palestinians; the Israeli 
leadership had condemned Yasser Arafat to the dustbin of history and had moved the 
Israeli army into Palestinian towns and territories.'^ Israel also remained unprepared to 
offer any insights into its long-term thinking about the Israeli-Palestinian relations and 
the final status talks with the Palestinians.'^ Despite conceding that there may emerge a 
" Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, p. 350. 
" Cited in Weitzman, B. M., The Inter-Arab System and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Ripening for 
Resolution, Perceptions, March-May 2000, Vol. V, no 1. www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/perceptA^-
lweitzman.htm. See also Ajami, F. The Dream Palace of the Arabs, (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1998). 
" Ehteshami, A., Palestine and the Arab World, Record of World Events, Keesing's, vol. 4, 2001. 
Ibid. 
180 
Palestinian state 'sometime in the future', Prime Minister Sharon gave no signs that his 
government was in fact moving in that direction. 
Yet, Arab states, militarily, were unable to help the Palestinians. They then held an Arab 
League Summit in Beirut in March 2002. During this Summit, a Saudi initiative was 
brought forward offering Israel full normalisation of relations with Arab countries in 
return of an Israeli full withdrawal from Arab lands. Israel rejected the initiative and its 
rejection was another setback for Arab collective action. 
However, the Palestinian conflict played an essential role in the emergence of the Arab 
system.^' The conflict also played a role in the emergence of the Middle East system. 
The decline of the conflict as a central affair in Arab politics gave way to the rise of a 
wider Middle Eastern political thought which ultimately helps the consolidating of the 
new Middle East system. 
The New Middle East System 
Since 1990 Arab states have shifted their politics from the language of qawmiyaa 
(Arab-national identity) to wataniyya (Arab state-national identity). Realpolitik is the 
most operative term to describe the shift. The structure on which Arab politics was 
made had changed. Arab states became constrained by the structure of the new 
emerging Middle East system, which accelerated the diminishing of the Arab system.^ ^ 
Self-help was das Mittel (the means) used to uphold the state. The norms, rules, and 
potential of pan-Arabism were no longer relevant because the American presence in the 
region whose dominating "force" changed the shape of the regional order. The 
American 'power' became the 'norm' which now determines the status quo in the 
region. Only absolute American power determines the form of the system. Therefore, 
Arab states, while aware of this fact, had not much choice but to ally with the United 
States. 
^ Ibid. 
" Quoted in Sela, A., The Decline of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1998, p. 15. 
Ehteshami, A., & R. Hinnebusch, "Conclusion: Patterns of Policy," in Hinnebusch & Ehteshami (eds.), 
The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States, 2002, p. 339. 
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By seeking alliances with the United States, Arab states started behaving in a realistic 
manner. They could not challenge the power of this 'giant'; therefore, allying with it 
would be a safe haven. In this case, the security of Arab states became strongly bound to 
that of the United States. The American agenda in the region created a coercive rather 
than diplomatic environment for executing its policies. The American agenda in the 
region has been described by Robert Pelletreau, the assistant secretary of state for Near 
Eastern affairs in this way: 
The prism through which we assess trends and conditions in the 
Middle East is the protection and advancement of U.S. interests. 
These are, briefly: a just and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours, Israel's security and wellbeing, a security framework in 
the Gulf that assures access to its energy resources upon which we and 
other industrial nations continue to be dependent, non-propitiation of 
weapons of mass destruction, control of destabilising arms transfer, 
promotion of political participation, and respect for basic human 
rights, ending state-supported and other forms of terrorism, promotion 
of economic and social development of American business and 
investment opportunities.^ ^ 
For the US to perform this long list, it had to rely on the use of force. US-Arab states' 
relations became dominated by a coercive environment. Security dilemma results from 
interactions between states.Interactions across Arab states became locked within the 
domination of the American power thus Arab states 'new' concerns became how to 
appease the United States. The United States' regional powerful presence allowed it to 
play the role of a regional unit. Therefore, interactions between Arab states and the 
United States became based on this mechanism. 
The events of 9/11 further complicated the security dilemma of Arab states; the attacks 
reinforced the newly emerging system in the ME. The United States' security 'in the 
region' results from its interactions with regional units. The events of 9/11 diverted 
most of the foreign policy capacities of Arab states into fighting the war on terrorism. 
However, their dilemma then became to provide the US with satisfactory results, which 
in turn means that Arab states had to 'step on the toes' of many existing groupings and 
forces in the region. Osama Bin Laden made the ousting of American troops from Saudi 
Arabia his battle cry. He said there was 'no more important duty' than to do so. Yet, 
" Middle East Policy (MEP) 3, no. 2, 1994, p. 1. 
^ Walz, Theory of International Politics, 1979. 
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Osama bin Laden's call to fight the Americans had empowered many people, and at the 
same time had undermined the authority of the Arab state in that bin Laden was seen as 
a defender of the Arab and Muslim rights. 
However, the showdown between the United States and Iraq demonstrated the extent of 
the American 'force' since the ousting of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The continuous 
marginalisation of Iraq was a reminder to regional actors of toying with Washington. 
The American presence in the region was taking shape. Over the years from 1990 to 
2003, American presence was oriented and then shifted from the doctrine of 
containment to that of pre-emption. What boosted that presence is the success of 
continuous use of force. However, the main characteristic of the Middle East system is 
that power and thus the use of 'force' is the determinant factor in shaping politics within 
the system. Remarkably, the system emerged as a result of the use of 'force'. Iraq 
invaded Kuwait and was ousted from Kuwait by the use of force. Sanctions were 
imposed on Iraq by force, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and Arab land 
remained by the implication of force. More importantly, the United States' force 
remained in its presence in the region, something which had influenced the making of 
the system by bringing it to full consolidation— also by force— and culminating in the 
Operation Iraq Freedom in March-April 200, which is merely a use of force. 
This study concludes that Operation Iraqi Freedom has shifted the balance of power 
further against the Arabs and consequently marginalised them in the system. Syria is a 
case in point; for the United States, there might be no need to 'hit' Syria in order to 
bring change in the Syrian stance toward regional issues such as the war on Iraq and the 
Palestine conflict. The 'force' which the United States used against Iraq is still present 
in the region. That means the U.S. force has been - and continues to be - clearly 
demonstrated. Therefore, the shifting of the United States troops from Saudi soil to 
Qatar has no effect on the status quo; the American forceful presence in the region 
could not be overlooked no matter where the American troops are stationed in the 
region. 
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The use of force generates a 'political rhythm' which could allow space for non-state 
regional groups to play the role that forms the opposition to the United States. Al-Qaeda 
is a case in point; this organisation was the last member to be included in the emerged 
system. The similarity between al-Qaeda and the United States is that they both 
'believe' in and 'use' force as a means to an end. Thus, because the 'system' is not built 
on moral beliefs, but on self-help and a structure, the United States protects its own 
interests by the use of force, and al-Qaeda opposes the United States by the same 
means. 
Thus, the relationship between the United States and Arab states became governed by 
mistrust as the United States started calling for broad changes in the region, chief of 
which was regime change. Therefore, mistrust and the continuous use of force continue 
to plague Middle Eastern countries, which serve partly to explain the predominance and 
resilience of Realist notions of inter-state behaviour. Rivalry, hostility, antagonism, and 
a host of geopolitical disputes characterise state relations - not co-operation and 
harmony.^^ 
Finally, the failure of regional institutions, multilateral or bilateral alliances, and of the 
regional power balance to give local security to states, brutally exposed by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, opened the door to acceptance of a heightened role for the non-
Arab periphery states and for the U.S. hegemon in the region.^^ The overall political 
order that governed the behaviour of Arab states in the region since the crisis is mainly 
its regional outcomes; the crisis freed Arab regimes from Pan-Arab constraints and 
enabled them to pursue their own state interests, and it opened the way for dialogue 
between the main parties who still engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict .However, 
Arab states, in seeking self interest, were faced with the new realities of the dominating 
system. 
Sasley, B., Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign policy, Middle East Review of International 
Affairs, (MERIA) vol. 6, no. 1. March 2002, www.meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/2002/issuel/jv6nla3.htm. 
*^ El-Shazli N., & R. Hinnebusch, 'The Challenge of Security in the Post-Gulf War Middle East 
System," in Hinnebusch & Ehteshami (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States, 2002, p. 
86. 
^ Ehteshami, A., & R. Hinnebusch, "Conclusion: Patterns of Policy," in Hinnebusch & Ehteshami (eds.). 
The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States, 2002, p. 339. 
184 
The region was no longer mainly characterised by Arab states being central in the 
system. They became peripheral in the newly emerged system where Israel backed by 
the United States took the central role. The Neo-Realist model illustrates this: seeking 
self-interest by one state generates insecurity for other states in the system. Thus states 
must rely on power in order to further their own interests and to protect these from the 
intentions and actions of other states. It is thus, the power of the United States and of 
Israel which determines the making of the system. But also the power of the al-Qaeda 
organisation which create a new impact on the making of politics in the region in which 
it create panicky and nervous American politics in the region. 
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